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disclaim and repudiate any alleged condition of American citizenship acquired by her marriage.

Her Majesty's counsel cited the case of Kelly vs. Owen, (7 Wall., 496.) On the part of the United States it was contended that, under the principles recognized by the commission in the cases of Mrs. Calderwood, No. 360, and others, it was settled that the national character of a married woman was in all cases determined by that of her husband; and that such national character, once acquired by marriage, continued on the death of the husband. That this doctrine had always prevailed in Great Britain, as well as elsewhere, where the domicile of the wife and widow had continued to be that of the husband's nationality; and that by no treaty stipulation or law, municipal or international, was the widow ever allowed to reclaim her original nationality while still domiciled within the nationality of her husband, until the conventions of 1870 and 1871; and that by those conventions she could only reclaim her original nationality in the form provided by the convention of 1871, which in the case of Mrs. Brand had never been done. That she was, therefore, both at the time of the commission of the alleged wrongs and at the time of the presentation of her memorial, a citizen of the United States.

The commission unanimously sustained the doctrine maintained on behalf of the United States, and dismissed the claim for want of jurisdiction.

2. In the cases of James B. Halley, administrator, &c., vs. The United States, No. 205, Ann Grayson, administratrix, &c., vs. same, No. 291, and others, the question was raised as to the jurisdiction of the commission in the case of the personal representatives of British subjects who had died holding claims within the treaty against the United States, where such personal representatives were citizens of the United States.

On the part of the United States it was claimed that under the treaty the claims against the United States of which the commission had jurisdiction must be not only those arising out of acts committed against the person or property of British subjects, but also must be prosecuted before the commission on behalf of British subjects; and that where the claim, though originally one of a British subject, had been transferred by act of the original claimant or by operation of law to citizens of the United States, such citizens could have no standing before the commission.

In the case of Mrs. Grayson, No. 291, the claim was prosecuted by her as administratrix of John J. Cowley, a deceased British subject. The claimant was the widow of Cowley, but had, before presenting her claim, intermarried with Grayson, a citizen of the United States. The distributees of Cowley's estate were the widow and certain brothers and sisters, all British subjects and domiciled within the British dominions. An award was made in favor of the claimant for the one-half of

the claim to which the distributees were entitled, rejecting the one-half belonging to the widow as the claim of an American citizen.

In the case of Halley and other cases submitted with it the following decision was entered:

The majority of the commissioners are of opinion that, where the claim is by an administrator in respect of injuries to property of an intestate who was exclusively a British subject, and the beneficiaries are British subjects as well as American citizens, the claim may be prosecuted for their benefit. The commissioners are all of opinion that the particular nationality of the administrator does not affect the question.

From the first portion of this decision Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissented, as follows:

By the very words of the treaty (Article 12) the claim must be, first, for an act done to the "person or property of” a British subject; second, it must be made "on the part of" a British subject. Distinctly, then, these two things must concur to give us jurisdiction. This is too plain to admit of controversy. The treaty is the language of both governments, and must be construed to effectuate not the intent of one only, but of both. If any of its terms have one sense in Great Britain and another in the United States by reason of their respective laws, neither of these senses can fairly be taken; another, though limited, sense must he sought, common to both countries. There is such a restricted sense of the language employed here. In Alexander's case I expressed myself on this branch of the present question. One born in the United States of British parents residing here would be protected by the United States as fully as any American against wrongs from other countries, Great Britain probably not excepted. And Great Britain would not, as against the United States, intervene in his behalf, though she would claim him as her subject, and hold him to accountability as such if found bearing arms against her. And if born here of British parents during a temporary sojourn, but afterwards domiciled in England and never residing here, the United States would practically treat him as not an American, refusing to intervene in his behalf against any other government, though she, too, would hold him to accountability as a citizen if found in arms against her. And so of persons born in Great Britain of American parents. The treaty is the product of diplomacy, providing this international tribunal for the amicable settlement of claims concerning which each power could lawfully claim redress as it saw fit, not of claims for which it would have no right to claim redress.

Alexander's case was a little different. He had estates and a domicile in both countries; was born in the United States of British parents domiciled here, but claiming only British nationality. This would be an interpretation of the treaty which would maintain our jurisdiction in all cases in which the complaining government would, by international law, have been at liberty to demand redress. It would settle all such cases, and thus effectuate the purpose of the treaty which was to terminate our diplomatic differences. The principles above stated, it seems to me, apply quite as fully where the person beneficially interested in the claim made before us is of both nationalities as where the person originally injured, being also of both nationalities, is still living and makes claim. To entertain the claim in either case is to assume that each government has by the treaty recognized its responsibility to the other for injuries done to those who are by its laws its own citizens or subjects. This construction, it seems to me, is utterly inadmissible. I cannot possibly bring myself to believe that either government intended any such thing.


Numerous questions in this regard arose during the progress of the commission, but they are so intimately connected with the merits of the cases themselves that they will be treated of under the separate cases as they may be hereafter considered.


The commission ordinarily allowed interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from the date of the injury to the anticipated date of the final award.


Saint Albans raid.

The First National Bank of Saint Albans vs. Great Britain, No. 1.
Collins H. Huntington vs. same, No. 2.

William and Erasmus D. Fuller vs. same, No. 3.

Bradley Barlow, receiver of the Saint Albans Bank vs. same, No. 4.
Mariette Field, administratrix, &c., vs. same, No. 5.

Sth W. Langdon vs. same, No. 6.
Joseph S. Weeks vs. same, No. 7.
Breck & Wetherbee vs. same, No. 8.
Aldis O. Brainerd vs. same, No. 9.

Charles F. Everest vs. same, No. 10.

Oscar A. Burton, receiver of the Franklin County Bank vs. same, No. 13. Lucien B. Clough, administrator, &c., vs. same, No. 14.

These claims all arose out of the same transaction, and were con sidered and decided together. All, except No. 14, were claims for property taken and appropriated or destroyed at Saint Albans, Vt., by an incursion of rebels, known as the Saint Albans raid, in October, 1864. No. 14 was a claim brought by the administrator of Elinas J. Morrison, deceased, to recover damages for the wrongful killing of said deceased by the rebels engaged in the same raid.

The entire amount claimed in all the cases was $313,490, besides interest:

The allegations in all the memorials were substantially the same, and as follows:

That, shortly before the 19th of October, 1864, a large number of persons, then domiciled or commorant within Her Britannic Majesty's province of Canada, combined together within those provinces for the purpose of committing acts of depredation, rapine, and war from said provinces as a base of operations, and as a shelter for immediate retreat, against the persons and property of citizens of the United States

residing within those States. That some twenty or more of those persons, shortly before that day, pursuant to the combinations so made, proceeded from Her Majesty's province of Canada East into the territory of the United States, and assembled at the village of Saint Albans, in the State of Vermont, distant about twelve miles from the border of said province. That, being so assembled, they took forcible and armed possession of a part of said village; there seized and imprisoned several citizens of the United States; fired shots at sundry citizens; by such shooting killed the decedent named in No. 14; set fire to several buildings in the village; entered three of the banks therein, seizing and imprisoning the officers of such banks, and seized and appropriated the securities and moneys from the safes of said banks, together with horses and other property named in the several memorials. That all these acts were committed under arms and with military uniform, equipage, and organization to a greater or less extent. That after the perpetration of these acts the perpetrators retreated in a body toward the province of Canada, and entered that province, carrying with them the plundered property, and closely pursued by the citizens of Saint Albans and vicinity, who organized for that purpose, and would doubtless have captured the fugitive marauders but for the asylum afforded them by Her Majesty's province. That shortly after the arrival of the retreating marauders within the province of Canada, several of them were arrested by local magistrates in that province, and a part of the plunder carried off by them was seized by such magistrates and retained in their custody. That immediately thereafter requisition was made by the Government of the United States upon Her Britannic Majesty's government for the surrender of said persons on the charges respectively of murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and robbery, committed within the jurisdic tion of the United States, such requisition being based on and conformable to the terms of Article 10 of the treaty of 9th August, 1842, be tween the United States and Great Britain. That the requisition was supported by full evidence on the part of the United States of the commission by the persons so charged of the acts of violence above named. That before the hearing before such local magistrates of the charges preferred against such arrested persons, Her Majesty's government for said province caused the jurisdiction of such local magistrates and the proceedings before them to be superseded by one Charles J. Coursol, a judicial officer of the province, who took jurisdiction of the matters ch ged, issued warrants for the arrest of the persons so charged, and caused such persons to be removed from the jail at St. John's, Canada, where they were confined under process issued by the local magistrates, to the city of Montreal; and also caused the property seized to be transferred from the custody of the local magistrates to the custody of Her Majesty's officers in Montreal. That a partial hearing was had before Judge Coursol, on which hearing full evidence was made of the commission of such acts of violence by the persons so

charged; and that the hearing was, on the application of the persons charged, unreasonably, and against the protest of the counsel for the United States, postponed from time to time to the 13th December, 1864, for the purpose of enabling the respondents to make proof of their being commissioned and authorized by the Confederate States of America, so called, to commit the acts of violence named. That on the 13th December Judge Coursol, without hearing any further proofs or arguments, in a hasty, unjudicial, and indecent manner discharged from custody the persons against whom such hearing had chiefly proceeded, and all other persons arrested and held on the same charge, and immedi ately and with indecent haste ordered the money and property of the claimants found upon the persons so charged to be delivered up to them, and permitted them to make their escape therewith, such money and propperty amounting to $80,000 and upwards, and having been fully proved and identified as the money and property of the claimants, and as having been plundered and carried off by the persons so charged and arrested and discharged. That subsequently further warrants were issued by Judge Smith, one of Her Majesty's justices of the superior court for the said province, on which warrants, after much delay and hindrance, arising from the friendliness of the constabulary of the province to the confederate raiders and their pretended government, and the unfriendliness of the same to the United States Government and its people, in consequence whereof most of the offenders were allowed to escape, and all the money aud property was allowed to be secreted or removed, five of the persons so charged were again arrested and brought before Justice Smith upon an application of the United States for their extradition. That after much delay Justice Smith decided that the persons were not the subject of extradition under the treaty, but were belligerents against the United States in committing the acts complained of, and in making their retreat to Canada and enjoying its asylum, and discharged the prisoners. That by these acts of the judicial officers of Canada, Her Majesty's government, in effect, refused to surrender the persons who committed these acts of violence within the United States, and refused to restore to the United States and to its citizens the property and money so taken and carried by the plunderers into the province of Canada. That in the commission of these acts, as well as in their organization and preparation for the same, these raiders claimed to act under the authority and in aid of the so-called Confederate States of America-the enemies of the United States-and that their confederation and organization for the purpose of committing these acts were well known to many of the government officials, local officers, and citizens of the province of Canada before the occurrence of the acts named at Saint Albans. That in consequence of the culpable negligence or connivance of the authorities of the province, no steps were taken to prevent the expedition, or to give any information to the United States Government, or any of its officers, so as to enable them to protect them

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