Neapolitan Government, but they had subsequently abandoned it, for by the concessions carried to Sicily by the Earl of Minto, a distinct and different Constitution was granted to that country; and thus the Neapolitan Government had adopted the latter interpretation, which offered no valid impediment to the acceptance of the Sicilian ultimatum, for that ultimatum recognized the union of the Crowns.

It is true that the Sicilians demand an extensive alienation of the exercise of the Royal prerogative, but the Treaty of Vienna did not bind the King in that respect; the King had abandoned a part of his prerogative in giving a Legislative Constitution to Naples; he might do so in a greater degree to Sicily if such were his Royal will.

The Treaty of Vienna consequently opposed no obstacle to the acceptance of the Sicilian conditions.

Nor did the Constitution granted by the King; for that Constitution would not thereby be violated in any greater degree than it had already been, by the departure from its terms, involved in the concessions on which the Earl of Minto had been empowered to treat. Those terms offered a separate and different Constitution to Sicily; the ultimatum demanded, in addition to this, an abandonment of the exercise of the Royal prerogative in favour of a Viceroy; but the Constitution of Naples could not fetter the King in any modification of his prerogative which he might adopt towards Sicily; and for such modification the Neapolitan Ministers could not be responsible; for a decree to that effect would not be countersigned by them, but by the Secretary of State for Sicily, and he alone would be responsible, but to the Sicilian, not to the Neapolitan Parliament.

It is true that the Sicilian ultimatum contained certain articles affecting the disposal of State property such as vessels and stores of war, and one respecting the indemnity for damage inflicted on the Porto Franco of Messina, matters which might be judged to fall within the province of the Neapolitan Parliament; but at present the Neapolitan Government were only called on to recognize the principle of a proportional repartition of the State property above mentioned, and to promise its execution, which would no doubt be carried into effect by Commissions of the respective Parliaments; for the principle was undeniably just. In regard to the indemnity, the justice of such a claim could only be proved by ulterior investigation, and the settlement of the question would probably on proper representation be left to the decision of the Parliaments; but should the Sicilians prove unreasonably obstinate on this article, the Neapolitan Ministers might yet assume a responsibility

which they could justify to Parliament by the urgent necessity of the case.

Proceeding to Prince Cariati's assertion that should Sicily cast off its allegiance it would be restored to the Neapolitan Crown by the arms of Allied Powers, I submitted to his Excellency that in the present conjuncture of affairs, such a result was by no means so certain as he might suppose; that I could not assert that Great Britain would interfere by force of arms to maintain the settlement made by the Treaty of Vienna, though such might possibly be the determination of Her Majesty's Government if appealed to; that his Excellency must be sensible that there were serious obstacles to such a course on the part of the German Powers, but that at best no small time must elapse before such an intervention, whether single or combined, could be rendered effectual; and that in the perilous interval the existence of a Revolutionary or Republican Government at Palermo would not only have a disastrous influence at Naples and especially in Calabria, so deeply disaffected to the reigning family, and where the materials of explosion were already collected, but would give an irresistible stimulus to the antimonarchical faction throughout Italy.

The hypothesis advanced by his Excellency of an appeal from Sicily to Naples for assistance in consequence of the impending prevalence of anarchy, was, I contended, extremely improbable and certainly remote; for the Sicilians had exhibited a remarkable facility of self-organization, which would naturally be consolidated by the convocation of the General Parliament, in which all classes except the lowest would be embraced and represented.

Prince Cariati also occasionally stated, though merely as his personal conviction, that Naples could do perfectly well without Sicily; that it had formerly, for 10 years during the war, so existed and flourished; that Sicily contributed in no degree to its welfare, having only a dynastic importance for the House of Bourbon, but no material interest for the Kingdom of Naples; and that for his part, as a Neapolitan, he wished the connection could be severed. for ever. Nor was his Excellency of opinion that the King himself had much at stake in accepting or rejecting the present proposals, for there was little honour he said in retaining a barren crown; and should His Majesty stoop to take a dignity so diminished, he would exercise about as much authority in Sicily, as he does over his titular and shadowy dominion of Jerusalem. "And how," added Prince Cariati," will the King be insured against the loss even of this nominal kingdom at any subsequent period, when a popular Viceroy or a rebellious mob may choose to wrest it from him?"

To these remarks I objected that though Naples might without

Sicily possess the resources necessary to make it a powerful and prosperous country, I could not admit that it derived no material advantages from the contiguity and intercourse of Sicily, the commerce of which with Naples, as members of the same realm, is probably mutually more profitable than it would be, were the two countries separated under hostile circumstances; but granting that Sicily were of little importance generally to the welfare of Naples, that could not be practically true at the present moment; for should Sicily renounce its present allegiance, it must assume an order of Government either republican or monarchical, the first entailing all the disadvantages already indicated, the latter involving the choice of a sovereign, most likely from one of the reigning Italian families, which would introduce a germ of jealousy and enmity between the States of the peninsula, which would be fatal to that scheme of union and alliance so much desired; whereas should the King resolve to accept the Sicilian terms, unjust and unworthy as they are, he might still, by a judicious choice of his lieutenant, possess in reality, if not in form, a great share in the government of the country, and await the reaction of a quieter time when modifications might possibly be introduced by the Sicilian Legislature of a nature more favourable to the royal prerogative. Nor would the union of the crowns, and the King's sovereignty in Sicily be permanently exposed to such danger as at the present moment; for the Great Powers might in a future contingency be in a better position for controlling the Sicilians, and compelling them to adhere to their legitimate Sovereign, than is the case just now.

In holding the language which I have had the honour to submit to your Lordship, I was careful to disclaim all sympathy or approval on the part of the Earl of Minto or Her Majesty's Legation in regard to pretensions so preposterous as some of those advanced by the Sicilians; and I recommended their acceptance solely on the ground of necessity and for the purpose of avoiding greater evils contingent on a contrary course. In this view I know that I have the support of M. Savarese, an influential member of the Cabinet, who went so far as to declare in my presence and in that of Prince Cariati, that a republic at Palermo would make one at Naples in 3 days; and though that assertion may possibly be rash in respect to the capital, it might I believe be applied to Calabria with perfect aptness.

I cannot flatter myself that I have produced much effect upon Prince Cariati, who frankly maintained that a general war was inevitable, and that in the scuffle, Sicily would be conquered and restored to Naples. Nor was his Excellency sensible to my representations that it was our common duty to mitigate as much as possible every cause which could inflame the disorders menaced by the

revolution at Paris, and lead to the catastrophe which he predicted. Prince Cariati repeatedly insisted that war was imminent; that it might break out between the Sardinian and Austrian troops at any moment and spontaneously; that the French would strike a mighty blow at the Italian coasts, and that it would be consistent with the dignity and interests of Great Britain to strengthen her navy in the Mediterranean, to reduce the Sicilians to reason, to grant support to the legitimate Sovereigns of Italy, and oppose an armed front to the Republican propaganda, of which the malignant operation was already apparent. I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

NAPIER.

No. 141.-Prince Castelcicala to Viscount Palmerston.

15, Princes Street, Cavendish Square, April 3, 1848. PRINCE CASTELCICALA presents his compliments to Viscount Palmerston.

Prince Castelcicala has the honour to send to Lord Palmerston the inclosed despatch which his Excellency read last Saturday.

Prince Castelcicala will consider it as a particular favour if his Excellency will be so good as to send the answer to the Prince as soon as possible, in order that the Prince may send his courier to Naples with it.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

CASTELCICALA.

(Inclosure.)-Instruction of March 20, 1848, to Prince Castelcicala. (Translation.) March 20, 1848.

On receipt of this you will go to Lord Palmerston to confer with his Lordship respecting the pretensions put forth by the Comitato at Palermo, of which he will have been informed by Lord Minto.

You will request him to declare frankly whether he still retains the opinions formerly held by him, and stated to me by you in the report No. 2431.

You will at the same time point out to him the serious difficulties which must ensue if England should vary from the principle of the union of the two portions of the royal dominions.

You will endeavour to obtain from him an assurance accordingly, and you will request him to write to Lord Minto, to the purport that he may observe towards the Sicilians a demeanour which may distinctly and unequivocally define the views of the British Cabinet.

You will immediately dispatch to me a courier with the reply; and you will request his Lordship to entrust his despatches on this subject to the same, or to another who may start at the same time.

I have further to communicate that the Royal Government is of opinion that the following basis cannot be departed from:

1. The Government is desirous that the principle of the integrity and unity of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies be respected.

2. That the royal prerogative in the dominions beyond the Straits be neither more or less limited than as it is determined by the Constitution of the 10th February, 1848, for the dominions on this side of the Straits.

3. That the internal administration of the two portions of the royal dominions may be divided and distinct so far as not to invalidate the principles established in the preceding Articles Nos. 1 and 2.

No. 148.-Viscount Palmerston to Lord Napier.

MY LORD, Foreign Office, April 6, 1848. WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 19th ultimo, giving the opinions expressed by Prince Cariati respecting Sicily, I have to observe that his argument that the conditions demanded by the Sicilians ought not to be conceded, because in his view those conditions were at variance with Article CIV of the Treaty of Vienna, was satisfactorily answered by your Lordship; but you might also have added that Article CIV contains nothing but an acknowledgment by the Allied Powers of a particular style and title adopted by the King of Naples, and that it does not preclude the King of Naples from changing that style and title if circumstances should at any time induce him to do so.

With regard to the opinion expressed by Prince Cariati that Sicily is of no importance to Naples, and that the Kingdom of Naples would go on as well if not better without being connected with Sicily, it may be observed that if that opinion is well founded it seems strange that the Neapolitan Government should of late have spent so much money and have made such military efforts to retain possession of Sicily; but at all events it is difficult to understand how Prince Cariati, entertaining such an opinion, could imagine that England would take the trouble and incur the expense of sending an armament to conquer Sicily in order to restore to Naples such a valueless and useless possession. But you may assure Prince Cariati that the British Government will undertake no such conquest, and will take no step to compel the Sicilians to reunite themselves to Naples, if the blind infatuation of the Neapolitan Government shall have provoked the Sicilians to sever the connection between Sicily and Naples. I am, &c.

Lord Napier.

PALMERSTON.

No. 152.-Viscount Palmerston to Prince Castelcicala.

Foreign Office, April 10, 1848.

PRINCE CASTELCICALA, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni

potentiary of His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, communi