If the whole or any part of said surplus trust fund is not so used, capital's portion thereof shall become the property of the employer, and may be withdrawn or paid out as surplus dividends or put into the business as new capital, as the employer may elect.

Recognition of Trade Unions.

SECTION 17. Employees who are members of any trade union or labor organization which is licensed under the following section of this act may authorize its president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer or clerk in writing to act for them and in their behalf for a term of one year in settling the scale or rates of ordinary wages, the rate of ordinary dividends and the value of the capital used in the business, and in settling other terms of the contract of employment, and to represent them in all matters before the industrial court. This writing shall be signed by the employees, shall be upon blanks prepared by the industrial court and shall be filed in the industrial court. Certified copies shall be furnished at fees to be established by the industrial court, and a certified copy shall be filed with the employer at or before the time of acting under its authority.

License for Trade Unions, etc.

SECTION 18. The secretary of the Commonwealth shall, upon application by the president or secretary of any trade union or labor organization, and the payment of one dollar, issue a license to the trade union or labor organization for the term of one year. The application for said license shall be in writing, and shall state the names and residences or post-office addresses of the president, the vice-president, the secretary, the treasurer and the clerk of the trade union or labor organization which desires to obtain the license. If, during the term of the license, any change be made in any of these officers, the trade union or labor organization holding the license shall forthwith give written notice thereof to the secretary of the Commonwealth, stating the names and residences or post-office addresses of the new officers.

Limited Liability of Members of Trade Unions.

SECTION 19. Members of trade unions and labor organizations which hold a license granted under this act shall not be personally liable as partners or otherwise for acts committed by other members of the same trade union or labor organization, unless the member sought to be charged therefor has authorized or requested such other member to commit the acts complained of, or unless he takes part in the overt act which causes the damage complained of.

Short Title.

SECTION 20. This act may be cited as the industrial equality partnership law of nineteen hundred and four.

APPENDIX No. 2.

PROFIT SHARING BY LAW.

In Connecticut (Gen. Sts., 1902, § 3342) any corporation organized after May 31, 1886, may, by its directors, distribute to persons employed in its service, or to any of them, such portion of profits as they deem just and proper (corporations organized before 1886 may be given this power by vote of their stockholders).

In Massachusetts (R. L., c. 110, § 69) co-operative associations shall distribute their profits among their workmen, purchasers and stockholders, as prescribed by by-laws, and as often at least as once in twelve months; but no distribution until ten per cent. of net profits have been appropriated for a sinking fund, until an amount has accumulated equal to thirty per cent. of capital stock. A corporation may (R. L., c. 110, § 37), by vote of its stockholders, issue employees' stock, to be held only by employees; par value to be ten dollars, and may be paid for in monthly instalments of one dollar; total amount of such stock outstanding at any time not to exceed two-fifths of actual capital paid in.

APPENDIX No. 3.

COMPELLING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF PERSONAL

--

SERVICES.

Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Reporter, 1894, pp. 317, 319.

HARLAN, Circuit Justice: "But the vital question remains whether a court of equity will, under any circumstances, by injunction, prevent one individual from quitting the personal service of another. An affirmative answer to this question is not, we think, justified by any authority to which our attention has been called, or of which we are aware. It would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him to work for or to remain in the personal service of another. One who is placed under such constraint is in a condition of involuntary servitude, a condition which the supreme law of the land declares shall not exist within the United States, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction. Courts of equity have sometimes sought to sustain a contract for services requiring special knowledge or peculiar skill, by enjoining acts or conduct that would constitute a breach of such contract. To this class belong the cases of singers, actors or musicians, who, after agreeing, for a valuable consideration, to give their professional service at a named place and during a specified time, for the benefit of certain parties, refuse to meet their engagement, and undertake to appear during the same period for the benefit of other parties at another place.

(Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeGex, M. & G. 604, 617; It., 5 DeGex & S. 485, 16 Jur. 871; Montague v. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189.) While in such cases the singer, actor or musician has been enjoined from appearing during the period named at a place and for parties different from those specified in his first engagement, it was never supposed that the court could by injunction compel the affirmative performance of the agreement to sing or to act or to play. In Powell Duffryn Steam. Coal Co. v Taff Vale Ry. Co., 9 Ch. App. 331, 335, Lord Justice James observed that when what is required is not merely to restrain a party from doing an act of wrong, but to oblige him to do some continuous act involving labor and care, the court has never found its way to do this by injunction. In the same case Lord Justice Mellish stated the principle still more broadly, perhaps too broadly, when he said that a court can only order the doing of something which has to be done once for all, so that the court can see to its being done.

“The rule, we think, is without exception that equity will not compel the actual, affirmative performance by an employee of merely personal services, any more than it will compel an employer to retain in his personal service one who, no matter for what cause, is not acceptable to him for service of that character. The right of an employee engaged to perform personal service to quit that service rests upon the same basis as the right of his employer to discharge him from further personal service. If the quitting in the one case or the discharging in the other is in violation of the contract between the parties, the one injured by the breach has his action for damages; and a court of equity will not, indirectly or negatively, by means of an injunction restraining the violation of the contract, compel the affirmative performance from day to day or the affirmative acceptance of merely personal services. Relief of that character has always been regarded as impracticable. (Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co v. Pennsylvania Co. 54 Fed. 730, 740, Taft, J., and authorities cited; Fry, Spec. Perf., 3d Am. Ed. sects. 87-91, and authorities cited.) . . . The fact that employees of railroads may quit under circumstances that would show bad faith upon their part, or a reckless disregard of their contract or of the convenience and interests of both employer and the public, does not justify a departure from the general rule that equity will not compel the actual affirmative performance of merely personal service, or (which is the same thing) require employees, against their will, to remain in the personal service of their employer.

APPENDIX No. 4.

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND INVESTIGATION.

Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Troubles. The laws of Pennsylvania (Pepper v. Lewis, Digest 1894, p. 183 et seq., § 68 et seq.) provide that, in case of differences between employers and employees, either

party or both may apply to the court of common pleas; and, if it considers the matter of sufficient importance, it shall select three men, and order each of parties to select three (and if one refuses, the court will appoint for that party), and these nine shall constitute a Board of Arbitration to summon witnesses, etc., and their decision shall be final on all matters brought before them for adjustment.

Compulsory Investigation of Labor Troubles. - The States of California, Kansas, Texas and Utah have Boards of Arbitration, but they act only when disputes are referred to them.

In Minnesota and Montana the Boards of Arbitration may investigate, but have no express power to summon witnesses.

In Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio and Wisconsin the Boards may investigate threatened or existing labor troubles, and to that end may subpoena witnesses, send for persons and papers, etc.

In Maryland (1878, c. 379, §§ 1-6) and in Massachusetts (R. L., c. 106, §§ 1-7) it is the duty of the Boards to investigate labor troubles, but they have no express power to summon witnesses, etc.

In Missouri (1901, p. 197, amended by 1903, p. 218), Idaho (1901, p. 66) and Indiana (St. 1901, Vol. II, c. 75, §§ 5205a-5205r), Boards shall investigate and have power to subpoena witnesses, send for papers, etc.

APPENDIX No. 5.

ENGINEERS' ARBITRATION PROPOSAL.

The proposition referred to in the text was laid before us by Mr. John E. Miles, in behalf of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers of Massachusetts. Mr. Miles stated that, in the opinion of the members of his organization, the appointment of the inspectors employed by the Board of Railroad Commissioners should be placed under the civil service rules, and that one member of the Board itself should be selected by the Governor from among the force of inspectors so appointed. He suggested also that the members of the Board should hold office during good behavior.

Under the conditions above outlined, Mr. Miles stated that the organization which he represented, and probably also the other associations of railroad employees, would be willing to agree to submit all differences which might arise between their employers and themselves to the binding arbitration of the Board of Railroad Commissioners. On Jan. 11, 1904, this committee received official notice that the legislative board of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers had voted not to endorse the proposition of Mr. Miles.

APPENDIX No. 6.

FORM OF ASSIGNMENT OF WAGES.

For value received I promise to pay

dollars and

cents and to pay

or order dollars on this note hereafter until the same shall be fully

in each and every paid, together with interest on all amounts thereof unpaid after sixty days, at the rate of twelve per cent per annum; and I hereby for the same consideration assign and set over to said

any and all

sums that now are, or hereafter may be, owed to me by any person, firm or corporation, for wages, commissions or compensation for services, and any sum that he may elect to collect now or hereafter so owed to me for any consideration; and I also hereby irrevocably authorize and empower him, or any person whom he may appoint for the purpose, at any time or times hereafter when I may be indebted to him, whether my indebtedness may be now or hereafter contracted, if it, or any part of it, shall be overdue, to make, sign and execute in my name a further assignment to him of any and all sums which, at the date thereof, may be owed to me by any person, firm or corporation therein to be designated, and to do in my stead all things necessary to render it effective to secure to said payment of such sum or sums.

My assignment above and all others made for me as above are to be collateral security for the payment to said of all my indebtedness to him now or hereafter contracted; and at any time when any part thereof shall be due and unpaid he is to collect under any of said assignments the whole amount thereby assigned, or enough to pay him all my said indebtedness then existing, whether due or not, with the reasonable cost of collecting the same, and apply the amount collected in such payment to him, rendering to me any surplus collected above enough for such payment. Any wife, child or husband I have or may have is authorized to buy goods on my name and account of said

dealing in his own name or the name of the

and

I will pay him for the same, and my indebtedness therefor shall be secured to him hereby.

APPENDIX No. 7.

INDIANA ACT ON ASSIGNMENT OF WAGES, AND JUDICIAL

OPINION.

[ACTS OF INDIANA, 1899, c. CXXIV.]

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana that every person, company, corporation or association employing any person to labor, or in any other service for hire, shall make