[Pacific Assurances of Russia.] Repudiation of any idea of Conquest of India or of Possession of 66 Constantinople. Intentions," said His Majesty, are attributed to Russia of a future conquest of India and of the possession of Constantinople. Can anything be more absurd? With regard to the former it is a perfect impossibility, and as regards the latter I repeat again the most solemn assurances that I entertain neither the wish nor the intention." His Majesty deeply deplored the distrust of his policy which was manifested in England, and the evil effects it produced, and he earnestly requested me to do my utmost to dispel this cloud of suspicion and distrust of Russia, and charged me to convey to Her Majesty's Government the solemn assurances he had repeated to me. I assured the Emperor that Her Majesty's Government were perfectly cognizant of, and fully appreciated, His Majesty's pacific intentions. I observed that the proposed occupation of Turkish territory had worked a change in the public opinion of England, and had produced alarm. I expressed a hope that the acceptance of the armistice would now enable the Powers to bring about a satisfactory pacification, and that it was of essential importance that the European concert should be maintained. I observed that the question of autonomy appeared to me as likely to offer the chief difficulty, and that, as it more directly affected Austrian interests, care should be taken not to exceed those limits which could be accepted by Austria. I said that in Bosnia and Bulgaria there was a large Mussulman and Catholic population, and mostly of the proprietary class, and their interest must be taken into account. Pretensions of Servia and Roumania. I then referred to the reported pretensions of Servia and Roumania to be erected into independent kingdoms. Such a measure, I observed, would be the first step towards a dissolution of the Turkish empire in Europe. History, I said, recorded the existence in former times of a kingdom of Bohemia, a kingdom of Servia, and a kingdom of Poland; they had all disappeared, and their dissolution had been chiefly caused by internal dissensions. If the pretensions of Servia and Roumania should be now admitted, it would be the creation of so many small [Pacific Assurances of Russia.] Polands, which very probably would drift into republics, which would neither be for the peace nor security of the neighbouring States. The Emperor said that there was no question of establishing kingdoms of Servia and Roumania, and that it would be a folly to do so. The Proclamation of Prince Milan (No. 463) had been the act of the army, which His Majesty thoroughly disapproved, and in consequence His Majesty had advised Prince Milan not to visit the head-quarters. He had, however, received a telegram from the Prince excusing himself for not obeying His Majesty's advice, on the grounds that duty to his country obliged him to go to his army under the present adverse circum stances. Russian Volunteers in Servian Ranks. A reference to the number of Russian volunteers in the Servian ranks induced me to observe that it had been very instrumental in producing the feverish excitement in Russia. To this His Majesty replied that he had permitted the officers to go provided they left the Russian service, and that he had hoped by so doing to calm the agitation (" de jeter de l'eau froide" was His Majesty's expression). His Majesty added that a great many Russian officers had fallen, and that the enthusiasm for the Servians had very much calmed down. The Emperor then said that he would now sum up the general observations he had made in the following points: Proposed Armistice. 1. The armistice which he hoped had been accepted. Proposed Conference and Object. 2. The immediate meeting of a Conference, the principal object of which was to agree upon the introduction of such reforms in the three Provinces as will safeguard the interests of the Christian populations, and give them that autonomy as may be necessary for that purpose. Guarantees for Execution of Reforms. 3. That the Porte shall give effective guarantees for the execution of these reforms. [Pacific Assurances of Russia.] His Majesty then took leave of me in the same cordial and gracious manner in which he had received me. AUGUSTUS LOFTUS. [On the 21st November, 1876, a formal request was made by the Russian to the British Government that the Emperor's Message might be published, and it was accordingly inserted in the "London Gazette" of the same evening. In a despatch to Lord A. Loftus of the same date, the Earl of Derby observed that the publication of this despatch "might be opportune, since the last few days had brought us the intelligence of the mobilization of a considerable Russian Force, and of the emission of the New Russian Loan for 100,000,000 roubles."] [Pacific Assurances of Russia.] No. 471.-DESPATCH from the Russian Government, containing Pacific Assurances of the Emperor. Livadia, 3rd November, 1876.* TABLE. Supposed Russian designs on Constantinople. Will of Peter the Great. Repudiation by Russia of Designs of Territorial Annexation. Supposed Russian Designs on Constantinople. Will of Peter the Great. I SEE with profound surprise by your last letter that ideas of our coveting Constantinople and of the Will of Peter the Great continue to haunt the minds of some people in England. Supposed Russian Designs on India. I confess I thought these absurdities were out of date, and had been dismissed, together with the conquest of India by Russia, to the domain of political mythology. Repudiation by Russia of Designs of Territorial Annexation. How often have not the Russian Emperors publicly asserted that no territorial annexation enters into their policy; that they would be much embarrassed by it, and that the maintenance of the status quo of the East was the best combination. In our form of Government the word of the Sovereign is not, like a Parliamentary declaration, revocable at the will of a majority. Their personal loyalty is at stake. How many times, morcover, have not facts confirmed this. If Russia had these desires she would do what annexing Powers do. She would quietly make her preparations, and act on the first favourable occasion. Had she not such an opportunity in 1829, in 1848, and 1870, when the attention and the forces of Europe were engaged elsewhere? * Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff, 18th November, 1876. [Pacific Assurances of Russia.] What proofs, then, is it necessary to give English Ministers of a disinterestedness, founded not on political virtue, but on reason and good sense. If they would just forget for one moment that they are English, and place themselves at a Russian point of view, we would ask them whether, conscientiously, they would advise the Imperial Government to seek the possession of Constantinople. There can be no doubt as to the reply. Why deny us the practical good sense they themselves have? Condition of Christians. The only rational combination for Russian interests is to leave the keys of the Black Sea in hands feeble enough not to close to Russia that commercial outlet nor to menace her secu rity. The Turkish rule fulfilled this programme. Is it our fault if the Turks have taken advantage of it by rendering their sway intolerable to their Christian subjects? Has not the English policy contributed to the abuse by exciting the suspicions of the Porte against Russia through her own rivalry, and in assisting her to make force the sole basis of her power? It is really painful to see two great States, which together might regulate European questions for their mutual advantage and the benefit of all, excite themselves and the world by an antagonism founded on prejudices or misunderstanding. The results are obvious. English public opinion itself has been aroused; and much more so, and more naturally, the national and Christian sentiment of Russia, for we are too near to these countries and have too many relations with them to confine ourselves to merely theoretical sympathies. This imposes on the Emperor duties from which His Majesty cannot shrink. But these duties are shared by all civilized Europe. What prevents England from fulfilling her part by joining with us for the protection of the Christians and sharing with us their gratitude and sympathy? The Eastern question is not only a Russian question: it involves the repose of Europe, peace and general prosperity, humanity, and Christian civiliza tion. Surely the space is large enough for England to place herself side by side with Russia? Have we not invited her there by inviting in the Straits the presence of her squadrons? What further pledge are we to give of our having no pretension to the exclusive possession of Constantinople? |