concluded on theth April (Nos. 485, 486) to show how much the loyal intentions of the St. Petersburgh Cabinet agreed with the proper precautions we took to assure to the country, together with the most scrupulous regards for our material interests, the absolute guarantee of our rights as a nation.

The first stipulations of the Conventions drawn up carry on the face of them the loyally avowed motives of the two Contracting parties, and do not admit of any ambiguity. In effect, if Roumania, when confronted by a situation clearly marked out, and by one if not officially at least tacitly recognised, has thought it her duty to accede to the propositions of the Imperial Russian Government, the Government of the Prince is convinced that it has not only spared Roumania the dangers of a compulsory military occupation, but has assured her the respect of her individuality and of her institutions, and at the same time a formal guarantee of the maintenance of her territorial limits. However uninfluential she may be, Roumania has the right to look after her preservation, when, by reason of her geographical position, she found herself placed, as it were, in the midst of a war which was no longer to be avoided. We trust that we have realised this aim called for by the necessities of Roumania's existence, and we cherish the hope that no one will contest the legality of our action.

In drawing up the Conventions of the th April (Nos. 485, 486), we hoped to have removed all uncertainty as to our attitude in the Oriential struggle. The character of these stipulations, and I make bold to say, the moderation which stamps them, should have cleared up all doubt touching the loyalty of our intentions with respect to our relations with Turkey, relations consecrated by the European Treaties which are referred to in our Conventions with Russia.

There was no need, so it seemed to me, for defining our relations with the Sublime Porte by a diplomatic agreement analogous to that of the th April, and which there was a desire that we should equally conclude with Turkey. Chiefly pre-occupied, it may be, with the importance of these relations with the Porte, those who suggested a line of action of such a nature clearly failed to grasp the dangerous consequences it might have had for Roumania. Moreover, rightly more desirous, as we were, for our own safety, and for the maintenance of this neutrality, of which the whole responsibility was thrown on us,

we could not have reasonably signed a Convention of such a nature, without knowing that we should ipso facto transport the seat of war into Roumania.

As it was, under the conditions which we had drawn up with the Imperial Russian Government, we could at least indulge the hope that Roumania would be preserved from the disastrous consequences of a war which we were most anxious to avoid. But is it not clear that by admitting into our territory the armies of the Sultan, we should have inevitably brought upon us all the horrors of war? I refrain from referring here to the excesses which, even before the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Turkey, and without the slightest provocation on our part, have been committed on our territory by the undisciplined vanguard of the Ottoman troops of the littoral of the Danube. It is sufficient to mention such criminal acts as these to show what dangers Roumania would have been exposed if the war had been transferred there.

Fault cannot, then, be found with either our intentions or our forethought, because we have acted as we have. We are, on the other hand, convinced that we have contributed, so far as our means allowed, to the localization of the war, and to its removal from our territory.

After what is written above, it would seem to me superfluous to criticise the somewhat thoughtless tone of certain proposals, according to which the Roumanian troops were bound to cooperate with the Ottoman army against the Russians. Such a proposal as this carries itself its own refutation, all the more so since it was not addressed to us till the very eve of the entry of the Russian armies into Roumania.

Having thus explained our attitude, I do not hesitate to assert here, in the name of the Government of His Serene Highness Prince Charles I, that on all points our intentions. have been consistent with our duties. If, on the one hand, we have striven to guarantee ourselves by the Conventions against the perils of a situation surrounded with uncertainty, we had, on the other, no intention whatever to break the ties which bind us to the Ottoman Empire, nor to endeavour to turn the eventualities which might arise to our own profit.

Such were the principles of our line of conduct. From the very beginning we had decided to persevere therein, unless Roumania were challenged by Turkey herself. Except in this

last case, we had no intention whatever to join Russia as a belligerent against the Ottoman Empire. The action of the Roumanian army was naturally defined by the previous declarations which we have made on several occasions to the Sublime Porte and to all the foreign Cabinets.

Unfortunately, the repeated destructive incursions amongst our peaceable people, carried out as they were on an everincreasing scale, the seizure of more than 200 vessels and of their cargo, seizures effected within our ports, and even up our rivers, such as the Tiu, the Talomitza, and the Olto, the use of petroleum to burn and destroy those of our ships which refused to follow the Turkish monitors, and lastly, the bombardment by these monitors and by the batteries on the right bank of the Danube of our towns and of our villages, which were prepared neither for defence nor attack, and where there was not a single Russian or Roumanian soldier; all these circumstances left us little hope that we should be able to maintain an attitude for which we would not voluntarily have departed at any price. Two facts have since occurred which have entirely destroyed any such hope, and disturbed our political security; in the first place, the insult offered us by the dismissal of our Agent at Constantinople, as if the Diplomatic Agent of Roumania were a Turkish functionary, and did not enjoy the immunities allowed by International Law to Foreign Representatives; and secondly, the despatch which his Excellency Safvet Pasha addressed to the Representatives of Turkey at the Courts of the Guaranteeing Powers on the 2nd of May (No. 497).

The unfriendly dispositions manifested towards us by the Sublime Porte in this despatch, the threats which it embodied towards our country and her institutions; threats which were followed by a general bombardment of the whole of our littoral, leave us no longer in any doubt that we are in a state of war with Turkey, and that this war has been declared against us by the Sublime Porte itself.

Confronted by this attitude of the Ottoman Government towards us, and by these acts of open enmity, which by the principles of international law manifestly constitute a state of war, the Roumanian Government fulfils a duty in clearly establishing before the Guaranteeing Powers, and before the public opinion of all Europe, that it is the Sublime Porte itself which has broken the existing ties between Turkey and

[Narrative of Events. War with Turkey.]

Roumania, and that consequently we cannot but cast back on the Porte the responsibility which it endeavours, in the despatch of 2nd of May, to fix on us.

In consideration of all these facts, the gravity of which cannot escape the notice of the just and enlightened opinion of the British Cabinet, the Government of His Highness Prince Charles I cannot remain a passive spectator. We are obliged

at once to take such measures as are needful in the state of affairs brought about by Turkey herself, in order to repel by force the aggressive acts of the Ottoman armies to which Roumania is exposed.

Strong in our right and in the justice of our cause, and trusting in the goodwill of the Guaranteeing Powers towards us, we shall do everything which our duty to the country imposes on us to defend our homes, to protect our institutions, and to guarantee our political existence.

Have the goodness to read to, and leave a copy of this note with, his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I avail, &c.,

COGALNICEANO.

[British and Russian Interests in the East.]

No. 501.-DESPATCH from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador in London, relative to British and Russian Interests in the East. St. Petersburgh, 8th May, 1877.

TABLE.

Suez Canal.

Egypt.

Constantinople.

Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

Christian Population of Turkey.

(Translation as laid before Parliament.)

M. le Comte,

Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff.*

St. Petersburg, 18th May, 1877.

YOUR Excellency has been entrusted by Lord Derby with a letter which develops the views of the English Cabinet as regards the questions which might be implicated in the present war, and would affect Interests that England ought to defend (No. 499). His Majesty the Emperor has perused it with deep interest, and appreciates the frankness of explanations, the object of which is to remove misunderstandings between the two Governments.

Our august master instructs me to respond with complete reciprocity by putting you in a position to develop with equal frankness and equal clearness our own views, both on the points raised by Lord Derby and on those that affect interests which His Imperial Majesty is bound on his side to protect.

Suez Canal.

The Imperial Cabinet will neither blockade, nor interrupt, nor in any way menace the navigation of the Suez Canal. They consider the Canal as an international work, in which the com. merce of the world is interested, and which should be kept free from any attack.

* Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff, 8th June, 1877. See also Nos. 503 and 507.