sessed. It may be that, while it wrung his heart with anguish to repudiate the flag of his country, even temporarily, yet that he felt that duty to others required he should do everything in his power to save their property from destruction. We render judgments in favor of the complainants in each case. FRIEDRICH ALBERT SCHREIBER AND AR nold Otto Meyer vs. THE UNITED STATES. No. 740. The doctrine held by the court in Worth vs. The United States, that claims may be sustained in favor of foreigners not naturalized, affirmed. Foreigners who have never resided in this country, yet who have laden their property on board American vessels, are entitled, as to such property, to protection in the premises, and may recover for its value if destroyed. The exclusion of British subjects from a right of participation in the Geneva fund extends only to subjects native-born, and not to persons who have acquired rights of naturalization in British India, but who still retain their citizenship of origin. A statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court. Mr. Frank W. Hackett for the complainants. The complainants bore "true allegiance" to the United States. The allegiance clause in the act is of a penal character, and the disability must be confined to such persons as Congress intended to exclude. Non-resident foreigners are not within the "mischief intended to be remedied." (Sedgwick on Statutory Law, 22, 28.) "True allegiance" means only that proof of disloyalty during the rebellion shall bar the claim. The "intent" must be regarded in construing the stat ute. (Sedgwick on Stat. Law, 255, note a and cases cited; Osgood vs. Breed, 12 Mass., 530; Wilber vs. Crane, 13 Pick., 284.) The court has already refused to construe this language literally. The complainants were entitled at the time of their loss to the protec tion of the United States in the premises. That the cargo was apparently under the shelter of the British flag when destroyed does not prevent the complainants from claiming that, as a matter of fact, she was under the American flag. Great Britain has always regarded the vessel as not under her flag. The United States have uniformly asserted their right of protecting the owners of this property. (6 Opinions Attorney-General, 638; MountagueBernard, Neutrality of Great Britain, 419.) The flag of a ship protects her cargo against the enemies of that flag. (The Nereide, 9 Cranch, 388.) The United States never conceded belligerent rights to the so-called insurgent cruisers. A neutral owner is entitled to the protection of the United States against the acts of their own rebellious subjects. (Treaty with Hanseatic Republic, proclaimed June 2, 1828; treaty with Prussia, 1828.) The fact that Meyer had a commercial domicile at Singapore, and had taken out a certificate of naturalization, does not bar his recovery. Under the naturalization act he was a mere local and temporary British subject, never forfeiting his original and permanent allegiance to his native country. He does not come under the ruling in Worth's case. (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1873, part 2, No. 508; Cockburn on Nationality, act No. XXX, 1852, government of the East India Company.) Complainants had a special property in the cargo destroyed. (Homer & Sprague vs. The U. S. ante; Villalonga vs. The U. S., 10 Court of Claims, 452.) Mr. J. A. J. Creswell, for the respondent. JEWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The claimants in this case are both aliens, neither of whom have ever resided in this country; one of them, Schreiber, was born in Berlin, and the other, Meyer, in Hamburg; and both of them at the time of the loss for which claim is here made resided at Singapore, and were then carrying on business under the firm-name of Behn, Meyer & Co. The facts out of which this claim arises are substantially these: The American ship Texan Star, owned by American citizens, arrived at Maulmain, in British India, about the 8th day of November, 1863, in search of a freight. By the 11th of the same month she had succeeded in contracting with one Abraham Cohen for the carriage of a cargo of rice from Maulmain to Singapore, and a charter-party therefor was executed on the 19th of the same month. Twenty-five days were allowed for the lading of the cargo. After the cargo was on board, the master, in full accord with Cohen, the charterer, made the nominal change of title and of the name of the ship to that of Martaban, the facts in relation to which are fully stated in the opinion of the court in case No. 736, in which the owners of the vessel claimed and recovered judgment for the loss of the vessel and freight. In that case a majority of the court held that the owners had not parted with their title in the vessel, notwithstanding their nominal transfer to Currie; that the acts done by them were lawful and proper attempts to deceive the enemy, and save their property from capture. After the cargo was on board the master signed a bill of lading, making the cargo deliverable to the order of Cohen, who indorsed the same and forwarded it by mail-steamer to Behn, Meyer & Co., the claimants, at Singapore, and at the same time drew his draft on them, of which the following is a copy: [No. 855.] MAULMAIN, 7th December, 1863. Exchange for $15,000. Thirty days after sight of this, my first of exchange, (second and third of the same tenor and date not paid,) pay to the order of self fifteen thou sand dollars, only value received, and place the same, with or without further advice to account of shipment of rice per Martaban. To Messrs. BEHN, MEYER & Co., Singapore. Accepted due, 22 | 25 January, 1863, Behn, Meyer & Co. (Indorsed:) Abraham Cohen. ABRAHAM COHEN. The claimants were commission-merchants in Singapore, and had been accustomed to receive consignments of goods from Cohen for sale, against which he was accustomed to draw drafts, which the claimants accepted, having the bills of lading indorsed to them, as in the present case. The Martaban was captured and burned by the Alabama on the 24th day of December, 1863, on which day, and before the hour of the destruction of the vessel, the claimants had accepted the draft drawn on them by Cohen, and had received the bill of lading, duly indorsed by him. This draft was by the custom of trade payable in Mexican silver dollars, and was paid in that coin. The claimants seek to recover the value in currency of the $15,000 paid by them as acceptors of this draft. That they were the owners of the cargo, at least that they had the legal title thereto, at the time of the loss, need not be discussed, as the law and authorities have been fully cited in an opinion filed by Rayner, J., in the case of Homer & Sprague vs. The United States. The only question in the case is on the right of these claimants, being non-resident aliens, to prosecute this claim under the law organizing this court. The case is this: The claimants were the owners of cargo lawfully on board an American ship, which cargo was destroyed with the vessel. The owners have recovered for the loss of vessel and freight. Can the present claimants, being aliens, who have never resided within the United States, recover for the loss of the cargo? There is no doubt that the value of this cargo, as well as of the ship and freight, was taken into consideration, and was included in the sum awarded to the United States by the Geneva tribunal. The loss of the ship, its value, as well as the value of the cargo on board, were set forth in the list of claims presented by our Government; and in the list of claims set forth by the English commissioners the value of the Martaban and of her cargo is included, without objection or comment. It is certain that the case of the Martaban and of her cargo was well known to the British government, for the owners of this cargo, the claimants in this case, had, in their capacity of British residents, made claim for compensation for this loss on both the Indian government and the British foreign office, on the ground that the Martaban at the time of destruction was carrying the British flag, and so her cargo was under British protection. But their claim was rejected, and they were significantly reminded by the governor-general of India that their own proofs showed that at the time their rice was laden on board the Martaban she was an American ship. The negative evidence in regard to the character attributed to these claimants, and to this claim by the British government, is very strong. The claim made by John Burns for the loss of the effects of his son, alleged by him to have been on board of a whale-ship destroyed, was instantly rejected by the English authorities, yet the claim of the owners of the cargo of the Martaban, amounting to a large sum, had been before the Indian government, and before the home government, as is shown by the memorial presented by the present claimants, in which all the facts were set forth-both the residence in Singapore of the claimants, the naturalization in India of one of them, and the British register of the vessel-and yet the representatives of Great Britain, who roused themselves against the petty claim of John Burns, were silent and made no objection to the claim of $15,000 for the cargo of the Martaban. These considerations are of little importance, except as strongly tending to show that this claim was recognized as a valid one by both parties to the arbitration, and as affording very strong presumption that the value of this cargo composed a material element in the sum finally awarded. It seems clear that the final claim of the United States included a demand for compensation for the value of all the private property de stroyed by the rebel cruisers, and it seems equally clear that the tribunal gave what it estimated to be the value of this property. It is not for us, however, to base our decisions upon what occurred at Geneva, even if we certainly knew what took place there. We are to look into the act of Congress, and unless the case of these claimants is embraced within its provisions, we cannot admit their claim, even if we knew the value of this cargo was paid for by Great Britain, and was now in the hands of the United States. And this brings us to the consideration of the real questions in the case. The Martaban has been adjudged by this court to have been an American vessel, notwithstanding the disguise she assumed; this cargo was placed on board of her before she assumed her disguise, and continued on board until her destruction, and was destroyed with her. The claimants are entitled to recover unless something in their personal con dition excludes them under the terms of the act. The only exclusions of a personal character are to be found in section twelve, in the last clause, which is as follows: And no claim shall be admissible or allowed by said court arising in favor of any person not entitled at the time of his loss to the protection of the United States in the premises, nor arising in favor of any person who did not at all times during the late rebellion bear true allegiance to the United States. We will first consider the first of these clauses. No claim shall be allowed in behalf of any person not entitled at the time of his loss to the protection of the United States in the premises. This provision was inserted for some purpose. If the act had contemplated indemnity only to those persons who were citizens of the United States, and had sustained losses, it would have been easy to have said so in terms. Citizens of the United States are always and everywhere entitled to the protection of their Government, and no country has goue farther thau ours in admitting the duty and asserting the right. But this question has already been deliberately passed upon by this court. In the case of Benjamin Worth vs. The United States, with other cases presented at the same time, the question was raised on demurrer by the counsel for the United States, "upon the ground that an unnaturalized foreigner cannot claim indemnity before this court for losses sustained by the depredations of the rebel cruisers." (See judgment of the court, opinion by Rayner, J.) The various cases were fully argued, and the demurrer was overruled in an opinion which fully stated the right of an unnaturalized foreigner to protection in the premises, and to recover for any loss sustained and proved. The syllabus of the case states the result as follows: The twelfth section of the act under which the court is organized provides that no claim shall be admissible or allowed arising in favor of any person not entitled at the time of his loss to the protection of the United States "in the premises," &c. Held, that this provision embraced all persons whether native-born or of foreign birth, whether naturalized or unnaturalized, except the subjects of Great Britain, who are held to be excluded on other grounds. The learned judge who prepared the opinion fully examined the ques tion of the right of protection of persons and property as constantly held by our Government, and, among other conclusions stated, said: It was a great principle for which our Government had contended from its origin-a principle identified with the freedom of the seas, viz, that the flag protected the ship and every person and thing thereon not contraband. Nothing which we could now add would strengthen the statement of the law, or the force of the reasoning made use of by the author of this opinion, as by citation and argument he sums up the course of the law in regard to the duty of protection, and concludes as follows: Therefore, on the ground of abstract justice and propriety, and upon the ground of legal right, we decide that foreigners entitled to the protection of our flag in the premises, whether naturalized or not, have a right to share in the distribution of this fund. What the words "in the premises" mean is also fully stated in the opinion: The next question is, Are they entitled to this protection, being foreigners, unnaturalized? The act of Congress creating this court, as before suggested, says nothing about citizens, in providing for who may present claims here; and it says nothing about foreigners or aliens, in specifying those who may not present such claims. It would seem that the framers of the act had a view to the case of unnaturalized aliens. Naturalized aliens having the same legal rights (we do not mean the same political privileges in entirety) with native-born citizens, of course it was unnecessary to have made any allusion to them. The act speaks of those entitled to the protection of the United States "in the premises." Those words, “in the premises," define and limit the application of the law within a narrow circle. It is not everybody entitled to the protection of the Government that can come before this court; it is not every one entitled to that protection who was a loser by depredations on the part of the so-called confederate government, by land as well as by sea; it was not every one that lost by confederate cruisers generally, that can come here. But it is every person entitled to the protection of the United States in the premises, viz, every such one who sustained loss or injury, directly resulting from damage caused by the so-called insurgent cruisers, Alabama, Florida, &c., and the Shenandoah, after, &c., that can come before this court, and without reference to whether such person is native-born or foreign-born, whether naturalized or unnaturalized. Since that decision, which was pronounced at a very early period in the sittings of the court, a large number of claims have been passed upon, in which the claimants were persons of foreign birth not naturalized, and in every case the court has entered judgment in their favor, when they showed a loss under the provisions of the act, except in the cases of native-born subjects of Great Britain. No matter what were the circumstances, or the place of residence, if the claimant, not a nativeborn subject of Great Britain, had goods on board of an American vessel which were destroyed by the cruisers, we have given him a judgment for the value of the goods destroyed, always provided he showed that he did no act during the late rebellion inconsistent with true allegiance. An examination of the judgments heretofore entered will show a very large number of cases of this sort, in no one of which was the question of the domicile of the claimant at the time of the loss made a subject of discussion. One of these cases, that of Levois vs. The United States, No. 158, is in all respects like the present. He represented in his petition that he was born in Paris; that during the entire period of the rebellion he resided in Paris; that he was never naturalized in this country, and was a subject of France. It appeared from his own testimony taken in the case that he had visited this country prior to 1851, but from that year to 1867 he had constantly resided in Paris, and did not during that period visit the United States. At the time of the breaking out of the rebellion he had a house of trade in New Orleans, at first with one Vidal as partner, and afterwards with one Mathon. While in business with Mathon, this house made a shipment of goods to New Orleans, which was destroyed by one of the inculpated cruisers. Mathon being dead, Levois made claim as surviving partner for the amount of this loss. The case was heard, and, at first, dismissed on the ground that the disloyal acts of his partner, Vidal, in the conduct |