Continuation of the history of the campaign. -Description of the field of Waterloo.- Character of the commanders.-Import- ance of the contest.-First attack on Hou- goumont.-Noble resistance of the guards. -Repulse of the French.-Second attack on the left.-Fall of sir T. Picton.-Gal- lantry of the 92d.-Scotch Greys.-Sir William Ponsonby.-Third attack on the centre.-La Hay Sainte taken by the French.-Desperate charge of the whole 이 Important and authentic letters from various individuals who were actually present in the battle of Waterloo, or afterwards tra- versed the sacred and interesting scene of that memorable conflict.-Letters from an officer to his friend in Cumberland: from officers of the guards.-Capture of Buona- parte's carriage.-Effects of the Irish howl. -Narratives of an inhabitant of Brussels, and of a German officer.-Buonaparte's conduct during and after the battle: his opinions and conversation.-Statement of Napoleon leaves Phillipeville, on his road to Paris.--Enthusiastic attachment of his troops. He arrives in the capital.-Con- ferences with the ministers, Fouché, and the princess Hortensia.Tumultuous meeting of the deputies.-Patriotic con- duct of La Fayette.-Meeting of the de- puties.-Proposed forfeiture of the crown. -Irresolution of Napoleon.-His final abdication in favour of his son.-Napoleon II. acknowledged by the deputies.-Re- tirement of Buonaparte to Malmaison.- New tumults at Paris.-The ex-emperor Prussians.-Operations of lord Welling- ton.-Good conduct of the British.-Con- nection of Louis with the operations of the allies.-Capture of Cambray.--Ad- vance of the king.-Journey of the com- missioners to Hagenau.-Progress of the allies.-Siege of Paris.-Operations of the Bavarian, Austrian, and Russian armies. -Convention for the surrender of the ca- pital.-Popular feeling at Paris.-Conduct of the chambers.-Re-entry of the king. -Influence of that event on the fate of Arrival of Buonaparte at Rochefort.-His irresolution.-Attempts at escape.-Sur- render to the British.-His conduct on board the Bellerophon.-Interesting con- versation.-Determination of ministers to send him to St. Helena.-His conduct on receiving the intelligence.-Protest against the measure.-Another interesting conver- sation.-Description of the island of St. Helena.-Napoleon's departure from Tor- bay, and arrival at his place of exile.--His State of parties in Paris.-Disturbances in the provinces.-Animosity and cruelty of the Prussian troops.-The museum de- spoiled, and its treasures conveyed to the countries from which they were taken.- Note of lord Castlereagh.-Letter of the duke of Wellington.-Distress of the Pa- risians.-Persecution of the protestants in France.-Massacre at Nismes.-Death of general La Garde.-Interest excited in England for the French protestants.-Un- N. B. As the engravings vary a little in the different editions, the Binder will please be THE HISTORY OF THE WAR. CHAPTER I. Situation of Louis the XVIII. on his Accession to the Throne of France.-State of Parties in that unfortunate Country.-Measures of domestic Economy and foreign Policy.-In fluence of the Clergy.-Debates on the Liberty of the Press-Financial Arrangements.— Regulation of the Prisons.-Discussions on the Slave Trade.-Transactions in St. Domingo-Proclamation of the Emperor of Hayti. THE situation in which Louis XVIII. was placed on his accession to the throne, required the display of the most splendid talents, and the utmost address and delicacy of demeanour. 'The natural temperament,however, of the new monarch was inactive and indolent, and he was by no means possessed of that firmness and comprehension of mind which were eminently requisite in the existing emergency. These deficiencies might possibly be supplied by the choice of wise and and prudent ministers, but in the present instance, the task of judicious selection was rendered peculiarly difficult by the claims of the emigrants, and exiled royalists, who naturally expected the largest portion of his countenance and favour. The emigrants were neither remarkable for their talents nor their prudence; and it might be doubted whether the sufferings of the exiled royalists had taught them wisdom. They latter were apt to estimate their services and distresses too highly, and the former dismissed from their recollection the important circumstance, that had they performed their duty as pastors and citizens, at the revolution, and steadily maintained their posts, the progress of crime, sedition and immorality might have been partially arrested, or totally repressed. It was generally believed and industri VOL. III. ously circulated, that Louis was subservient in every political measure, to the influence of the priests. The French indeed during the revolution had fallen back into so deplorable a state of indifference or infidelity, with regard to religion, that a judicious restoration of its rights, and a moderate inculcation of its doctrines, would have been an invaluable blessing to them, and to the world. Their love of military glory, and their ambition of conquest, had been cherished and strengthened by the looseness of their moral and religious principles. A change therefore in favour of the worship and doctrines of christianity, was one of the principal objects to which the attention of the new monarch was directed, but his efforts were rendered more dangerous than effectual by the jealousy of the people, who regarded every regulation in favour of the church and the clergy, as a precursor of the re-establishment of tythes, and the return of ecclesiastical oppression. [1814.] But there were other difficulties and dangers which surrounded the restored monarch, besides those which had their origin and foundation in his personal character and habits, as contrasted with those of his subjects. He had been restored by the conquests and success of foreign powers, over the French people. Even those who were B most weary of the tyranny and oppression of Buonaparte, and most desirous of the accession of the Bourbons, contemplated with a sense of bitter humiliation, the entrance of an invading army into the "sacred capital." It is an extraordinary but an undoubted truth, that the most loyal of the emigrants exulted in the victories of their countrymen, even when they were gained over the allies while the latter were fighting for the restoration of the Bourbons, and by Buonaparte, for whom they entertained a deep and deadly hatred. The influence of military glory in the bosoms of Frenchmen, is paramount to every virtuous, loyal, and honourable feeling. Their former triumphs in the field of carnage, and their prospects of future conquest and revenge, are the subjects of their nightly dreams, and their daily meditation. It was justly feared, therefore, that the monarch who had been elevated to the throne of France, by the victories of her enemies, would long be regarded in no other light than as a memento of national defeat and disgrace, and as the object of feelings directly opposite to respect, or pride, or gratitude. These unfavourable impressions were confirmed by the reflection that the restoration of the Bourbons was chiefly effected by the ancient and natural enemy of France: by a government which had long and successfully resisted her efforts to obtain the empire of the world, and had finally succeeded in forming the coalition by which her territories were invaded, and her capital besieged. The person of Louis had been protected, and his cause sustained by the British court, when no other state dared to grant him shelter, or acknowledge his pretensions; and his gratitude so far surmounted his discretion, that he awakened all the inflammatory passions of every class of French society, by ascribing his return to the intervention of the Prince Regent. When Louis XVIII. was called from the retired tranquillity of his residence in England, to experience the dangers and anxieties of a throne, he had forgotten that a great proportion of the inhabitants had been born, or educated, at a period when the Bourbons were considered as pretenders to the crown: as a race of imbecile and sanguinary fugitives, who had fled the kingdom in the moment of danger and alarm, and for a long series of years had endeavoured to redeem the consequences of their own licentiousness and cowardice, by acts of cruel but impotent revenge. He assumed the sovereign powers, unknown to military fame, and incapable, from his infirmities, of leading into the field a nation of warriors, who had long been accustomed to believe that a monarch and a conqueror were synonimous. If he looked around him, the prospect presented half a million of soldiers attached to Buonaparte by the habits of their lives, and by their gratitude to the hero who had led them to conquest and to plunder. To the name of peace they entertained a natural and inveterate aversion, and it was impossible that they could love the individual who had deposed the emperor, and who, in all the qualities requisite to excite their esteem and confidence, was so dissimilar to their favourite. It might have been supposed that the indulgence granted to France by the allies would have inspired the nation with gratitude, and have conciliated their attachment to a monarch, whose mediation between the confederates and his subjects had preserved his country from all the horrors of revengeful warfare. The provocations experienced by the allies were of a nature to have justified the most sanguine and unlimited retaliation on the capital and provinces of France, and their forbearance presented an honourable contrast to the measures of Napoleon, under circumstances precisely similar. The invaders, after having suffered the greatest degradation from Buonaparte, after they had seen their respective countries desolated by the conqueror, and themselves obliged to bend to his will, become masters of France: the capital of that country is surrounded; their soldiers, who feelingly recollect all the misery to which their own country had been exposed from France-many or most of whom could recal to mind their houses destroyed, and their nearest and dearest relations murdered,-behold Paris before them completely in their power; they pant for vengeance; they expect it from their leaders; it is due not only to their own sufferings, but also, |