But it is objected to him, that, "the king had not ratified the convention of the 3d of July; that the stipulation written in article 12 only expressed a renunciation of the high powers on their own account of troubling any person whosoever in France, on account of his conduct or political opinions, and that they had no intention to interfere in any way with the acts of the king's government. This reply made to the lady of marshal Ney does not solve the difficulty. The high powers could not renounce on their own account any inquiry after any person whatever in France, on account of his conduct or political opinions, unless they actually possessed the right to make these inquiries. We undoubtedly cannot renounce any right whatever, excepting, as far as we have acquired it, and we can only pardon as far as we were able to punish. Ejus est permit tere cujus est votare. Ejus est nolle, qui potest velle.-L. III. ff. de reg. Jur. Quod quis si velit habere non potest, id repudiare non potest.-L. CLXXIV. ff. de reg. Juris. Is potest, repudiare qui et acquirere potest. L. xvIII. ff. de acquirenda vel omittenda hereditate. There is likewise a principle of the rights of men, that "foreign nations ought not to interfere in the interior government of an independent state. It is not for them to judge between the citizens whom discord induces to fly to arms, nor between the prince and the subjects; the two parties are equally foreign to them, equally independent of their authority: it remains for them to interpose their good offices for the re-establishment of peace, and natural law invites them to it." -Vattel, lib. III. cap. 18. sec. 296. Thus the high powers had only the rights of war in the country which the force of arms placed in their power, but they had not (according to the law of nations) the power of judging the conduct and the political opinions of the citizens who had taken part in the revolution. This principle was well known on the part of the plenipotentiaries who concluded the convention of Paris; it is therefore impossible to understand art. 12 in the sense which the high powers understood it, viz. renouncing a right which they had not. But the king of France was their ally; it was in his holy cause that they had taken up arms; they acted for him and in his name. The proclamation of the 25th of June, and the treaty of the 20th November, leave no doubt in this respect; it cannot therefore be said, that the convention of the 3d July was not binding on the king of France. His majesty, always great and generous, "had not wished to unite his arms nor those of his family to the instruments which Providence had made use of to punish treason" (proclamation 25th June), but the allied generals," whose powerful efforts dissipated the satellites of the tyrant (same proclamation), had necessarily, with the power of acting offensively in the interest of the alliance, and what the lawyers call casus fœderis, the power of making capitulations and truces, which in stopping the effusion of blood, would naturally hasten the epoch of the pacification and return to order. Otherwise, and if we only suppose them to possess the first of these powers without admitting the second, it follows, that war once commenced could only terminate with the extinction of all the combatants; a principle too repugnant to the rights of nations, to humanity, and above all, to the paternal sentiments of his majesty for his people. Thus, the same generals who had the power of attacking the French army and taking Paris in case of resistance, had certainly the right of granting the clauses of a convention which spared the city the horrors of a siege, and the consequences of being taken by storm. "Since a general and a commandant of a place ought naturally to be provided with all the powers necessary for the exercise of their functions, we have a right to presume that they have these powers; and that of concluding a capitulation is certainly of the number, especially when the orders of the sovereign cannot be waited for. The treaty which they shall make on this subject will be valid, and will bind the sovereigns in whose name and authority the respective commanders acted."-Vattel, lib. III. art. 16. sec. 261. Will it be said that this convention was made with rebels? If so, it would not be the less a treaty, a faith sworn, and an obligatory convention. Let us hear what Vattel says on the subject. "The most certain means of appeasing seditions, and at the same time the most just, is that of giving satisfaction to the people; and if they have risen without a cause, which, perhaps, never happened, we ought, as we have observed, to grant an amnesty to the greater number. As soon as the amnesty is published and accepted, all the past ought to be buried in oblivion; no one ought to be troubled for what he had done relative to the commotions. And in general, the prince, a religious observer of his word, ought to keep all he has promised even to the rebels, by whom I understand those who had revolted without reason or necessity. If his promises are not inviolable, there will be no longer any safety for the rebels in treating with him. As soon as they have drawn the sword they must throw away the sheath, as an old author observed. The prince will be wanting in the gentlest and most salutary means of appeasing a revolt, and there will only be left to him to put it down, and to exterminate the revolters. Despair will render them formidable, while compassion will procure them aid, increase their party, and the state will find itself in danger. What would have become of France if the leaguers had not been able to confide in the promises of Henry the Great?"-Vattel, book III. ch. 18. sect. 291. Will it still be said that article 12 is out of the ordinary terms of a capitulation? We reply no, because the parties only capitulate to save their lives and liberty, and it would not be saving them, to exchange the chance of a cannon ball for the expectation of the gallows; to stipulate for a partial and temporary amnesty, of use to-day, and of no value to-morrow; binding on the allies, from whom they had nothing to fear, and without effect as to the king of France, who alone had the right of punishing legally. In the second place we reply, that "if it happen in the conferences for a capitulation that one of the commandants insists on conditions which the other does not think it in his power to grant, they have one step to take, which is to agree on a suspension of arms, during which all things shall remain in their present state until superior orders are received."-Vattel, book III. ch. 16. sect. 262. Now nothing of this kind was done, because the allied generals knew well that they had full powers from the king of France to save his capital, even at the price of his most just resentments. Thus when his majesty entered Paris, amidst the lively acclamations of a people intoxicated with the happiness of seeing him again, he did not disavow the convention of the 3d July, which it is to be presumed, his majesty would not have failed to have done, if his intention had not been, in profiting by the benefits of the convention, to carefully maintain all the stipulations. "We have shewn," says Vattel," that the state cannot be bound by an agreement made without its order, and without authority on its part; but is it absolutely bound to nothing? that is what we have to examine. If the things still remain in statu quo, the state or the sovereign can simply disavow the treaty, which falls to the ground by this disavowal, and is perfectly as if it had not been made; but the sovereign ought to manifest his will as soon as the treaty comes to his knowledge; not, in fact, that his silence can give force to a convention which ought to have none without his approbation, but there would be bad faith in leaving the time to the other party to execute on his part an agreement not intended to be ratified."-Vattel, book II. chap. 16. sect. 212. Now the fact is, that his majesty has not disavowed the convention of the 3d July, after being made acquainted with it. Not only his majesty has not disavowed the convention of the 3d July, but it may be said that his government suffered and procured its execution in what concerned the retreat of the army behind the Loire, and remitting the arms of Paris and Vincennes; and that he has claimed its execution in the interest of the monuments, whose preservation was stipulated for to the profit of the city of Paris, &c. &c. Will it be objected that these partial executions do not bear on article 12? We briefly reply, that conventions are indivisible; that we cannot rescind the dispositions, or reject one and retain another, because they altogether form the general condition under which the contract was made, and without which it would not have been made. If the allied generals had not granted article 12 we should have fought; 250,000 men would have lost their lives, and Paris would have been taken, pillaged, burnt, and destroyed. All these miséries are spared by the convention; and if it has been neces sary to subscribe to an amnesty, which, at the most, could only benefit a few indivi duals, we may easily console ourselves on reflecting on all the calamities which the rejection of article 12 would inevitably have produced. Amidst the general confusion and alarm, marshal Soult profited by the hints which he had received from several of his friends, escaped from Paris, and published a long memorial, more remarkable for its prolixity than its eloquence or veracity. CHAP. XX.-1815. War in Ceylon-Unfortunate expedition of 1803.-Massacre of the English.-Renewal of the war-Capture of Candy, and dethronement of the king-Hostilities against the Nepaulese.-Proclamation of the governor-general.-Termination of the Indian war.Ratification of our treaty with America.-Revolutions in Guadaloupe, Martinique, and China-Domestic History. It will now be necessary to revert from the contemplation of the interesting vicissitudes which had marked the character of European history, to more distant scenes of intrigue, of bloodshed, and of hostility. The vast extension of the British company's possessions in the East Indies having proportionally enlarged the sphere of their contact with the neighbouring powers, always either jealous of their sway, or envious of their prosperity, it could not be expected that they should long remain in the enjoyment of perfect peace, even supposing no ambitious views on the part of their own servants; and the present year afforded very interesting intelligence of the military kind from that quarter of the world. At the most distant extremity of the Indian peninsula, the island of Ceylon afforded employment for the British arms. On the transfer of that island from Holland to Great Britain, Ceylon was divided between their high mightinesses the states-general and the king of Candy, under circumstances which could not fail to be the source of perpetual hostility. The former possessed a belt of sea-coast round the whole island, broad in some parts and narrow in others, in which the latter was confined, as within an en chanted castle which he could not pass. The king of Candy had Areca nuts, and ivory, and honey, and a few other articles which were saleable among the various merchants and traders who lived under the protection of the Dutch, but none of the first necessity; while the latter had under their complete controul, two articles that were almost indispensible to the king of Candy-fish and salt. The Candians were therefore naturally desirous to obtain an establishment on the seacoast. The policy of the British, as well as of the Dutch government, was to exclude them from all approach to the salt waters.The seeds of war thus sown were easily 3 L added to the hostility of the natives, they would be doomed to almost certain destruction. His overture having been rejected with disdain, the next step was to shew that the Candians were making preparations for immediate war against the British. They as brought into a state of activity, and the disposition to hostility was promoted by the unsettled state of the Candian government. On the death of the legitimate king of Candy, in the year 1798, Pelemé Talavé, the chief adigar or prime minister, contrived to raise to the throne, in prejudice of the nearest relatives of the deceased king, a young Ma-sembled in force upon the frontiers; they labar of inferior extraction, and of no talents. The queen, and all the relations of the former king, were thrown into prison; but the queen's brother, Mooto Sawmey, escaped from Candy, and sought the protection of the British government. The second adigar, who was a man of integrity, was beheaded; and as the upstart king had been raised to the throne as a mere puppet, to dazzle the eyes of the vulgar, Pelemé Talavé ruled with absolute sway. Six months had scarcely elapsed of the new reign when this consummate villain made certain mysterious overtures to Mr. North, the whole scope of which he did not at that time clearly comprehend: but on a second interview, he had the audacity to submit a direct proposal for assistance to take away the life of the king whom he had recently created, and to place himself on the throne. On the price of these infamous conditions he offered to make the English masters of the country. It is unnecessary to add that Mr. North received with horror, and refused with indignation, a proposal so atrocious. This man was not, however, deterred from renewing his infamous offer, in the following year, to Mr. Boyd, the public secretary; making at the same time a declaration, that his sole motive in raising an ignorant and obscure youth to the throne, had been that of rendering him detestable in the eyes of his people, and to effect a revolution which should end in the extinction of the foreign family, and allow the Candians to be governed by the legitimate chiefs of the island. His real intention, however, appeared to be that of drawing the British into a war with the Candians; of enticing their troops into the interior of the country; where, from the impassable defiles, mountain torrents, thick forests, the total want of roads for carriages and beasts of burthen, but above all, from the extreme unhealthiness of the climate, detained thirty or forty British subjects, who had repaired as usual to Candia, in the pursuit of commerce, and treated them with the utmost barbarity. They robbed some Moormen also, subjects of the British government, who had from time immemorial carried on a commerce with the Candians, of their cattle and Areca nuts. An explanation was demanded, but the first adigar refused to give any, and rejected every conciliatory proposition for the accommodation of existing dif ferences. It was evident indeed that he courted war, as best suited to his own nefarious purposes. He calculated upon obtaining credit if the English were vanquished and expelled from the island, or that in the struggle he might find an opportunity of dispatching his puppet king, and then secure his own power by offering advantageous terms to the English. In this state of treacherous plotting and open preparation for war, the governor felt it his duty to put the British troops in motion. The adigar made no secret of his opinion, that the English would succeed in taking Candy; he seemed indeed to wish it; but he made himself secure that he could contrive to starve or drown them afterwards. In fact, our troops, almost without firing a shot, found themselves in the capital of the Candian dominions, where, however, not a living creature was to be seen excepting a few parish dogs. One division of the army, from Columbo, had performed the march of one hundred and three miles, and the other division, from the opposite point of Trincomalee, a march of one hundred and forty-two miles, through one of the most difficult countries in the world. Both arrived nearly about the same time at the central city, but they found it a desert: it had been evacuated and set fire to in many places, and the treasure and all the most valuable articles had been removed. The king had fled to Hangerambettee, a royal palace, in a strong position, two days march from Candy, and hither the first adigar, still playing the villain, endeavoured to draw the British army, commanded by general Macdowall, under a promise that he himself would assist in delivering his master into their hands. They were so credulous as to trust him, and marched a detachment of 800 men towards that quarter, many of whom were cut off by the enemy, who had been posted everywhere in ambush. Parties of banditti hovered continually round the British outposts, and whenever any stragglers fell into their hands they were invariably put to death in the most barbarous and shocking manner. The chief adigar now addressed letters to the Maha Madelier, the head Singalese servant of the British government, expressing his surprise that the governor should put himself to so much trouble and expence, instead of coming to some arrangement as to the deposition of the king, and the establishment of his (the adigar's) power. An answer was returned from the English head-quarters, that if the safety of the king's person were secured, by putting him into the hands of the English, the province of the Wanny yielded to Mootoo Sawmey, the king's brother, and the Seven Corles, with the road across the country, to the British, peace should be restored. The garrison of Candy was already reduced to a very critical situation. The rains had commenced, and were soon expected to fall in torrents from the mountains; so that it became evident that no further hostilities could be prosecuted until the ensuing dry season; and sickness had spread among the troops to a most alarming degree. On the arrival of the second adigar in Candy, carrying a firelock and match wrapped up in white muslin, as an emblem of peace, it was agreed.in the conference with general Macdowall, and in the spirit of the chief adigar's letters, that the fugitive king should be delivered over to the care of the British govern ment; that Pelemé Talavé should be invested with supreme authority in Candy, under the title of Ootoon Komarogen, the great prince; that he should pay annually the amount of 30,000 rupees to Mootoo Sawmey, who would hold his court at Jaffnapatnam; that the road to Trincomalee and the province of the Seven Corles, should be ceded to his Britannic majesty, and that a cessation of arms should immediately take place. On the faith of this treaty, which nothing but extreme necessity could have justified, and by which we sanctioned the injustice of the usurper, a garrison was left in Candy, consisting of 700 Malays, and 300 Europeans of the 19th regiment, and Bengal and Madras cavalry; besides a considerable number of sick who could not then be safely removed. The Candians now began to draw nearer to the capital. They attempted by every means to seduce the Malay soldiers from their allegiance. Their chief native officer, captain Nouradeen, received a letter from his brother, a Malay prince in the Candian service, soliciting him to seduce his countrymen to revolt, and assassinate the British soldiers, for which the king would reward them handsomely with lands and money. Nouradeen immediately made known this insidious proposal to major Davie, who had been left in command, and used every exertion to pre vent desertion in his corps: but, in spite of his endeavours, a few of his men went over to the enemy; and the Europeans were dying at the rate of six men a-day. The Candians were evidently making preparations, but major Davie was ignorant whether they were intended as an infraction of the treaty, or to forward its execution. Mootoo Sawmey trembled at his situation, and would gladly have renounced all pretensions to the sceptre of Candy to be within the dominions of the British. At length the Candians made their long threatened attack on the garrison, which, in its enfeebled state, was incapable of much resistance. The English hoisted the white flag, and the firing ceased. A parley was. held with the first adigar, in which it was stipulated that Candy should be immediately delivered up by the British; that all the British troops should march out of Candy, with their arms, on the road leading to Trinco malee; that Mootoo Sawmey should be per mitted to accompany them; and that the |