object they are resorting to the policy of ascertaining the total requirements of the country concerned, and intercepting such imports as may be presumed, because they are in excess of those requirements, to form no part of the normal trade of the country, and therefore to be destined for the enemy.

28. The total net imports of a particular commodity by any country in normal times give a satisfactory index to its requirements, and where these are provided for on a generous scale, suitable allowance being made for the commercial dislocation inseparable from a state of war, it is not unfair, after eighteen months of war and in the light of the experience which has now been gained, to invite the prize court to regard with suspicion further consignments of any kind of goods of which the imports have already exceeded a figure ample to satisfy the country's requirements.

29. It ought not to be difficult to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with all parties on the subject, as the official statistics afford information not only as to the quantities of particular commodities required by neutral countries, but also of the sources from which they are usually obtained. Arrangements of this nature will be of great service in removing the friction and misunderstanding which now arise, as it will help the commercial classes in the neutral countries to form an idea of the limits within which their trading operations are not likely to encounter difficulty.

30. The adoption of such a system, although not unattended by difficulty, has been greatly facilitated by agreements made with the organizations which control imports in the neutral countries, as well as by arrangements with some of the shipping lines, and with several of the interests concerned in the import of particular commodities from neutral countries. His Majesty's Government intend to avail themselves of every opportunity which may present itself in order to bring about a more extended adoption of this equitable system.

31. Moreover, the fact that a neutral country adjacent to the enemy territory is importing an abnormal quantity of supplies or commodities, of which her usual imports are relatively small, of which the enemy stands in need and which are known to pass from that neutral country to the enemy, is by itself an element of proof on which the prize court would be justified in acting, unless it is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Hostile destination being a question of fact, the court should take all the relevant circumstances into consideration in arriving at

its decision, and there seems to be no reason in principle for limiting the facts at which the court is entitled to look in a case of this kind.

32. The second section of the United States note (paragraphs 16–24) deals with the validity of the measures against enemy commerce which were embodied in the British Order in Council of the 11th March, 1915, and in the French Decree of the 13th March, and maintains that these measures are invalid, because they do not comply with the rules which have been gradually evolved in the past for regulating a blockade of enemy ports, and which were summarized in concrete form in articles 1-21 of the Declaration of London.

33. These rules can only be applied to their full extent to a blockade in the sense of the term as used in the Declaration of London. His Majesty's Government have already pointed out that a blockade which was limited to the direct traffic with enemy ports would in this case have but little, if any, effect on enemy commerce, Germany being so placed geographically that her imports and exports can pass through neutral ports of access as easily as through her own. However, with the spirit of the rules, His Majesty's Government and their allies have loyally complied in the measures they have taken to intercept German imports and exports. Due notice has been given by the allies of the measures they have taken, and goods which were shipped or contracted for before the announcement of the intention of the allies to detain all commerce on its way to or from the enemy countries have been treated with great liberality. The objects with which the usual declaration and notification of blockade are issued have therefore been fully achieved. Again, the effectiveness of the work of the allied fleets under the orders referred to is shown by the small number of vessels which escape the allied patrols. It is doubtful whether there has ever been a blockade where the ships which slipped through bore so small a proportion to those which were intercepted.

34. The measures taken by the allies are aimed at preventing commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, and not merely at preventing ships from reaching or leaving German ports. His Majesty's Government do not feel, therefore, that the rules set out in the United States note need be discussed in detail. The basis and the justification of the measures which the allies have taken were dealt with at length in Sir E. Grey's note of the 23rd July, and there is no need to repeat what was there said. It need only be added that the rules ap1 See Special Supplement for July, 1915, p. 157.

plicable to a blockade of enemy ports are strictly followed by the allies in cases where they apply-as, for instance, in the blockades which have been declared of the Turkish coast of Asia Minor or of the coast line of German East Africa.

35. Some further comment is perhaps necessary upon the statements made in paragraph 19 of the United States note, where it is said that, because German coasts are open to trade with Scandinavian countries, the measures of the allies fail to comply with the rule that a blockade must be effective. It is no doubt true that commerce from Sweden and Norway reaches German ports in the Baltic in the same way that commerce still passes to and from Germany across the land frontiers of adjacent states, but this fact does not render the measures which France and Great Britain are taking against German trade the less justifiable. Even if these measures were judged with strict reference to the rules applicable to blockades, a standard by which, in their view, the measures of the allies ought not to be judged, it must be remembered that the passage of commerce to a blockaded area across a land frontier or across an inland sea has never been held to interfere with the effectiveness of the blockade. If the right to intercept commerce on its way to or from a belligerent country, even though it may enter that country through a neutral port, be granted, it is difficult to see why the interposition of a few miles of sea as well should make any difference. If the doctrine of continuous voyage may rightly be applied to goods going to Germany through Rotterdam, on what ground can it be contended that it is not equally applicable to goods with a similar destination passing through some Swedish port and across the Baltic or even through neutral waters only? In any case, it must be remembered that the number of ships reaching a blockaded area is not the only test as to whether it is maintained effectively. The best proof of the thoroughness of a blockade is to be found in its results. This is the test which Mr. Seward, in 1863, when Secretary of State, maintained should be applied to the blockade of the Confederate States. Writing to Mr. Dayton, the United States Minister in Paris, on the 8th March, he said: "But the true test of the efficiency of the blockade will be found in its results. Cotton commands a price in Manchester and in Rouen and Lowell four times greater than in New Orleans. * Judged by this test of results, I am satisfied that there never was a more effective blockade." Similar language was used in the despatch to Mr. Adams in London. The great rise in price in Germany of many articles, most necessary to the enemy in the prose

cution of the present war, must be well known to the United States Government.

36. Attention is drawn in the same paragraph to the fact that cotton has since the measures announced on the 11th March been declared to be contraband, and this is quoted as an admission that the blockade is ineffective to prevent shipments of cotton from reaching the enemy countries. The reason for which cotton was declared to be contraband is quite simple. Goods with an enemy destination are not, under the Order in Council, subject to condemnation; they are restored to the owner. Evidence accumulated that it was only for military purposes that cotton was being employed in Germany. All cotton was laid under embargo, and its use in the textile factories was prohibited except in very special cases or by military permission. In these circumstances it was right and proper that cotton with an enemy destination should be subjected to condemnation and not merely prevented from passing, and it was for this reason that it was declared to be contraband. The amount of cotton reaching the enemy country has probably not been affected in the least by its being made contraband on the 20th August, as supplies from overseas had been cut off effectually before that date. Even the "Konfektionär," a German technical paper, dealing with the textile industry, admitted in its issue of the 1st July that not a gramme of cotton had found its way into Germany for the preceding four weeks.

37. Before leaving the question of the validity of the measures which France and Great Britain have taken against enemy commerce, reference must be made to the statement made in the 33rd paragraph of the United States note that "the curtailment of neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal, cannot be admitted. His Majesty's Government are quite unable to admit the principle that to the extent that these measures are retaliatory they are illegal. It is true that these measures were occasioned and necessitated by the illegal and unjustifiable proclamation issued by the German Government on the 4th February, 1915, constituting the waters surrounding Great Britain, including the whole English Channel, a "war zone," into which neutral vessels would penetrate at their peril, and in which they were liable to be sunk at sight. This proclamation was accompanied by a memorandum alleging that the violation of international law by Great Britain justified the retaliatory measures of the German Government owing to the acquiescence of neutrals in the action of this country. The legitimacy of the use of retaliatory measures was

thus admitted by the Germans, although His Majesty's Government and their allies strongly deny the facts upon which their arguments were based. But although these measures may have been provoked by the illegal conduct of the enemy, they do not, in reality, conflict with any general principle of international law, of humanity, or civilization; they are enforced with consideration against neutral countries, and are therefore juridically sound and valid.

38. The more abstract question of the legitimacy of measures of retaliation adopted by one belligerent against his opponent, but affecting neutrals also, is one of which His Majesty's Government think the discussion might well be deferred. It is a subject of considerable difficulty and complexity, but His Majesty's Government are surprised to notice that the Government of the United States seem to regard all such measures of retaliation in war as illegal if they should incidentally inflict injury upon neutrals. The advantage which any such principle would give to the determined law-breaker would be so great that His Majesty's Government can not conceive that it would commend itself to the conscience of mankind. To take a simple instance, suppose that one belligerent scatters mines on the trade routes so as to impede or destroy the commerce of his enemy-an action which is illegitimate and calculated to inflict injury upon neutrals as well as upon the other belligerents-what is that belligerent to do? Is he precluded from meeting in any way this lawless attack upon him by his enemy? His Majesty's Government can not think that he is not entitled by way of retaliation to scatter mines in his turn, even though in so doing he also interferes with neutral rights. Or take an even more extreme case. Suppose that a neutral failed to prevent his territory being made use of by one of the belligerents for warlike purposes, could he object to the other belligerent acting in the same way? It would seem that the true view must be that each belligerent is entitled to insist on being allowed to meet his enemy on terms of equal liberty of action. If one of them is allowed to make an attack upon the other regardless of neutral rights, his opponent must be allowed similar latitude in prosecuting the struggle, nor should he in that case be limited to the adoption of measures precisely identical with those of his opponent.

39. The third section of the United States note deals with the question of the means of redress which are open to United States citizens for any injury or loss which they suffer as the consequence of an unjustifiable exercise of the belligerent rights of the allies. The contention put for