A Manual of the Law of Torts, and of the Measure of Damages |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
9 Jur absence of malice acquired actual agent arrest bailee Bing bound Broom's carrier cause of action charge chattel common carrier consequence contract Court custody defendant English law enjoyment entitled evidence exercise existence fact false imprisonment fraud G. W. Ry Gale on Easements Goddard on Easements grant Hence Hilliard I. C. Act implied India injury invasion jurisdiction justify L. C. on Torts landlord liable libel loss Magistrate malicious master Mayne on Damages ment nature negligence nuisance obstruction offence officer ordinary otherwise owner party Penal Code plaintiff possession prescription privileged privity of contract probable cause prosecution real property reasonable and probable recover remainderman remedy right to light Roman law rule Selw servant servient tenement slander Smith special damage Story on Agency Story on Bailments tenant thing third person tion trade-mark trespass unless warrant wrongdoer wrongful act
Popular passages
Page 346 - Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally — ie, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself — or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.
Page 222 - But if the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it.
Page 89 - The civil irresponsibility of the supreme power for tortious acts could not be maintained with any show of justice, if its agents were not personally responsible for them; in such cases the Government is morally bound to indemnify its agent, and it is hard on such agent when this obligation is not satisfied; but the right to compensation in the party injured is paramount to this consideration.
Page 173 - But a license to hunt in a man's park and carry away the deer killed to his own use; to cut down a tree in a man's ground, and to carry...
Page 18 - that wherever a man does an act which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury to another, and which in the particular case does produce such an injury, an action on the case will lie.
Page 168 - We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
Page 64 - Where a person is so situated that it becomes right, in the interests of society, that he should tell to a third person certain facts, then, if he bona fide, and without malice, does tell them, it is a privileged communication.
Page 2 - Where an act, in itself indifferent, becomes criminal if done with a particular intent, there the intent must be proved and found ; but where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant; and in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent.
Page 146 - I conceive that, to constitute a public nuisance, the thing must be such as, in its nature or its consequences, is a nuisance — an injury or a damage, to all persons who come within the sphere of its operation, though it may be so in a greater degree to some, than it is to others.
Page 68 - So if it be proved that out of anger, or for some other wrong motive, the defendant has stated as true that which he does not know to be true, and he has stated it whether it is true or not, recklessly, by reason of his anger or other motive, the jury may infer that he used the occasion, not for the reason which justifies it, but for the gratification of his anger or other indirect motive.