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the comforts which flow from a sense of obedience to the laws of his being, or with the pleasurable emotions which arise from social actions, must not only remain a stranger to moral happiness, but also suffer the penalties annexed to disobedience.

We have endeavored to show, that by the economy of man's nature, his existence in a civilized state can only be sustained by labor and knowledge combined; therefore, had labor been attended with no other reward than the gratification of the senses, the condition of man would have been infinitely worse than that of any other created being. But the Divine Word, which declared that "Inthe sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," redeemed man from this hard condition. This added a moral duty to the physical necessity; and although the burthen was not increased, man thereby became the recipient of the rewards attendant upon labor as a moral institution. How benevolent and sublimely beautiful appear the designs of the Creator, when thus considered! Yet man, not perceiving the moral obligation, nor appreciating the rewards of obedience, looks alone to the physical necessity, and esteems labor a curse imposed upon his race. And until this fatal delusion shall be removed, he must continue to labor under the law of physical necessity, or from a morbid desire to accumulate wealth; and civilization, as ever heretofore, will be doomed to rise and fall like the waves of a troubled ocean.

Owing to the blindness and ignorance of man, in regard to the means of promoting his own happiness, he is prone to look upon labor as a condition degrading to his nature; and endeavors to escape from it by any method which his imagination can devise. As well might we expect that a galley slave would be scrupulous in regard to the manner of escaping from the toils of the oar, as to expect that one who perceives no moral reward associated with labor, should be quite conscientious in selecting the mode of escape from a condition which he esteems not less hard and degrading. Void of gratitude to his Maker, and feeling no sympathy for his fellow-man, he submits to the dominion of self love; and disregarding all social observances and moral obligations, he goes forth prepared for deeds of desperation, and resolves to imitate the rich and privileged orders in appropriating the labors of others to his own use. Hence the knave, clothed in falsehood and deception, like the fabled Proteus, assumes every form and guise. Is he a dealer in small wares, he pratices upon the ignorant and the credulous with false representations of value, with false weights and measures, and ingeniously conceals the defects of his commodities. A merchant, he is a speculator, cunning in the art of raising and depressing the markets by concealment and false intelligence. A mechanic, he is unfaithful and unjust to his employer, and working up to the letter of his contract: to secure the enforcement of his demand, he disregards the moral part of the obligation, and rejoices in the fraud. A physician, he is ignorant of the science, and of all the virtues which adorn the profession; and, eager for his fee, he boldly exhibits his nostrums, reckless of their

effects. He studies the art of insinuation more than medicine, and imposes upon the ignorant and the unwary, by the use of hard names and the abuse of all systems but his own. A lawyer, unmindful that he is the agent of justice, he is a trickster in practice; and, regardless of the interest of his client, experiments upon his rights by encouraging litigation; suborns, or is privy to the subornation of perjury, and aids in defrauding the ignorant of their rights: bringing reproach upon the administration of the laws of the country, and upon the profession to which he belongs. A minister of religion, he is regardless of aught save his own interest: he seeks an alliance with wealth, intrigues for the best living; and having succeeded in his schemes, throws off the mask which covered his knavery, and laughs at the gullibility of the world. A politician, ignorant of every principle which constitutes and adorns a statesman, he is a demagogue, following the lead of the party in power, regardless of all other consequences than his own political advancement; and pandering to the prejudices and passions of his constituents, he manages to divert their attention from the consideration of his baseness; and by his vile practices, deprives the country of the services of more honorable and capable men.

Actuated by the same cause, the more degraded seek to procure by theft the means of existence, which might be acquired with less risk and more certainty by honest industry. While the more daring spirits, armed with instruments of death, go forth to rob the unprotected traveler or the unguarded mansion. Hence, too, the strolling mendicant, the mountebank, and the army of vagabonds, all seeking to reap where they have not sown.

This prejudice against labor, and the evils which flow from it, are not confined to those whose condition requires them to be engaged in useful employment, but extends to all classes. The apprehension that, from some unforeseen accident, they may be compelled to labor—and a strong desire to rescue their offspring from a condition esteemed so hard and degrading-lessen the enjoyments of the rich, and make them timid in the application of a reasonable portion of their wealth to social purposes. And more than all, this prejudice against labor mingles with nature's pure fountain; and those holy affections, which were designed to resolve two hearts into one, are poisoned and polluted with gold. It is true, that in this country, few, or perhaps none, will admit that labor is a degradation, or that it detracts from the respectability of an individual; nevertheless, we can not be blind to the fact, that the prejudice against labor is still strong and deeply rooted in the general mind; and that a desire for the possession of wealth, rather than a sense of moral duty, constitutes the principal incentive to labor-except in the case of such as are compelled from necessity.

Labor induced by a mere desire for wealth, or by necessity, may develop the resources and increase the wealth of a country, but can not secure the permanent advancement of civilization and of moral improvement. The people of this country require little to stimulate them to labor; and there is, perhaps, no other coun

try in which labor is so generally and equally distributed. But we desire that all men should labor from a sense of duty: this would equalize and lighten the physical burthen of labor — while a consciousness of obedience to the will of the Creator would be a continual source of moral pleasure. Then, man would no longer desire to escape from this condition of his nature; and the motives to subsist upon the labor of others would cease, and justice prevail throughout the earth and the causes of social enmity ceasing, sympathy and social love would every where abound; and the precept, which requires that man should do unto others as he would that they should do unto him—and that other, which teaches him to love his neighbor as himself— would no longer be considered as opposed to his individual interest.

ART. III-THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,

OR AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND DEGREE OF EQUALITY REQUIRED IN CONTRACTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

The subject of our inquiry enters so extensively into the pursuits and business of active life, that to many it may seem an idle undertaking to pursue an investigation of the kind. But to the reflecting mind—to every one who is willing to look into the reason of things—the subject is one of deep interest. In the mere theory of contracts there is sufficient to lead us to the investigation we propose; and if we have carefully observed the business of life, with its toils and strifes, we have seen enough to show us its practical importance.

If we look to our system of jurisprudence, and note its incongruities in respect to contracts, we shall be led, irresistibly, to the inquiry, Why such a state of things has so long existed? How it has happened that this matter has remained stationary for so long a time, while, during the same period, there has been steady and rapid progress in the arts and sciences, civilization, and the rules of government?

How frequently has it occurred, in the experience of almost every one, and to his great surprise, that what he had relied on as a valid obligation, is declared, from extraneous circumstances, to be of no binding force whatever. Such a result impresses itself upon the mind as a glaring incongruity in our system of laws. That incongruities exist, it would be hardihood to deny; but they are more a matter of regret than surprise. The reason of their existence is to be found in the history of our system of jurisprudence. Ours was the slow growth of many ages and several centuries. In each successive modification which it underwent in the progress of civil freedom in the admixture of foreign learning and law in its necessary adaptation to the ever augmenting wants of an extensive, bold and liberal spirited commerce-as new relations and new usages arose-new

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views of equity or policy were opened, or old rules were adapted to purposes for which they were never intended, by judges who partook of the altered spirit of the times.

It would lead to an unprofitable digression to pursue the causes and history of the incongruities of the law. Let us return to the consideration of what may be regarded as settled doctrine, so far as external rules are concerned, in the matter of contracts

A contract is defined, by law writers, to be an agreement or mutual bargain between two or more contracting parties.

It is not necessary, for the investigation we have in view, to state the different kinds or sorts of contracts recognized in law. It is next said that it is essential to a valid agreement that it must be founded upon a good consideration. That which is the motive of the contract is regarded as the consideration, and this is essential to its validity. The civilians hold that, in all contracts, there must be something given in exchange-something that is mutual or reciprocal. And lawyers and divines, time out of mind, have said that "all bargains are made under the idea of giving and receiving equivalents in value."

In the mere exchange of commodities- the mere giving and receiving things which have a fixed value, or are of such a nature or kind that their value at the time of exchange can be ascertained with reasonable certainty-there need be no apprehension that an unfair advantage will or can be taken. But the point to which the reader's attention is directed, is to the important and difficult question as to the nature and degree of equality in compensation, or in knowledge, required between the parties to a contract, in order to make it binding in law and just and right in morals

If A. has a knowledge of some fact, which is unknown to B., but which materially affects the estimate or value of property of which B. is the owner, may not A. take advantage of his knowledge of such fact and buy the property of B., without communicating such fact to B.; and may not this be done without violating any rule or principle of law or morals?

Here is a practical statement of the question. In a case like this, ingenious minds, unhacknied in the ways of men and unaccustomed to argue away their first warm impressions, would not long hesitate in pronouncing such an advantage, if not a palpable fraud, at least an ungenerous trick. It is not unlikely that most men would pronounce such an advantage a bold fraud, and would look upon a system of laws which would uphold it, as unjust and disgraceful.

No better proof of the universal agreement of the decisions of untutored moral feeling in such cases, need be required, than is furnished by the indignation which is so frequently excited when an unlettered man-or one of feeble intellect — is over-reached by his crafty and unprincipled neighbor. An opinion apparently so natural, seldom springs from caprice or accidental prejudice. It must be regarded as the spontaneous result of the moral observation and experience of our whole

lives. It may be difficult to analyze it into its elements, still it is irresistible in its conviction.

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This moral feeling, in a case like the one suggested, points at once to the motive or consideration for which B. parted with his property; to the idea or theory of giving and receiving equivalents. And it is argued that if the vendor, from the fact of being better informed, by extraneous circumstances, as to the true value of the thing sold, than the purchaser or from any other cause, should knowingly obtain more for it than it is worth or if, for want of equality of knowledge or accident, the buyer should get it for too little-in either case, one party has not received the equivalent which was the motive or consideration of the contract. As a matter of course, if this argument is sound-if it is sustained by reason and the dictates of morality—a contract made under circumstances of superior advantage to one or the other of the contracting parties, should be rescinded for want of equality

Now the question naturally occurs, whether it is possible, in the nature of things, to preserve exact equality in knowledge or value in the making of contracts?

It certainly would be a bold proposition to affirm that an individual cannot make an advantageous bargain without incurring the reproach of dishonesty. It would shock common sense to affirm that our code of morals prohibits an individual from exercising his sagacity and foresight in the making of agreements with his neighbor. While it is true that "knowledge is power," the experience of life teaches us that knowledge is the most useful capital employed in any business.

By common consent, the skilful and industrious are allowed the full benefit and enjoyment of that necessary superiority over their neighbors, which welldirected industry must always give. And it is fair to presume that no one will contend that it is essential to a fair bargain, or the making of a contract on principles of perfect equality, that the parties in respect to the subject matter should be required mutually to disclose their respective plans or anticipated profits.

All will allow that the hope of gain, leads to enterprise and activity, in the various pursuits and business of men. And it may be stated as an undeniable general proposition-subject, of course, to many exceptions-that the profits of every transaction, when not dependent on fortuitous circumstances, arise from the superiority of one party to the other, in some material knowledge in respect to the subject matter of the contract. This feature becomes more apparent as we extend our inquiries, and trace the analogy in different directions, of cases of the most opposite moral character- from the arts of deliberate knavery, to the fairest gains of skill and industry. Now, it is true, that the law of contracts, as it is settled in England and the United States, recognizes as its leading principles, faith must be preserved by the contracting parties towards each other; fraud or art on either side, affords good ground for the interference of the of the law, to protect or relieve the injured party.

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