ourselves only with the advantages and disadvantages which Hamburg as a separate state will have to expect from acceding to the Union; and as the proverb, that " Every man is his own nearest neighbour," is never more appropriate than in political questions, we shall specially have to take into consideration

1st. The financial point of view.

We consider that opinion to be the soundest, which sees in the Union nothing more than a financial measure, id est, a means, not indeed of a scientific guidance of commerce, or of the improvement of native at the expence of foreign industry; but only a means of increasing the revenues of the state, which otherwise would have to be levied in other, perhaps more burdensome, ways. The Prussian system will find in the raising of the tolls those three objects united, but it naturally lays no small weight on the financial point of view. It may be deduced from the first view of the very nature of the thing, that, by throwing down the toll barriers which formerly traversed Germany in all directions, the frontiers to be watched will be considerably shorter, the expense of watching and levying the dues will be so much diminished, and thus the net return of the duties will be increased. As, further, the toll is in reality a tax which in the end affects the consumer of the taxed goods, and the amount of it must, therefore, be an advantage to each separate state in proportion to the amount of its consumers who pay the tax, so, according to the system of the Union, the amount of duty under the united states is to be divided according to the supposed number of the consumers; that is, according to the proportion of the population. From this rule there is no exception in the hitherto known conventions, and even of the conventions to be concluded with Frankfort and Nassau, we know not that they are to contain an opposite provision. If, therefore, the question here arises, how the coffers of Hamburg would stand after acceding to the Union? we can only found our answer on the previous supposition, that, if we adhere to the same convention, the above-named principle will be followed.

Now, under this supposition, it appears there can be no doubt that Hamburg's state revenue from the toll, notwithstanding the

disproportionate height of the Prussian tariff in comparison with the one subsisting here, (half per cent Court of Banco, on the value of the goods) will not be increased at all; but, on the contrary, will probably be diminished. Materials are wanting to enable us to form accurate calculations, by which this can be maintained and proved; the present total income from duty is as little publicly known as the total amount of the Union tolls. Meantime, one can form a probable idea of the result which such calculations would afford, if one were to receive the following, certainly not quite incorrect principles, as made out:-The lands of the Customs' Union receive by far the greatest part of their transmarine articles of necessity through Hamburg. Hamburg sends by far the greatest portion of the goods which it imports from beyond sea into the territories of the Union. What the Customs' Union receives from other lands (Bremen, Antwerp, Rotterdam, &c.) is not much more than that which Hamburg sends into other than the toll united lands; therefore, the total transmarine imports into the Customs' Union are not much greater than the imports into the Hamburg harbours alone; and, indeed, one can set down, according to the measure of the population of the lands here coming under consideration, the proportion of the one to the other as of three to two. If, further, we reckon that of the goods here imported one-third (in value) enjoy, as despatched goods, the freedom of transit; two-thirds, on the contrary, are taxed (and, indeed, this duty amounts to about of the value) one receives, if one marks the value of the total imports, for the sake of brevity, with X, for the value of imports into Hamburgh X, and for the present amount of duty X. The population of the Union territory (Baden, Frankfort, Nassau, and Hamburg included) is estimated at 25,480,000; the population of Hamburg (according to the table of the Diet) at 130,000. Hamburg, therefore, by acceding to the Customs' Union, would receive of the total amount of the toll, which, for brevity's sake, we mark with Y, If, now, it be required that our state revenue, after acceding to the Union, should remain equal even to its present receipt, that, therefore, it be in other words, the

Y

4-9 X
200

=

1 450

1

200

X

= then Y must be

450

196

196X
450

98 226

X;

Y 196.

amount of toll of the Union must be Y

98

225'

or about 43 per cent.

of the value of the total import X. But, as now the Prussian toll, with all its high rates, still has not attained so extravagant a height, the reverse is to be deduced therefrom; viz. that our tollrevenue after the accession will not be equal to its present amount, but will be much less; and, indeed, less in the same proportion as the average amount of the Prussian toll rates is lower than 43 per cent of the value of the goods: the future amount of the duties could only become equal to the present when we should raise our present toll fromper cent of the value to an average of 43 per cent of the value-a measure which would border on insanity.

Another part of the financial question has relation to the division of the state revenues. It will be represented as one of the merits of the Customs' Union, that a greater uniformity of taxation will thereby be introduced into Germany. If there be essentially an advantage in this, still in relation to the direct taxation this operation of the new system will always belong to the remote and problematical, if it cannot be overlooked in weighing the grounds for and against the acceptation of the same. But, as regards the indirect taxes, it lies in the nature of things that these, by the introduction of the new Customs' Union, will experience an important modification. The duty on goods, or, more properly, only the import duty-for the export and transit duty is more a burdening of the foreign country, and of certain internal fabrics in favour of the state presents itself to the state which levies it essentially as a tax on the consumer. Therefore, in preparing the import duty tariff, we must principally consider whom that consumption tax affects, who are the consumers, who ought to pay from their consumption a duty to the state. M. von Nebenius has devoted to this subject from page 191 to 248 of his book. He begins with laying down the principle, that justice requires that by each tax the higher income must be taxed in a greater proportion in favour of the state, than the income of minor importance. To satisfy this demand completely would be very difficult, perhaps impossible; an approximation to the same

would consist in the acceptation of the Prussian toll tariff, which in its applications responds in a great measure to that demand.

If we now take, as certainly every one would gladly do, that superior principle of the Toll Union as the fairest and most just; if, furthermore, we admit that the applications of the Prussian tariff, in their relations to each other, are principally adapted to that principle, still the remark obtrudes itself, that the acceptation of the Prussian system of duties can clearly be only an approximation to that principle; therefore, in this view, can only be an improvement, where, before the acceptation of the new system, we were further removed from it; and then the question arises, as it is a question alone of the state or city of Hamburg, how the matter at present stands with regard to the repartition of duties. Does it correspond with the above asserted principle, that the higher income must be taxed higher than the lower, or is it opposed to that principle?

In order to contemplate the question briefly, we have among our four direct duties three which are based exactly on that principle, to which, therefore, they respond in a certain degree. The property and income tax (introduced by the Council and Burgher decree of 11th July, 1831,) is adjusted, as its name indicates, according to the income; is raised according to a certain per-centage of the same, and, therefore affects, exactly as the luxury tax united with it, that which is to be paid for country houses, riding horses and domestics, according to its nature, cach inhabitant paying according to the proportion of his income. The same holds good of the tax for demolishing the fortifications, which, although destined for a special temporary object, cannot be left unremarked upon among the rubrics of the income budget. It is calculated on the thousand of the fortune, or where there is no fortune, of the property, and, indeed, according to different classes, so that from the larger fortune there is also more derived per thousand than from the smaller-an income of 1000rxd. pays 1rxd. an income of 10,000, not 10, but 60.

Finally, the guard money tax, to pay the cost of the Burgher military from those who are dispensed from service, or are free by

sessor.

age or sex, is adjusted according to the rent; and as this is the rule, can be regarded as the surest measure of income (or of consumption) directly again according to this. There, then, remains the ground tax. Here, indeed, one may object, and justly, that this tax, if reckoned according to the amount of the ground tax, is not regulated according to the latter, as the revenue of a house is by no means generally in harmony with the income of the posHowever, one must allow at least, that, according to the rule, house proprietors do not belong to the poorer classes, that thence the ground tax does not affect in the rule the income of inconsiderable amount, and in so far does not respond to the above indicated principle. But, here we must take into consideration another argument. The principle, that the higher incomes must be burdened with higher taxes, is not the only one on which the system of apportioning the taxes should be founded. Not only greater income, but greater rights in the state, can justify the putting on higher burdens. If the former principle responds more to the requirements of equity, one may say of this latter one, that it satisfies more the demands of strict justice. The Burgher has not to thank the state for his larger income, but he undoubtedly owes to the state the enjoyment of greater state rights; these latter are founded on the constitution of the state, the former not: thus, with regard to his state rights, and not on account of his fortune, is he bound to higher sacrifices to the state. But, in our state, the ground proprietors are exactly those who enjoy the benefits of all political rights. They make the laws, they fix the taxes; they may, therefore, be the first to fulfil the former, to pay the latter. Almost all the other citizens and inhabitants, however, some functionaries excepted, abstain from making use of their political rights; and however much they were to pay in taxes from their incomes however they might be distinguished by talent and knowledge-and however much they may have worked by their activity in favour of the universal good, they have no voice in the high questions of the legislation and taxation of the budget. Hence, in our constitution lies the justification of the ground tax, which has been exposed to so manifold