cise twice or three times a day; they then select a trade for him, the apprenticeship to which is the sole diversion allowed to the labours of his new situation. The captains are responsible for the double instruction of the recruits. However strict may be their surveillance, it may well be imagined that much time is required for their apprenticeship. There is no other channel of instruction than the fear of corporal punishment.

The cavalry is recruited with men of the highest stature. The choice is made among the strongest aud tallest men of the levies for the heavy cavalry, and, in the absence of such men, they are taken from the infantry by the commandants of the corps, who, in general, have but little respect for the other qualities of the recruits, and for their aptitude in horsemanship.

The selection of the men destined for the artillery and the engineers is not made with greater care in Russia than that of the men enlisted in other branches of the service.

The recruits are treated, on arriving at their corps, as they are in the infantry. It often happens that several months elapse before they teach them, in the cavalry to bleed a horse; in the artillery, the service of the guns; and in the engineers, the labours of attack, and the construction of works for a campaign.

As all the garrison battalions are recruited with men of all arms, who, before they have attained the legal duration of their term, have no longer sufficient strength to continue in active ser vice, there is no exception to this general rule, but for the batta lions stationed in the governments of Orenburg and Siberia.

The regiments of the guards which, at the period of their institution, were to take their men from the grenadiers, recruit from the regiments of the line, not by taking the bravest men, as was done in Napoleon's guard, but by choosing those who unite with vouth figure and appearance. The Autocrat requires fine men for his parades.

CORRESPONDENCE.

AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

Paris, 19th Sept., 1836.

A month has elapsed since we first heard that disturbances were to break out in Portugal, and that it was intended to proclaim the Constitution of 1820 at Lisbon. I am enabled to assure you that this news was originally spread by the Miguelites residing at Paris, as well as by the agents of the Diplomacy of the North. At the same time our confidential correspondence with the North apprised us that Russia, and her ally Prussia, had the intention of pushing Portugal into a republican path, in order to prepare for the return of Don Miguel to that country. Letters from Rome contained similar indications, and gave reason to think that the Pope himself would promote republicanism in Spain as well as in Portugal, in order to further the ends of Don Carlos and Don Miguel. Finally, at the same period, we learnt that the regiments of Don Carlos had proclaimed the Constitution of 1812.

Last week vague rumours prevailed at Paris of the realization of these projects at Lisbon. It is possible that the Government was informed of them by the telegraph. Not much credit, however, was attached to them until to-day, when the fact is confirmed, and every one looks out for a remedy in this new crisis.

The public begins to be convinced that, under the pretext of the Constitution of 1820, the real question is the interest of Don Miguel. The public, therefore, cannot be opposed to intervention, under such circumstances; and they certainly would not compare an eventual expedition to the Peninsula with that which was undertaken in 1823 by the Duke d'Angoulême.

But the King seems still opposed to intervention; he continues to dread, however unjustly, that such an expedition may be compared to that of 1823; he does not wish to engage his Cabinet and his troops in new complications; he fears, also, that Russia would take advantage of such an intervention, to interfere in the affairs of Turkey. I still believe that, in the Council, M. Guizot is the least opposed to intervention; but, if he were to insist upon it, he would not be listened to by the King.

It is not improbable that Russia would be glad to take advantage of our intervention. The Russian Diplomatists at Paris say aloud that Russia knows of a project of coercive measures towards Portugal, on the part of England and France; that Russia, much more disinterested, is preparing to evacuate Silistria; but that she certainly would have the right to march to Constantinople, if the English and French were to appear at Lisbon.

One might certainly reply to Russian Diplomacy, first, that Turkey does not require their intervention, whilst the intervention might be demanded at London and at Paris by the Cabinet of Lisbon. One might add that in Turkey the Government and the status quo are not now essentially threatened, notwithstanding the conspiracies which Russia has been able to foment at Constantinople, whilst the case is very different in the Peninsula. In fact, one might intervene in Portugal and co-operate in Spain, at the same time that one might prevent the intervention of Russia, if one may make use of that expression, in Turkey. Still the King does not appear disposed to admit an intervention on the part of France.

If the King were to persist in this resolution, which is extremely probable, we might apprehend grave consequences to the Peninsula, in the encouragement thus given to the factious, and in the policy of the North, which, seeing France weakened by the events of the neighbouring countries, would assume a very threatening tone, and might push matters much farther.

As it is, the language of Northern Diplomacy towards France becomes insulting. The same diplomacy which has prepared the troubles in the Peninsula accuses the French Government of

being the author of them, by having afforded succour to the liberal refugees of Spain in 1830.

This reproach is particularly addressed to M. Molé, who be came Minister of the Interior after the Revolution of July. The "Journal des Debats" replies to it to-day, in an article which appears to emanate from the Cabinet of M. Molé.

To tell the whole truth, we admit, on the one hand, that M. Molé did not succour the refugees; on the other hand, we avow and proclaim that the partizans of the Government of July did give succour in 1830, and that the Government countenanced them with pleasure. The writer of these lines can certify that the subscription lists circulated in the offices of the Ministerial journals at Paris; he himself was called upon to put down his name, and he glories in having subscribed. He could indicate the name of the person, at that time intimately connected with the Government of July, who procured the signatures to the lists; he is certain that subscriptions took place at the houses of the Ministers and at Court. The subscriptions were quite as public as those raised in favour of Greece.

People believed that the North would declare war against France; France wished, indeed, to secure her frontiers on the side of Spain, even by means of the Propaganda. If France had had the good sense to apply a remedy to Northern insolence, she might have excited liberal feelings as far as Berlin and St. Petersburg. It is probable that Louis Philippe himself will end by being reduced to such an expedient.

M. MOLÉ, IN 1830.
I.

Conversation between M. Molé and the Prussian Envoy.

MUCH has been said of a diplomatic note which Count Molé, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1830, addressed to the Prussian government, with respect to Belgium; foreign journals, and even

the "Journal des Debats," at Paris, and the diplomatic circles, have often spoken of this note. This mode of exposing facts might afford Prussia a pretext for denying the circumstance, the substance of which was true; it is important, therefore, to state the facts as they really happened. The details we are about to give have not hitherto been explained.

The note of M. Molé to the Prussian government never existed; but M. Molé held a conversation in 1830 with the Minister Plenipotentiary of Prussia, Baron de Werther, which has the same importance, and which is doubly interesting by throwing light on an historical fact of first-rate interest, and of affording an opportunity for appreciating the character of Count Molé, who is at present Minister for Foreign Affairs, and President of the Council.

When, in 1830, the Belgic revolution broke out, as a consequence of the revolution of July, the Prussian government made a movement to send troops into Belgium; M. Molé, informed of these preparations, immediately addressed himself to Baron de Werther, and as there was some difficulty in bringing about an interview at the Hotel des Capucines, (the new government of France not yet being officially recognised by Prussia) the minister for Foreign Affairs, recalling to M. de Werther the remembrance of their former intimacy in society, invited him to a meeting at his private house in the Rue Ville d'Evêque.

M. de Werther repaired thither, and the following are the principal points of the conversation which followed.

Count Molé. Write to your Court that if a single Prussian soldier sets his foot in Belgium, France will instantly let loose her army, and we cannot foretell where our troops would stop.

Baron de Werther. (Irritated.) How! You expect to be recognized, and you have nothing to utter but threats?

Count Molé. And those threats would forthwith be followed by acts.

This conversation, which was doubtless scrupulously reported by M. de Werther in his despatches to his cabinet, must have necessarily produced an electric effect at Berlin. The Prussian