FALLACY OF THE RUSSO-GERMAN PRESS. [The following extract from a Wurtemberg journal shows the ingenious arguments with which Russia endeavours to blind European opinion to her real object. The memoir to which this letter refers is a genuine document, but the fallacy here adopted consists in the Russian Cabinet pretending that the conquest of Constantinople would divert her from her real aim-the acquisition of India; whereas the possession of Constantinople at once secures that aim, which never can be accomplished so long as the Bosphorus and the Euxine are accessible to a British fleet. We have marked in italics those passages in this extract which are expressly designed to mislead public opinion.] 66 23 September 28th, 1836: WHILST in western Europe the greatest attention is paid to those operations of Russia which affect the more proximate interests, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg appears anxious for the present to place these affairs in the back ground, in order to be able to devote her entire activity to Oriental affairs. It would appear as if Russia had entirely abandoned her aim of incorporating, at a more or less remote period, European Turkey with the Russian Empire, and to have adopted a vast and certain plan of extending Russian power towards the centre of the commerce of the world and of universal dominion. Men exalted by their station allude to the existence of a highly interesting memoir which was presented a few years ago to the Emperor by a talented Russian statesman,* in which the natural motives and the necessary results of the proposed line of policy were elucidated with the most perfect knowledge of the question. The author therein represented how fruitless and replete with danger would be the efforts of Russia for the conquest of Constantinople, where, if the object were even attained, in consequence of the many points of interest between the new and then Christian capital of the South and the remaining European states, and the constant threats of the maritime powers, who would thereby be affected, a new policy would arise, which would be anti-national, and might, sooner or later, effect the division of the empire. In the latter case, Russia would lose all the fruits of her former victories. Nay, one might safely maintain that the possession of Constantinople would, of necessity, entirely draw Russia from the object which her military power and her geographical position point out to her, namely, supremacy over Asia, and the speedy acquisition of India; or, in other words, universal dominion; because she would have to exert the entire efforts of her co lossal expansion to defend points against the European powers, probably Austria included, which, although of high importance in themselves, * General Yermaloff. ED. VOL. IV.NO. XXXIII. S S are still very disproportionate to the immeasurable advantages that are to be acquired in Asia. By such a course, her power towards the East would be checked. If Constantinople were even taken, still its possession must be maintained by constant wars, and by extension to the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean, where England, France, and Austria would follow every step, and might wage war for each important point. But Russia would augment her power and her dominion, under much more favouring circumstances, if she were to apply her exertions in the direct route to India. Here no European power can follow her, and, once arrived at the goal, it would only be necessary to engage England in a war, the issue of which could not be doubtful, in order to place the entire destinies of the world in the Emperor's hands, and the commerce of the world in the hands of the Russian nation. bay might as well be in the possession of Russia without the necessity of its causing a division in the empire, as it is at present in the possession of England, without injury to the national unity of Great Britain. But the possession of Constantinople would threaten Moscow and St. Petersburgh with a southern Greek empire. In the Bom * What must be Russia's appreciation of European intellect, when she can presume to put forth such contemptible fallacies! south, Russia's influence would be continually secured by the affection of the Greek Catholic population, and would thereby support the conquests to be made in Asia. The means assigned as specially necessary to the proposed end are the undisputed possession of the coasts of the Caspian, and the passes and mountains of the Caucasus, a preponderating influence in Persia, and the emigration of the Christian populations of Central Asia into the Russian provinces, acquired by conquest from Persia and Turkey.* A nerve of Russian power must be thereby formed in Central Asia, and thence in due time applied to the conquest of India. This new turn of Russia's policy is of infinitely more scientific importance, and it elucidates many appearances in her most recent diplomacy. The Porte appears already to have some anticipation of it, and looks with anxious regards to her Asiatic possessions, which cannot be defended at a critical moment, like European Turkey, by her oldest allies. Probably the Turkish ambassador, who is returning from Teheran, will be able to communicate to the Sultan further details of the plan laid down by Russia. D. C. *These are but the preparatives of Russia- means to the acquisition of India, which will promptly be made use of after the occupation of Constantinople.-ED. ON THE RELATION OF FRANCE TOWARDS THE GERMAN CUSTOMS' UNION. (FROM THE GERMAN OF DR. NEBENIUS®.) We rejoice to see many enlightened friends of freedom of trade, in that country which is bordered by the long extent of the Customs' Union, participating in our views on the union of the German states. Germany is concentrating itself: Germany feels the necessity of unanimity through a powerful tie it unites many hitherto independent members in one and the same bond: this bond is freedom of trade: it borrows from our revolution the means of peace it works the fall of its internal tolls-the animated and universal watchfulness which this mercantile alliance stirs up shows clearly that it is one of the greatest events of our epoch: it is, in our eyes, one of the brightest symptoms of the new era which has commenced for Europe."-Thus does a Frenchman greet the Union, in which he can perceive nothing that can occasion the slightest uneasiness to France. Without doubt the relations of France and Great Britain to the Union are, in many respects, essentially dissimilar. The trade hitherto between France and Germany, and particularly the interests of French manufacturing industry, are by no means affected in the same degree as the British trade and manufacturing interests by the Union Tariff. The relations of the products of the German countries, and those of their western neighbours, are of that kind, that, notwithstanding the circumscribing laws of France, the value of the mutual imports of products and all sorts of goods, taken as a whole, is, since that time, much more nearly equalized; and, besides, an understanding upon mutual facilitation is rendered much easier. Both parties have no unimportant trading interests in common, the powerful furtherance of which becomes possible through the Union-so far from the fa vourable position which Germany attains with regard to other countries being injurious to France, it is to be expected, on the * It is matter of infinite astonishment to us that this remarkable work has not been hitherto translated into English or French. |