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contained the proviso "not specially enumerated or provided for." The issue was, therefore, directly raised as to which of the said paragraphs contained the more specific and narrower enumeration.

Comparing the tariff act of 1883 with that of July 24, 1897, it will be observed that the enumeration for wearing apparel composed of cotton chief value, as appearing in paragraph 314 of the latter act, is limited by the phrase "not otherwise provided for." Referring to paragraph 370, it will be observed that the enumeration for wearing apparel of every description, composed wholly or in part of wool, is not limited by the phrase "not specially provided for," as was the case in paragraph 362 of the act of March 3, 1883, which formed the basis for the decision of the Supreme Court in Hartranft v. Meyer (135 U. S., 237). The phrase "not specially provided for," as appearing in paragraph 370, relates entirely to felts not woven, and can not, in the opinion of the Department, be held to refer back to clothing and articles of wearing apparel specially enumerated in the preceding portions of said paragraph. Therefore, wearing apparel composed wholly or in part of wool must be held to be specially enumerated in said paragraph without any restriction whatsoever, and as between such enumeration and that for wearing apparel composed of cotton or of which cotton is the component material of chief value not specially provided for, as appearing in paragraph 314, it is the opinion of the Department that the enumeration in paragraph 370 is specific and direct, and leaves no room for applying paragraph 314 to the tennis jackets involved in this case. For the reasons stated, the decision in Hartranft v. Meyer, relied upon by the Board of General Appraisers, is inapplicable.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Hartrauft v. Meyer was rendered April 28, 1890. That Congress had notice of this decision, and took pains to guard against the raising of the same issue under the tariff act of October 1, 1890, is plainly shown by the fact that in paragraph 392 of said act duties were imposed on manufactures of every description made wholly or in part of wool, while in paragraph 414 of the same act, which provided for manufactures of silk or of which silk is the component material of chief value, the following proviso was added: "That all such manufactures of which wool, or the hair of the camel, goat, or other like animals is a component material, shall be classified as manufactures of wool." In the tariff act of August 28, 1894, Congress omitted this proviso, and paragraphs 283 and 302 of that act, which provide, respectively, for manufactures composed wholly or in part of wool, not specially provided for, and manufactures of silk or of which silk is the component material of chief value, not specially provided for, are, therefore, a substantial reproduction of paragraphs 362 and 383 of the tariff act of 1883, for like goods, thus making the decision of the Supreme Court in Hartranft v. Meyer applicable to importations under that act. In the tariff act of July 24, 1897, Congress, however, again inserted the proviso: "That all manufactures, of which

wool is a component material, shall be classified and assessed for duty as manufactures of wool" (paragraph 391).

Taking into consideration, therefore, the previous history of tariff legislation in regard to the assessment of duties on manufactures composed wholly or in part of wool, it would appear that it was clearly the intention of Congress to leave no room for construction in matters pertaining to the assessment of duties on manufactures composed wholly or in part of wool, and that it was the intention of Congress to specially provide for such manufactures under proper paragraphs of the wool schedule, act of July 24, 1897.

You are, therefore, hereby directed to file an application for review of the said decision of the Board of General Appraisers (G. A. 4315), in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890. As the time within which an appeal may be taken will expire thirty days from December 7 last, you will please bring the matter to the attention of the United States attorney for your district at your earliest convenience, furnishing him with a copy of this letter.

Respectfully, yours,
(2991 i.)

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Baltimore, Md.

(20473.)

Sugar bounties.

W. B. HOWELL,

Assistant Secretary.

Department's circular, No. 199, of December 12, 1898, relative to sugar bounties, applicable only to sugars shipped to the United States on or after that date.-. Instructions as to refined sugars from Holland.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, January 3, 1899. GENTLEMEN: In reply to your letter of the 19th ultimo, I have to inform you that the provisions of Department Circular No. 199, of December 12, 1898, relative to sugar bounties, are applicable only to sugars shipped to the United States on or after that date, previous shipments remaining subject to the provisions of similar circulars in force at the time of such shipments.

Of the two classes of raw sugars produced in Holland, specified in said circular No. 199, the class receiving the lowest bounty, viz, sugars testing 98 per cent or above, is not at present produced in any considerable quantity, and, so far as the Department is informed, is not used in refining. Should the importers of any sugar from Holland claim that it was refined from raw sugar testing 98 per cent or above, such claim will be scrutinized with the utmost care, in view of the strong presumption to the contrary created by the existing conditions of the sugar industry in that country.

Respectfully, yours,
(6761 h.)

W. B. HOWELL,
Assistant Secretary.

Messrs. COMSTOCK & BROWN, New York, N. Y.

(20474.)

Production of certificates by Chinese.

Wives and children of Chinese of exempt classes must produce certificates.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, January 3, 1899.

SIR: The appended copy of an opinion, dated November 3 last, from the honorable the Attorney-General, wherein it is held that the wives and children of Chinese persons of the exempt classes are required to present, as a condition precedent to lauding, the certificate prescribed by section 6 of the act approved July 5, 1884, relating to the exclusion of Chinese, is transmitted for your information and official guidance. Respectfully, yours, W. B. HOWELL, Assistant Secretary.

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, San Francisco, Cal.

Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., November 3, 1898. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of October 31, in which you inform me that since the first of October, 1896, customs officers have been instructed, in accordance with Synopsis decision 17455, to require the certificate prescribed by section 6 of the act of July 5, 1884, relating to the exclusion of Chinese, to be presented by all applicants for admission to this country, without reference to sex or age, and that under my opinion of July 15 last such officers have been instructed that only such Chinese persons as are specifically enumerated, viz, officials, teachers, merchants, or travelers for curiosity or pleasure, shall be allowed admission upon presentation of the prescribed certificate. You state that the wife of Lee Yuen, a Chinese merchant resident of Rochester, N. Y., for ten years or more, has applied for admission to this country, but has not produced a certificate from the Government of China from which country she comes directly to the United States, and you refer to credible testimony submitted as to the meritorious standing of Lee Yuen as a merchant of the city named. On these facts you submit for my decision the question whether or not under the circumstances the woman should be allowed to join her husband.

In my opinion referred to, considering the right to admission of Chinese persons known as traders under a certain form of certificate, I reached the conclusion that a trader, not being expressly known to the laws as among the exempt classes, and not being properly included therein as a merchant, is not entitled to admission into the United States even upon a certificate framed in accordance with section 6 of the act of 1884. The broad result may be drawn from this opinion that no Chinese person not connected with the diplomatic service is entitled to admission into this country unless embraced in the classification marked out by the phrase "officials, teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for curiosity or pleasure." We now have to consider whether the wife of a Chinese merchant is properly to be excepted from this absolute exclusion.

In the case of Tung Yeong (19 Fed. Rep., 184) the court considered, under the treaty of 1880 and the act of 1882, the right of entry of certain Chinese children of tender years, and found there was no requirement

of law which would necessitate the denial to the parent of the custody of his child and the sending of the latter back to the country from which he came. The treaty of 1880, by article 2, accorded to Chinese subjects when proceeding to the United States as teachers, students, merchants, or travelers, together with their body and household servants, all the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions which are accorded to the subjects and citizens of the most favored nation. Section 6 of the act of May 6, 1882, as amended by the act of 1884, required from "every Chinese person other than a laborer who may be entitled by said treaty (the treaty of 1880) or this act to come within the United States," certificate of permission and identification from the Chinese Government or from the other foreign government of which at the time such Chinese person shall be a subject; and this amended section provided for the contents of such certificate and made the same the sole evidence permissible on the part of the applicant for admission to establish a right of entry into the United States.

In the case of Ah Quan (21 Fed. Rep., 182, 186) it was held that the wife or minor child of a man of the Chinese race other than a laborer entitled to come to the United States is a Chinese person entitled under the law to enter this country upon the production of the required certificate, but not otherwise, in view of the provisions of the amendatory act requiring a certificate, the court being satisfied that these provisions embraced every Chinese individual.

In the case of the Chinese Wife (21 Fed. Rep., 785), affecting the wife coming to this country for the first time, of a laborer returning under the laws then in force, Justice Field held that, although the status of the wife is not necessarily that of her husband, and she is, therefore, to be regarded as other than a laborer, she is, however, a distinct person and must furnish the certificate required; while Judge Sawyer thought that the status of the wife follows and partakes of that of the husband as one of his class, and that the wife was, therefore, to be excluded absolutely as a laborer.

In the case of Chung Toy Ho et al. (42 Fed. Rep., 398), Judge Deady held that the wife and children of a Chinese merchant, who was entitled, under article 2 of the treaty of 1880 and section 6 of the act of 1884, to come within and dwell within the United States are entitled to come into the country with him or after him as such wife and children without the certificate prescribed in said section 6, the court considering that the domicile of the wife and children is to be taken as that of the father, and concluded, therefore, that though they are not expressly mentioned in the treaty, the act of 1884 does not limit or restrict the privileges conceded by the treaty, but only adds a rule or measure of evidence by which they may be conclusively established. The learned judge further considers that the father is entitled to the company of his wife and the care and custody of his children by natural right, and ought not to be deprived of them unless the intention of Congress to the contrary is clear and unmistakable.

The cases of Wo Tai Li (48 Fed. Rep., 668) and Li Foon (80 Fed. Rep., 881) follow the earlier decisions exacting a certificate from all Chinese persons of the permitted classes, while the case of United States v. Gue Lim (83 Fed. Rep., 138) follows Judge Deady's decision in the case of Chung Toy Ho.

In United States v. Lee Yee Sing (85 Fed. Rep., 635) the court adheres to the opinion rendered in the case of Mrs. Gue Lim, but sustains the exclusion by the collector of customs of a minor child of a Chinese merchant domiciled in this country, on the ground that paragraph 6 of the

act of August 18, 1894 (2 Supp. R. S., 253) makes the decision of the appropriate government officer excluding an alien from admission into the United States final unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury.

In most of the foregoing cases it appears that the husband or father had duly acquired a commercial domicile in this country.

In the case of Lau Ow Bew v. United States (144 U. S., 47, 63), it was held that a Chinese merchant having a commercial domicile here may leave the country for temporary purposes and return without the production on his reentry of the certificate required by the act of 1884, and that the certificate is only required to be produced by Chinese persons of the exempted classes upon their original entry into the United States for travel, business, or to take up their residence.

The inquiry, then, in many cases, including the case before us is this. Is the status of the wife and her relation to her husband when he has become duly domiciled here, and is not, therefore, required to produce a certificate upon his return to the country after a temporary absence, to be taken as extending such exemption to her, so that upon the original entry of the wife of such a Chinese merchant she would not be required to produce a certificate, but merely to submit evidence as to her identity and valid relation to her husband sufficient to satisfy the collector of customs under the act of August 18, 1894 ?

Conceding that a fundamental natural right exists under the language of the treaties of 1880 and 1894, by which, in view of the relationship to the husband and father, a valid wife and legitimate minor children, or children of tender years, may be admitted to this country, I am clearly of opinion that this right in all cases must be established by the rule or measure of evidence laid down by section 6 of the act of 1884, namely, by the certificate therein required. I can perceive no valid distinction between the case of the wife of a Chinese merchant accompanying her husband to this country upon his original entry here, and that of the wife of such a merchant already domiciled here and entitled to remain in this country, who subsequently follows her husband and seeks to join him here, and for that purpose to enter the country for the first time. In both cases a certificate for the wife is requisite.

The status of a valid wife and her relation to her husband fairly embracing her with him in the permitted classes, if she is not in fact a laborer, does not extend so far as to confer upon her an immunity from the certificate requirement to which the husband is entitled because of his having acquired a domicile here. The wife is a distinct Chinese individual, and since all Chinese persons of the privileged classes must produce upon their original entry into this country the prescribed certificate (authorities cited ante; see, also, Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U. S., 424, 428), the wife of a merchant must in any case produce that certificate upon her original entry here.

I, therefore, answer your question by stating that the Chinese woman in this case, Mrs. Lee Yuen, should not be allowed to join her husband and remain in this country without the production of the proper certificate from the Government of China.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. GRIGGS, Attorney-General.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

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