nation this high satisfaction will follow a just and beneficial course of conduct; that what it regards with so much aversion, wili infallibly happen to it, if it fails in the propriety of its own behaviour, we may be sure that a strong security is gained for a good intercourse among nations. Besides this, it does not seem impossible to find various inconveniences to which, by way of penalties, those nations might be subjected, which refused to conform to the prescriptions of the International Code. Various privileges granted to other nations in their intercourse with one another might be withheld from that nation which thus demeaned itself in a way so contrary to the general interests. In so far as the withholding of these privileges might operate unfavourably upon individuals belonging to the refractory nations,-individuals who might be little, or not at all, accessory to the guilt-the effect would be the subject of proportional regret. Many, however, in the concerns of mankind, are the good things which can only be attained with a certain accompaniment of evil. The rule of wisdom, in such cases, is, to make sure that the good outweighs the evil, and to reduce the evil to its narrowest dimensions. The We may take an instance first from trivial matters. ceremonial of other nations might be turned against the nation, which, in this common concern, set itself in opposition to the interests of others. The lowest place in company, the least respectful situation on all occasions of ceremony, might be assigned to the members of that nation, when travelling or residing in other countries. Many of these marks of disrespect, implying injury neither to person nor property, which are checked by penalties in respect to others, might be free from penalties in respect to them. From these instances, adduced merely to illustrate our meaning, it will be easy to see in what manner a number of considerable inconveniences might, from this source, be made to bear upon nations refusing to conform to the beneficial provisions of the international code. nations, means to the same Besides the ceremonial of other end might be derived from the law. A number of cases might be found in which certain benefits of the law, granted to other foreigners, might be refused to them. They might be denied the privilege of suing in the courts, for example, on account of anything except some of the higher crimes, the more serious violations. of person or property. [11] Among other things, it is sufficiently evident, that this Tribunal would be the proper organ for the trial of piracy. When preponderant inconvenience might attend the removing of the trial to the usual seat of the tribunal, it might delegate for that purpose the proper functionaries to the proper spot. By the application of the principles, which we have thus expounded, an application which implies no peculiar difficulty, and requires nothing more than care in the detail, we are satisfied that all might be done, which is capable of being done, toward securing the benefits of international law. A FEDERAL SUPREME COURT. BY JOHN STUART MILL, 1806-1873. In his treatise on Representative Government, Mr. Mill has the following "considerations" :— To render a Federation advisable several conditions are necessary. 1. That there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. 2. That the separate States be not so powerful as to be able to rely for protection against foreign encroachments on their individual strength. 3. A third condition, not less important than the two others, is that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting States. There are two different modes of organising a Federal Union : 1. The federal authorities may represent the Governments solely, and then acts may be obligatory only on the Governments as such : 2. Or, they may have the power of enacting laws and issuing orders which are binding directly on individual citizens. The former is the plan of the German so-called Confedera- A SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. The other Under the more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of each particular State owes obedience to two Governments, that of his own State, and that of the Federation, it is evidently necessary not only that the constitutional limits of the authority of each should be precisely and clearly defined, but that the power to decide between them in any case of dispute should not reside in either of the Governments, or in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire independent of both. There must be a Supreme Court of Justice, and a system of subordinate Courts in every State of the Union, before whom such questions shall be carried, and whose judgment on them, in the last stage of appeal, shall be final. 2. Every State of the Union, and the Federal Government itself, as well as every functionary of each, must be liable to be sued in those Courts for exceeding their powers, or for nonperformance of their federal duties, and must in general be obliged to employ those Courts as the instrument for enforcing their federal rights. 3. This involves the remarkable consequence, actually realised in the United States, that a Court of Justice, the highest Federal tribunal, is supreme over the various Governments, both State and Federal; having the right to declare that any law made, or act done by them, exceeds the powers assigned to them by the Federal Constitution, and, in consequence, has no legal validity. 4. The tribunals which act as umpires between the Federal and the State Governments naturally also decide all disputes between two States, or between a citizen of one State and the Government of another. The usual remedies between nations, war and diplomacy, being precluded by the federal union, it is necessary that a judicial remedy should supply their place. 5. The Supreme Court of the Federation dispenses international law, and is the first great example of what is now one of the most prominent wants of civilised society, a real International Tribunal. 6. The powers of a Federal Government naturally extend not only to Peace and war, and all questions which arise between the country and foreign Governments, but to making any other arrangements which are, in the opinion of the States, necessary to their enjoyment of the full benefits of union. THE POSSIBLE MEANS OF PREVENTING WAR IN EUROPE. BY THE LATE PROFESSOR SIR J. R. SEELEY, K.C.M.G., Litt.D. (From a Lecture delivered February 28th, 1871.) Civil Society has for its principal object the prevention of private war, and if war between individuals, between townships, between countries, between particular nations can be prevented, can be permanently abolished, why not between nations generally? Compared with any properly organised legal system, what is deemed the justice of war is simply deplorable. If there is some justice in war there is not anything like enough of it. A proper legal decision is not one in which justice enters; but one in which nothing but justice enters. The proper cure for popular indifference is a feasible and statesmanlike scheme of Arbitration, such a scheme as should take account of details, and provide contrivances to meet practical difficulties. The object of this lecture is to offer some suggestions to those who may wish to find out in what way a system of International Arbitration can practically be realised. The introduction of such a system involves a vast number of political changes, but is not on that account to be considered Utopian, because a Utopian scheme is not merely a vast one, but one which proposes an end disproportionate to the means at command, whilst the means available here, the forces, the in |