fluences that may be called in for the accomplishment of this work, are as enormous as the difficulty of the work itself.

I. The international system wanted is something essentially different from, and cannot be developed out of, the already existing system by which European affairs are settled in Congresses of the Great Powers.

What is wanted is something in the nature of a Law-court for international differences. Now, a European Concert has nothing of the nature of a Law-court, and when people call it an Areopagus, or apply to it other epithets proper to judicial assemblies, they are surely guilty of an inadvertence which needs only to be briefly indicated. A Law-court may, of course, have many defects, and yet not cease to be a law-court; but the defect of the European Congress is not an incidental and venial, but a radical, and, therefore, fatal defect. What should we think of a judicial bench every member of which was closely connected by interests with the litigants, and on which, in the most important cases, the litigants themselves invariably sat?

cause.

That the judges should be avowedly partial is quite enough to strip them of all judicial character; but when the litigants are among the great European powers they are judges in their own An ambassador cannot be at the same time a judge; and a Congress of plenipotentiaries cannot possibly be a Law-court. There ought to be no representation of interests on a judicial bench. A good court is, not where both parties are represented on the bench, but where neither is.

II. The system wanted necessarily involves a Federation of all the Powers that are to reap the benefits of it.

We have a problem of Federation before us, and not merely of constituting a law-court. The law-court is not only historically found invariably within the State, but it also takes all its character and efficiency from the State. It is a matter of

demonstration that a State is implied in a law-court, and as a necessary consequence, that an international law-court implies an international State. The nations of Europe must therefore constitute themselves into some sort of federation, or the international court can never come into existence. Judges cannot constitute themselves, and a judicial assembly is inconceivable without a legislative assembly of some kind executing its sentences.

III. In order to be really vigorous and effectual, such a system absolutely requires a federation of the closer kind; that is, a federation not after the model of the late German Bund, but after the model of the United States, a federation with a complete apparatus of powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, and raised above all dependence upon State Governments.

In spite of their one internal war the American Union may be said to have solved the problem of the abolition of war, and we may see there the model which Europe should imitate in her international relations. Now this great triumph of the Union was achieved on the very ground upon which an earlier confederation had conspicuously failed in the same undertaking; and a comparison of the two federations shows that where the federal organisation was lax, and not decisively disentangled from the State organisation, the federation failed; it succeeded when the federal bond was strengthened.

IV. The indispensable condition of success in such a system, is that the power of levying troops be assigned to the Federation only, and be absolutely denied to the individual States.

The special lesson which is taught by the experience of the Americans is, that the decrees of the Federation must not be handed over for execution to the officials of the separate States, but that the Federation must have an independent and separate executive, through which its authority must be brought to bear directly upon individuals. The individual must be distinctly conscious of his obligations to the Federation, and of his member.

ship in it; all federations are mockeries that are mere understandings between governments.

"There has been found hitherto but one substitute for war. It has succeeded over and over again; it succeeds regularly in the long run wherever it can be introduced. This is, to take the disputed question out of the hands of the disputants, to refer it to a third party, whose intelligence, impartiality, and diligence have been secured, and to impose his decision upon the parties with overwhelming force. The last step in this process, the power of enforcing the decisions by the federal union only, ist just as essential as the earlier ones, and if you omit it you may just as well omit them too."

[But, happily, historical fact does not agree with this statement of Professor Seeley; for in the instances of successful arbitration, to which he has just referred, there is not a single one in which force has had to be employed in order to compel obedience to the decision of the arbitrator. This follows from the nature of the reference to Arbitration, in which it is essential that the contending parties should agree together to refer the matter in dispute to Arbitrators, and should, by implication if not formally, as is sometimes done, bind themselves to carry out the award, which then becomes a matter of honour and good faith.-ED.]

ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

BY DR. J. C. BLUNTSCHLI.

1867.

I. Parties, between whom differences have arisen, may refer the settlement of their dispute to Arbitration.

2. As a rule, the parties who desire Arbitration have the right of freely appointing the Arbitrator.

3. If the parties cannot agree in the choice of Arbitrators, each of thern is allowed to choose an equal number. In the absence of a special agreement, the choice of an umpire is made by the Arbitrators themselves or remitted by them to some neutral person or power.

4. The Arbitral Tribunal, when it is composed of several persons, acts as a corporate body. It hears the parties, examines witnesses and experts, weighs the important facts and considers the evidence.

5. The Tribunal is authorised, in case of doubt, to make to the parties equitable proposals with a view to the adjustment of the difference.

6. The Tribunal decides on the interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement, and, as to its own competency in conformity therewith.

7. The decision of the majority has the force of a decision of the whole Tribunal.

8. The decision of the Tribunal has for the parties the force of an Agreement or Treaty.

SCHIEDSRICHTERLICHES VERFAHREN.

VON DR. J. C. BLUNTSCHLI.

1867.

1. Die streitenden Parteien können auch die Erledigung ihres Streites einem Schiedsgericht übertragen.

2. In der Regel steht es den Parteien, welche ein Schiedsgericht berufen, frei, zu bestimmen, wem das Schiedsrichteramt übertragen werde.

3. Vertragen sich die Parteien nicht über gemeinsam zu ernennende Schiedsrichter, so ist anzunehmen, jede Partei wähle ihre Schiedsmänner frei, aber in gleicher Anzahl, wie die Gegenpartei. Ist nicht verabredet, wie der Obmann zu bezeichnen sei, so steht es den beiderseitigen Schiedsrichtern zu, entweder den Obmann gemeinsam zu wählen oder einem unparteiischen Dritten die Wahl desselben anheim zu geben.

4. Das aus mehreren Personen bestehende Schiedsgericht handelt gemeinsam als Ein Körper. Es vernimmt die Parteien und je nach Umständen auch Zeugen und Sachverständige, prüft die erheblichen Thatsachen und erhebt die erforderlichen Beweise.

5. Das Schiedsgericht gilt im Zweifel als ermächtigt, den Parteien billige Vergleichsvorschläge zu machen.

6. Das Schiedsgericht urtheilt über die Auslegung des Compromisses der Parteien und demgemäss über seine Competenz.

7. Der Spruch der Mehrheit gilt als Spruch des ganzen Schiedsgerichts.

8. Der Spruch des Schiedsgerichts wirkt für die Parteien, wie ein Vergleich.