Assemblée, en chemise, la torche au poing, toujours par le propre jugement de ses propres confrères, qui encourront la même peine sans y rien changer, s'ils n'en décident selon l'intention de ces instructions.

25. Unissant ces instructions à celles que j'ai données dans mon Testament politique, il n'y a point d'apparence que la maison d'Autriche ne prospère, que toute l'Europe n'ambitionne d'être sous sa domination, et qu'elle ne supplante peu à peu tous ceux qui lui résistent.

26. Il faut admettre dans cette Chambre les sujets des pays nouvellement conquis, reconnus habiles et éprouvés fidèles, afin que chacun trouve un rang dans l'Etat, à proportion du mérite que le ciel lui aura communiqué, les observant de près, aux mêmes droits et dangers de punition que dessus; par où personne ne sera indisposé contre le sage gouvernement de la Famille dominante, et on évitera ce qui arrive aujourd'hui au gouvernement d'Espagne, qui n'a pour amis ni parents, ni alliés, ni sujets acquis, ni ennemis déclarés.

Signé CHARLES DE LORRAINE.

WILLIAM PENN'S EUROPEAN DIET, PARLIAMENT, OR ESTATES, 1693-94.

This scheme, which was given to the world by Penn in his "Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates," and first published in 1693-94, is not a reproduction of Henry IV.'s Grand Design. Penn, as indeed he confesses at the close of the Essay, may have owed to it the formal suggestion of his plan, but that is all.

That plan was the creation of a permanent Sovereign Tribunal ―an International Parliament or Congress, which should exercise judicial functions as well as deliberative, and also act as a Committee of Safety. The judicial function was the chief feature of this proposed permanent Diet.

Penn's proposals then were :

Earlier sections of the Essay :—

[SECT. I. Of Peace, and its Advantages.]

[SECT. II. Of the Means of Peace, which is Justice rather than War] [SECT. III.

Government, its Rise and End under all Models.]

[SECT. IV. Of a General Peace, or the Peace of Europe, and the Means of it.] In my first Section, I showed the Desirableness of Peace; in my next, the Truest Means of it; to wit, Justice not War. And in my last, that this Justice was the Fruit of Government, as Government itself was the Result of Society which first came from a Reasonable Design in Men of Peace.

1. That the Sovereign Princes of Europe should, for the love of Peace and Order, agree to meet, by their appointed Deputies, in a General Diet, Estates, or Parliament, and there establish Rules of Justice for their mutual observance.

Now if the Soveraign Princes of Europe, who represent that Society, or Independent State of Men that was previous to the Obligations of Society, would, for the same Reason that engaged Men first into Society, viz.: Love of Peace and Order, agree to meet by their Stated Deputies in a General Dyet, Estates, or Parliament,

2. That this body should meet yearly, or once in two or three years at furthest, or as they should see cause.

and there Establish Rules of Justice for Soveraign Princes to observe one to another; and thus to meet Yearly, or once in Two or Three Years at farthest, or as they shall see Cause,

3. That it should be styled the Sovereign, or Imperial, Diet, Parliament, or States of Europe.

and to be stiled, The Soveraign or Imperial Dyet, Parliament or States of Europe.

4. That before this Sovereign Assembly should be brought all differences depending between one Sovereign and another, that cannot be adjusted by diplomatic means before its sessions begin.

before which Soveraign Assembly, should be brought all Differences depending between one Soveraign and another, that can not be made up by private Embassies before the Sessions begin;

5. That if any of the Sovereignties constituting this Imperial Diet should refuse to submit their claims or pretensions to the Diet, or to accept its judgment, and should seek their remedy by arms, or delay compliance beyond the time specified, all the other Sovereignties, uniting their forces, should compel submission to, and performance of, the sentence and payment of all costs and damages

and that if any of the Soveraignties that Constitute these Imperial States, shall refuse to submit their Claim or Pretensions to them, or to abide and perform the Judgment thereof, and seek their Remedy by Arms, or delay their Compliance beyond the Time prefixt in their Resolutions, all the other Soveraignties, United as One Strength, shall compel the Submission and Performance of the Sentence, with Damages to the Suffering Party, and Charges to the Soveraignties that obliged their Submission. To be sure, Europe would quietly obtain the so much desired and needed Peace, to Her harassed Inhabitants; no Sovereignty in Europe having the Power and therefore can not show the Will to dispute the Conclusion; and, consequently, Peace would be procured, and continued in Europe.

[SECT. V. Of the Causes of Difference, and Motives to Violate Peace.] [SECT. VI. Of Titles, upon which those Differences may arise.]

6. The composition of this Imperial Diet should be by proportionate representation.

[SECT. VII. Of the Composition of these Imperial States.]

The Composition and Proportion of this Soveraign Part, ox Imperial State, does, at the first Look, seem to carry with it no small Difficulty what votes to allow for the Inequality of the Princes and States. But with Submission to better Judgments, I can not think it invincible; 7. The determination of the number of persons or votes for every Sovereignty would not be impracticable if it depended on an estimate of the yearly value of their respective countries.

For if it be possible to have an Estimate of the Yearly Value of the several Soveraign Countries, whose Delegates are to make up this August Assembly, The Determination of the Number of Persons or Votes in the States for every Soveraignty will not be impracticable. 8. This estimate was to be reached "by considering the revenues of lands, the exports and entries at the Custom Houses, the books of rates, and surveys, that are in all Governments, to proportion taxes for their support."

Now that England, France, Spain, the Empire, &c., may be pretty exactly estimated, is so plain a Case, by considering the Revenue of Lands, the Exports and Entries at the Custom Houses, the Books of Rates, and Surveys that are in all Governments, to proportion Taxes for the Support of them, that the least Inclination to the Feace of Europe will not stand or halt at this objection. I will, with Pardon on all Sides give an Instance far from Exact; nor do I pretend to it, or offer it for an Estimate; for I do it at Random: Only this, as wide as it is from the Just Proportion, will give some Aim to my Judicious Reader, what I would be at : Remembering, I design not by any Computation, an Estimate from the Revenue of the Prince, but the Value of the Territory, the Whole being concerned as well as the Prince. And a Juster Measure it is to go by, since one Prince may have more Revenue than another, who has much a Richer Country: Tho' in the instance I am now about to make, the Caution is not so necessary, because, as I have said before, I pretend to no Manner of Exactness, but go wholly by Guess, being but for Example's Sake. I suppose the Empire of Germany to send Twelve; France, Ten; Spain, Ten; Italy, which comes to France, Eight; England, Six; Portugal, Three ; Sweedland, Four; Denmark, Three: Poland, Four; Venice, Three; the Seven Provinces, Four; The Thirteen Cantons, and little Neighbouring Soveraignties, Two; Dukedoms of Holstein and Courland, One: And if the Turks and Muscovites are taken in, as seems but fit and just, they will make Ten apiece more. The Whole makes Ninety. A great Presence when they represent the Fourth, and now The Best and Wealthiest Part of the Known World; where Religion and Learning, Civility and Arts have their Seat and Empire.

9. It is not absolutely necessary that there should be as many Delegates as votes; for the votes may be given by one Delegate as well as by ten or twelve.

But it is not absolutely necessary there should be always so many Persons, to represent the larger Soveraignties; for the Votes may be given by one Man of any Soveraignty, as well as by Ten or Twelve : 10. Though the fuller, that is, the larger, the assembly is, the more solemn, effectual, and free the debates will be, and its resolutions will carry greater authority.

Tho' the fuller the Assembly of States is, the more Solemn, Effectual, and Free the Debates will be, and the Resolutions must needs come with greater Authority.

11. The place of the first session should be central, as much as is possible; afterwards as the Assembly itself shall determine. The Place of their First Session should be Central, as much as is possible, afterwards as they agree.

12. To avoid quarrel for precedence the room may be round, and have several doors to come in and go out at.

[SECT. VIII. Of the Regulations of the Imperial States in Session.]

To avoid Quarrel for Precedency, the Room may be Round, and have divers Doors to come in and go out at, to prevent Exceptions. 13. The Assembly may be divided into sections, containing each ten members, each section to elect one of its number to preside over the Assembly in turn.

If the whole number be cast in Tens, each chusing One, they may preside by Turns,

14. All speeches should be addressed to the President, who should collect the sense of the debates and state the question before the vote is taken.

to whom all Speeches should be addressed, and who should collect the sense of the Debates, and state the Question for a Vote,

15. The voting should be by ballot, after the prudent and commendable method of the Venetians.

which, in my Opinion, should be by the Ballot after the Prudent and Commendable Method of the Venetians: Which, in a great Degree, prevents the ill Effects of Corruption; because if any of the Delegates of that High and Mighty Estates could be so Vile, False, and Dishonorable, as to be influenced by Money, they have the Advantage of taking their Money that will give it them and of Voting undiscovered to the Interest of their Principles, and their own Inclinations; as they