Ambassador in London, instructing him to renew the offer of mediation.70 On August 14, an official note, covering the American position on the points at issue between the United States and Great Britain, which the Russian Chancellor had requested, was presented, together with a printed copy of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1813, with reference to the non-employment of British seamen and other regulations to become effective when the war was over. Five days

later, Adams, in an interview with the Chancellor, urged upon him the importance of positive information as to the acceptance or rejection of the Russian proposal by Great Britain in order that Bayard and Gallatin might not be unnecessarily detained. The Chancellor replied that he could make no positive statement. A few weeks later, November 2, in an official interview he told Harris, the secretary of the mission, that the Russian Ambassador had expressed his unwillingness to present the second note which had been sent him inasmuch as Great Britain had already announced her decision to the Russian Emperor." The declination of the British Government was also learned from Lord Walpole, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The commissioners endeavored to secure from the Chancellor an official statement of the fact

70 American Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 17, 1813; Writings of Gallatin, I., 569-574.

71 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 539.

of Great Britain's refusal. This he declined to make on the ground that he had not been officially informed by the Emperor.72 Months passed and no official information was received by the mediation envoys.

The American commissioners were thus placed in a most exasperating position. They had powers to treat under the mediation, but no one with whom to treat. They were conscious that the fruitlessness of the mission would add to the factional feeling at home. Though annoyed at the evasive methods employed by the Russian Government, they still felt obliged to remain at St. Petersburg until officially informed of the refusal of Great Britain. There was less objection to the delay, however, since they hoped to receive new instructions from the President relating to the overtures of Great Britain for direct negotiations." Nevertheless, the commissioners at last grew restive, and Bayard decided to remain no longer at St. Petersburg. He addressed a note to the Chancellor announcing his intention of leaving and asking for his passports. He and Gallatin left St. Petersburg on January 25, and proceeded to London.75

72 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 539.

73

73 Adams to Monroe, Dec. 30, 1813; MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 125.

74 Bayard to Romanzoff, Jan. 7, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 137-147.

75 Adams to Monroe, Jan. 29, 1814; MS., Bureau of In

Two weeks passed and no official communication came from the Russian Government with reference to the British note. Adams, then, believing that the Emperor did not intend to make public Great Britain's refusal of mediation, determined to prove the fact. He accordingly requested of the Chancellor that he be given a copy of the British Ambassador's note to which reference had been made.76 Romanzoff replied that he had been informed by Count Lieven that Lord Castlereagh had communicated directly with the Government at Washington suggesting that instructions for a direct negotiation be sent to the American commissioners through the medium of Admiral Warren." Count Lieven's despatch, containing this information, was shown to Adams. The Chancellor was deeply chagrined that the official papers received from London had not been sooner communicated to him.78 He considered himself so ill treated in the matter that he offered his resignation to the Emperor." It was shown later that the final refusal on the part of Great Britain to accept mediation had been communicated the

76 Adams to Clay, Feb. 2, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 137

141.

77 Romanzoff to Adams, Feb. 4, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 142.

78 Adams to Gallatin and Bayard, Feb. 6, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 150-154.

79 Adams to Monroe, Feb. 4, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 147-149.

first of September to Count Nesselrode, the Russian Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Lord Cathcart, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.80 Count Nesselrode was with the Emperor at his headquarters with the army when the note was received, and he failed to send it to the Chancellor, whose influence in the Russian Government was waning. The annoying circumstances in which the American commissioners had been placed was due to Russian politics, the Emperor evidently wishing to force the resignation of Count Romanzoff.

80 Cathcart to Nesselrode, Sept. 1, 1813; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 622.

CHAPTER IV

ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS

While the American commissioners were delayed at St. Petersburg in connection with the fruitless mission of mediation, the British Government had been arranging for a direct negotiation. The Prince Regent, upon learning that the commissioners were not averse to a negotiation at London or Gothenburg, but that their powers were limited to the negotiation under the mediation of Russia, ordered sent to the port nearest the seat of Government of the United States a flag of truce, with an official note offering direct negotiations. The note, addressed by Lord Castlereagh, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the Secretary of State of the United States, said that the British Government was "willing to enter into discussion with the Government of America for the conciliatory adjustment of the differences subsisting between the two States, with an earnest desire on their part to bring them to a favorable issue, upon principles of perfect reciprocity, not inconsistent with the established maxims of public law, and with the maritime rights of the British empire." This communication, brought

1 Castlereagh to Secretary of State, Nov. 4, 1813; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 621.