British note of August 19, and declared that these would only be a fit subject of deliberation when it became necessary to decide upon the expediency of an absolute surrender of national independence.58

The American ministers expected an immediate reply which would terminate the negotiations; but not until September 4 did they receive an answer. Meantime despatches had been sent by George M. Dallas to America announcing the failure of the negotiations.

On the day before the American note was received, the British ministers had written to their Government asking whether, in case the American ministers refused to accept the basis of uti possidetis, even for a provisional article, they should break off negotiations.59

60

The note of the American ministers was sent to Castlereagh, then in Paris, for information as to the nature of the reply that should be made. He answered that no written reply should be given to the American note save under instructions of the British Cabinet; but that a verbal communication should be made to the Ameri

58 American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711–713.

59 Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 24, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 190-191.

60 Goulburn to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; Wellington's Suppplementary Despatches, IX., 193-194. British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 102.

can ministers apprising them of the fact that their note had been referred to the British Government.81

Castlereagh at once sent the despatches and letters from the British ministers to the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool. In a personal letter he stated that in his discussions with the British ministers at Ghent he had proposed that the proposition on Indian limits should be given less peremptorily, especially the phrase “it is equally necessary"; but that the British ministers had opposed any change for fear of appearing to weaken. Upon the words "purchase or otherwise" he had also cautioned them from committing themselves without further authority. He considered the whole territorial question one of expediency, not to be insisted on if it would result in a rupture of the negotiations. For the war to be continued on the part of Great Britain for territorial aggression, as it would be represented, would make the war popular in America. Castlereagh made the suggestion of proposing to the American ministers a provisional article for them to sign on the subject of Indian pacification, separate from the question of territorial limits.62

Before the papers from Castlereagh reached London, the Cabinet had had under advisement despatches

61 Castlereagh to Goulburn, Aug. 28, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 196.

62 Castlereagh to Earl Liverpool, Aug. 28, 1814; Welling

and notes which had been sent direct from Ghent, and the general outline of the answer proposed by the British ministers was approved; but the peace ministers were criticized in so presenting the British policy in their notes as to have made a rupture possible on the territorial question alone. The members of the Cabinet expressed the fear that a break on that basis. would unite all the parties in America in favor of the continuance of the war. It was declared important to place the responsibility of the rupture, if it was to take place, clearly upon the American ministers.63 The recent military successes in Canada, however, mitigated against the Cabinet's consenting to lower appreciably the British demands.

64

When sending the American note to their Government the British ministers had enclosed a projected reply. In the letter of the same date they expressed embarrassment over the words "perfect reciprocity," which the Americans had insisted were used in Castlereagh's note of November 4, 1813, but which were not found in the copy which had been given them of the

63 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 2, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 214. Liverpool to Wellington, Sept. 2, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 211-213.

64 Goulburn to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 193-194. Memoirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 99-100. British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; MS., British Foreign Office,

5, 102.

document in the Foreign Office relating to the same matter of the date of October 30, 1813. The ministers requested a copy of the letter of November 4, 1813. The American version was shown to be correct, when the British note was later published.

In view of the British insistence upon the establishment of an independent Indian territory as a sine qua non, the American commissioners gave up all hope of agreement upon a treaty. They decided to give up their house at the end of the month, though later they concluded to keep it until the middle of September, and Adams discussed with his colleagues the advisability of his return to St. Petersburg. The two missions gave the usual formal dinners in anticipation of the closing of a negotiation.

CHAPTER VI

THE INDIAN QUESTION AND THE CANADIAN BOUNDARY

The American ministers, after sending their note of August 24, were kept waiting a week before any word was returned from the British ministers, and then there came only the announcement that the American note had been referred to the British Government. The Americans had attributed the delay to the desire of the British ministers "to give a greater appearance of deliberation and solemnity to the rupture." As a matter of fact, it only illustrated what was shown throughout the negotiations: that the British commissioners were mere puppets in the hands of the British Cabinet.

On the first of September, Adams had an extended conversation with Goulburn about the British proposals. This interview was by no means reassuring to Adams, and in his report of it to Secretary Monroe he wrote: "In the whole tenor of his discourse I perceived not only an inflexible adherence to the terms which we had rejected, but, under the cover of a personal deportment sufficiently courteous, a rancorous animosity against America which disclosed that there was nothing