ages the Slavonic nations around the Danube were, in different degrees, under Turkish rule; that they have been advancing in power and wealth while their tyrants have been a declining caste; and, finally, that Russia necessarily is at once the protector of these communities and the natural foe of their Moslem oppressors, it is impossible not to see that this state of things inevitably led to a tremendous conflict. It is more important for us to note the attitude with respect to the crisis of the two powers which, on this great occasion, might have shaped the destiny of this part of Europe. We cannot doubt that more or less ambition was intermingled with purer motives in the conduct of Russia in 1875-6, and she will be condemned by history if her present triumph is sullied by intrigue or the lust of conquest. On the other hand, it was, no doubt, difficult for England to recede on a sudden from what had been her traditional policy, and to abandon her support of the Turk; and she is perfectly within her rights to see that her interests shall receive no injury at the present juncture. But we must not the less express our regret that England and Russia did not coöperate in the great deliverance which seems now accomplished; and we are firmly convinced that this very alliance, negotiated wisely, and under just conditions, would not only perhaps have assured the freedom of European Turkey without war, but would have been the best means of maintaining the rights we seek to uphold in this part of the continent. As events have turned out, whatever her motives, Russia has become the liberator of the Slavonic race, from the Carpathians to the verge of the Bosphorus, while the government of England, we say it with shame, has done nothing to promote this object, nay, has crossed and opposed it in every way; the result being that England has had no share in one of the grandest of human achievements. 9. A few words must now be said on the resources and the military position of the belligerent powers when the contest began. The armies of Russia were, beyond question, incomparably superior to those of the Turks, in numbers, efficiency, and worth in the field; and, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, this was demonstrated in the course of the struggle. The czar disposed of probably six hundred thousand warriors; and though the organization of this powerful force was, in some respects, very far from perfect, it was infinitely better than that of their enemies, comparatively useless in the open field, from a deficiency in most of the requirements of war. On the other hand, the Turks had contrived to assemble more numerous and even better-appointed arrays than generally had been supposed in Europe. The collective strength of their armies perhaps was from three hundred thousand to four hundred thousand men; and though these levies had in a great degree the character of the hordes of the East, they had one advantage over their disciplined foes,-a superiority in arms, which, in defensive warfare, made them adversaries of the most formidable kind. There was less disparity, therefore, in the hostile forces than many observers believed beforehand, and the inferiority of the Turks was to some extent compensated by the conditions of the strife. As the Russians of course would assume the offensive, they would necessarily encounter many obstacles of a natural and artificial kind: in Asia the mountain chains of Armenia and the strong places that cover Erzeroum; in Europe, the Danube, the Bulgarian fortresses, the Balkans, and the immense distances between the Pruth and the plains of Roumelia; and these circumstances concurred to favor a belligerent on the defensive in the highest degree. Add to this that the Turks had the great advantage of the uncontrolled command of the sca, that is, possessed the means of throwing their forces on almost every point of the theatre of war with comparative rapidity and with little risk, and we shall understand how, for a few months at least, the contending powers were not wholly unmatched. For the rest, the Russian commanders were not, as a general rule, superior men; and though, with some exceptions, they were more versed in war than the nominees of the corrupt Nurgish court, many among them, when hostilities began, seem to have had a doubt as to what was to be done, and were either over-confident or timid in the extreme. - 10. War was proclaimed by Russia in April of last year (1877), and Asia Minor became the first scene of the conflict. On this theatre the Grand Duke Michael had assembled an army which has been described as from eighty thousand to one hundred and twenty thousand strong, and which was certainly superior to the enemy in its front. This force, commanded by Loris Melikoff, marched rapidly across the Turkish frontier, and, dividing itself into three bodies, made on the right for Batoum, on the Black Sea, in the centre for the great fortress of Kars, and on the left for the line of the Aras. The column on the right, when it approached Batoum, received severe checks from the garrison of the place, and became isolated from the rest of the army; but on every other point of their broad advance the Russians at first were completely successful. Tur gakassoff, to the left, passed the plains of Ararat, and, taking possession of Bayazid, reached the head-waters of the Eastern Euphrates; and Melikoff, with the main column, had in a few days forced the approaches to Kars, had surrounded the fortress with his light horsemen, and had even despatched some troops THE GRAND DUKE MICHAEL, RUSSIAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN ASIA MINOR. beyond it. The frontier of Armenia was thus occupied; and though the ranges and the defiles that impede the march of an enemy are difficult in the extreme, a daring offensive might, at this moment, have assured the Russians decisive success. The Turks, in fact, always slow and unready, had been completely taken by surprise, and, though orders had been given to defend the province, Armenia was really all but defenceless. It is now known that Mukhtar, the Turkish commander, had a force of only a few thousand levies when Melikoff first appeared before Kars; and had the Russian general pressed boldly forwards, he might probably have made his way to the capital, and finished the campaign almost at one blow. Melikoff, however, contented himself with beginning operations to invest Kars, and soon afterwards he directed a part of his forces to attack Ardahan, a secondary fortress at a distance on his right. This delay may have changed the course of events; at least it gave the Turks a favorable chance, which their leader knew how to make use of. Having hastily reinforced the garrison of Kars, Mukhtar fell back with his scanty force to the position of the Soganlook Pass, a mountain defile that covers Erzeroum, and once there he made great efforts to increase and to form his imperilled army. His exertions were seconded by the government at home, which sent him a large detachment by sea; recruits also flocked into his camp from the Moslem population of the surrounding country; and before long he was at the head of a force which, though of a motley kind, was not contemptible as regards mere numbers. 11. Simultaneously with the campaign in Asia, the Russians began to advance in Europe. For months before war had been declared, the hosts of the czar had been drawing together from the interior to the banks of the Pruth, and the Grand Duke Nicholas was now at the head of an army which had a numerical strength of fully three hundred thousand men. A large part of this force, however, was left in the rear to defend the coasts of Southern Russia from the Turkish fleets. Very great deductions, too, must be made from what were merely returns on paper, and probably not more than one hundred and eighty thousand men crossed the frontier of the empire in the first instance. A variety of circumstances caused the march of the invaders to be extremely slow: bad weather injured the Rou manian highways; large tracts of the country were turned into swamps impracticable but at a few places; the railway communication was very defective; and the affluents of the Danube, largely swollen with floods, were difficult barriers for troops to get over. Complaints, too, were made that the Russian arrangements were cumbrous, and showed a want of system; and though we ought not to lay too much stress on them there can be little doubt that the Russian advance was not, like that of a modern German army, marked by that care of administrative detail which is a secret of celerity in war. In addition to these there was another cause that made the operations of the Russians tardy. It was necessary that they should cross the Dan ube, a water-way of immense breadth, in places guarded by powerful fortresses, and occupied by a hostile flotilla; and time was required to overcome these obstacles, and to make the passage of the river possible. The Russian commanders devoted weeks to making preparations for this great object, to con |