nine thousand men, more, probably, than a fourth of his troops, and the disorganization of his forces was complete. There was now little chance of storming the pass, and the prospect of joining Mehemet Ali, and of concentrating the collective armies on the Lom, the one valid chance of success for the Turks, - had, it may be said, altogether disappeared. The cause of the Porte had, in truth, been shipwrecked, and the isolation and defeat of Suleiman's army had necessarily paralyzed and stopped Mehemet. We turn to notice the movements of that chief, which, as we have said, might have become eventful had he been seconded as he had reason to expect. The army of Mehemet was formed of three bodies: one under his own command, then the Egyptian division, and another commanded by Eyoub Pasha; and, taken together, we believe, as we have said, it was from eighty thousand to one hundred thousand strong. Opposed to it, along the line of the Lom, was the army of the heir-apparent of the czar, from fifty thousand to sixty thousand men; but though it was so very inferior in force, it was a much better army than that of Mehemet, which was crowded with young and foreign levies. It is evident, therefore, that to secure for the Turks a chance of success for an offensive movement depended on Suleiman and his good troops, and from that it followed that, without his support, much could not be hoped for from the commanderin chief. This consideration is the real key to the timid and weak operations of Mehemet, though other causes, no doubt, concurred. As we have seen, that general had advanced a part of his forces as far as Osman Bazar, in the hope that Suleiman would march and join it; but when this hope vanished he fell back by degrees, and, for a time, rested within the line of his fortresses. He moved forward, however, in a few days again, and had a successful combat with a Russian division placed about midway on the course of the Lom; this being succeeded by two or three other actions, in which he also obtained the advantage. Upon this, Mehemet made a demonstration against the northern end of the enemy's lines, and he even attained a position near Rustchuk which menaced Sistova and the main bridge on the Danube. The czarowitch now fell back to the Jantra, and for some days, it is now known, there was considerable alarm in the invaders' camp for the communications, which appeared imperilled. But Mehemet was, as usual, halting and slow, and he remained on the Lom, probably unequal to strike a bold blow at this important moment.

28. These demonstrations of Mehemet on the Lom-they scarcely deserve a more serious name were followed by a sortie from Plevna, made by a division of Osman's forces. This attack, however, had little result, and we mention it only as an indication of a general plan on the part of the Turks at this juncture to assume the defensive. By the first days of September the prospects of the Turks, which had been promising three weeks before, had once more become overclouded; their scheme of attack had altogether failed; and, as reinforcements were approaching their enemy, the balance of fortune, which at one moment might possibly have been turned in their favor, was evidently inclining once more against them. In considering the causes of this failure two or three circumstances are very apparent. It is evident, in the first place, how imperfect and weak were the Turkish armies when they endeavored to attack, and how utterly inferior to their antagonists. Brave and excellent as the soldiery were, they were, to a great extent, without the means of making rapid marches and effective manœuvres; their transport service and commissariat were bad, and their officers had little skill and instruction. The backwardness, in a word, of the Ottoman race revealed itself in its organization for war; and, however well the troops could defend positions, they could not equal the Russians when on the offensive. Neverthless, as we have endeavored to show, the Turks really had a fair chance of success from the 31st of July to the third week of August, had their operations been ably conducted, so great had been the results of the defeat at Plevna, and so comparatively small the number of their foes. In examining the reasons why they did not succeed, the principal blame attaches to the chief who, from first to last, had in this contest a baleful influence on the Ottoman cause. As we have, we think, demonstrated, Suleiman Pasha ought to have joined Mehemet, and was expected to do so, and this junction might have changed the position of affairs. He chose, however, to diverge to the Shipka Pass, and from this moment the one strategic movement that might have had results became all but hopeless. In addition, the pasha ruined an army in his frantic efforts to force a passage; and, though he gave some proof of tactical skill, this reckless persistency was almost criminal. As for Mehemet Ali, he certainly displayed no energy in his operations on the Lom; but it must be borne in mind that, without his colleague, he had not the means of decisive action; he was like a bird that tries to fly though deprived of a wing. Besides, he was viewed

with dislike and distrust, as a renegade, by his Moslem lieutenants, and it is certain that more than once they refused, even when in the field, to obey his orders.

29.

During these weeks, full of intense interest, the Russian

ABD-UL-KERIM PASHA, TURKISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

commanders retained the positions in Bulgaria which they had previously held, and stood on the defensive only. Gourko having retreated behind the Balkans, they still continued on an extended line from the Shipka Pass to the banks of the Danube, one flank being spread out on the Lom, another being detained

round Plevna, and their base and front being very narrow. This was certainly a bad military position; it exposed their corps to defeat in detail, and a single reverse might have been disastrous. On the hypothesis that they would be on the defensive only until the arrival of their supports, they would have done better, in a military point of view, had they fallen behind the Balkan passes, and concentrated in united strength on a point extending from Plevna to the Lom, their communications with the Danube being, at the same time, covered. In a position like this they might probably have defied the Turks, though twofold in numbers; whereas they certainly ran a great risk, and allowed themselves to incur real danger. Their dispositions, besides, were defective, even in the arrangements they actually made. The Shipka Pass was too weakly held, and the czarowitch made the great mistake of endeavoring to cover the whole line of the Lom, instead of guarding only its most important passages, a mistake that might have been well punished. Moreover, as it is true defensive strategy, especially against a slow-moving enemy, to attack whenever there is a good occasion, the Russian leaders, according to rule, ought not to have been contented with a mere passive defence, but should have endeavored, if possible, to strike sometimes, which, in their situation, was not at all impossible. Holding as they did a central position between sluggish armies at great distances, they might have dealt heavy blows at their divided enemies, and by these means might have obtained victory instead of merely averting defeat. In spite, however, of these shortcomings, we are not disposed altogether to agree in the censure which has been lavished upon them. Their system of passive defence was successful; they seem to have fairly measured the capacity of their foes, and they at least avoided any serious reverse. Bulgaria, moreover, it must be borne in mind, is not adapted to rapid manœuvres; the Russian troops, too, had suffered a great deal, and it might have been hazardous to attempt the very operations which, in theory, would appear promising. As for the concentration of the Russian armies in better positions than those they held, this would have been surrendering a large part of Bulgaria to the horrors of Turkish crime and outrage; and mere military considerations were probably postponed to the requirements of a policy which could not permit such a desertion as this in a war of the kind.

CHAPTER XLIX.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

DIPLOMACY BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR - THE DEAD-LOCK IN EUROPE ENGLAND AND RUSSIA ON THE VERGE of WAR PREPARATIONS FOR A CONTEST THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE SITUATION.

1. Soon after the declaration of war by the czar, Count Schouvaloff, the Russian ambassador in London, had a confidential communication with Lord Derby upon the subject of his government's intentions in making war upon Turkey. This conversation took place on the 8th of June, 1877. It was published for the first time in a memorandum contained in the Parliament Paper No. 15, on the 18th of February, 1878. It is a document of the highest importance, not only because it enables the world to compare Russia's statements at the commencement of the war with her proposals at its close, but also because it proves how fully the Russian government laid its inventions before the English cabinet. At the end of July, 1877, that is, about six weeks later, this conversation of Count Schouvaloff's was further confirmed by what the Emperor Alexander himself said to Colonel Wellesley, who communicated the imperial statement to Lord Derby, in August, 1877.

2. Count Schouvaloff observed that, "With regard to Constantinople, our assurances can only refer to taking possession of the town or occupying it permanently. It would be singular and without precedent if, at the outset of a war, one of the belligerents undertook beforehand not to pursue its military operations up to the walls of the capital. It is not impossible that the obstinacy of the Turks, especially if they knew themselves to be guaranteed against such an eventuality, may prolong the war, instead of bringing it to a speedy termination. When once the English ministry is fully assured that we shall in no circumstances remain at Constantinople, it will depend on England and the other powers to relieve us of the necessity of even approaching the town." The count admits that as regards the Straits, that is "a question which can only be resettled

1 Compiled from a sketch in "British Quarterly Review," written by John W. Probyn, also from the London "Times" and "News."