by the plaintiff, and one also agreed with him as to the location of the train on the side track at the time of the accident. But this is important only as affecting the credibility of the witnesses. The leading questions of fact, whether the plaintiff was charged with any duty in looking after the stock in the car, and was permitted to return to the car for the purpose of hitching the horse, and especially whet er his statements that he would be safe in doing so, and that the train would not move, were questions to be determined by the jury, and this court will not interfere with the discretion and determination of the trial court in refusing a new trial thereon. The conductor had control of the movements of the train, and so far represented the company. The plaintiff was entitled to rely upon his assurance that it would not be moved, and that it would be safe for plaintiff to visit the car, and the company was bound by his acts and statements in reference to it. If the testimony of the plaintiff is true in respect to his obligation to care for the stock, and they required attention, it was proper for him to enter the car for that purpose, with the knowledge and consent of the conductor, who must have known the situation of the door of the car; and, if the train was not to be moved for a considerable time, we are unable to see that there was anything in plaintiff's conduct in visiting the car which conclusively establishes contributory negligence on his part. It was, at least a question for the jury. Whether the rules of the company allowed drovers or their servants to ride in stock cars to watch and care for stock or not, is not, we think, material, under the issues as presented by the evidence in this case. There is no presumption against the authority of the conductor to allow them to visit the car, and look after their stock while stopping at a station; and there is no evidence of any rule limiting his authority. We think the evidence in plaintiff's behalf made a case for the jury. Wright 7. London & N. W. R. Co., 1 Q. B. Div. 255-257; Fowler . Baltimore & O. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 579, 584, 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 480; Pool . Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 53 Wis. 657, 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 332; Jacobus v. St. Paul & C. R. Co., 20 Minn. 134, (Gil. 110.) 2. The trial court also considered the question of excessive damages, and was of the opinion that the amount fixed by the jury, though the verdict was large, was not so far disproportionate to the nature and extent of the injury suffered as to warrant it in setting aside the verdict.. We esteem the judgment a large one, and if the trial court had been of the opinion, from its impressions of the case upon the evidence, that the verdict ought to have been set aside, this court would not have interfered. But there was no abuse of discretion in refusing a new trial on that ground. In support of the verdict, the evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to show, among other things, that the foot was amputated near the ankle, but so as to save the heel. At the time of the trial, more than a year and a half after the injury, there was a running sore on the "stump" of the amputated limb, and he had endured great pain and suffering, which continued up to the time of the trial. He was crippled for life, and his limb, which was exhibited to the jury, was liable to continue to cause him suffering in the future. He was 45 years of age, and had been a carpenter, and able, previously, to earn good wages. Evidence of these and other facts testified to was before the jury. It is a case from the nature of which the trial court was in much better position to judge of the question than an appellate court could be. Each case must stand largely upon its own facts, and the question is one peculiarly for the jury. Ferguson v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 63 Wis. 146, 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 285; Berg v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 50 Wis. 419, 428, 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 70. Order affirmed. OLIVIER ข. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE R. Co. (Louisiana Supreme Court, May 18, 1891.) Passenger Riding on Platform-Overcrowding Car.-A party voluntarily boarding a crowded train and taking his place on the platform of a car, without complaint or effort to obtain a seat or other better accommodation, cannot assign the overcrowding of the train as negligence in the railroad company. Same Knowledge of Conductor.-On the other hand, when the conductor sees him in that position and collects his fare without objection, the company cannot attribute its occupancy as negligence. Same-Duty of Passenger and Company. In such case the passenger is bound to conduct himself with the care and caution which his position requires, and the company is bound to guard him from danger incident to the position arising from its own acts. Admissions as to Cause of Injury-Evidence-Impeachment.-A party's admissions as to the cause of an injury for which he claims damages are good evidence against him, and the statements of a companion made in his presence without contradiction may have the like force with his own admissions. In his case the latter were also admissible as part of the res geste, and to impeach his testimony given on the trial, for which foundation was duly laid. Verdict of Jury-Review of Findings on Facts.--While always disposed to give to verdicts of juries all proper weight, the law of this state imposes on the court the duty of reviewing their findings on the facts as well as on the law, and when, upon the evidence before us, it appears that a verdict is manifestly erroneous, we are bound to reverse it. APPEAL from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. Case stated. FENNER, J.-The cause of action is substantially as follows: That plaintiff became a passenger on defendant's railroad, having duly paid his fare for passage to Milneburg; that, owing to the crowded condition of the train, he was compelled to ride on the platform of one of the cars; that on approaching Milneburg the engineer sounded the whistle to announce the stop about to be made; that the speed of the train was diminished by degrees, inducing petitioner to believe it was about to stop, when the said train was suddenly and violently put in sudden motion by the engineer thereof, causing a sudden and violent jerk or start, which threw petitioner from the platform under the wheels of the car, which passed over his foot, and occasioned injuries which necessitated the amputation of his leg below the knee; that said injuries were due solely to the fault and negligence of defendant in this particularly. "(1) That he should have been provided with a seat in said train and not have been compelled by the overcrowding of said car to ride on the platform. (2) That said train should not have been suddenly started after the diminution of its speed, and the preparation and apparent intention of the engineer to stop the same." Plaintiff avers his freedom from any contributory negligence, and demands $20,000 as damages. Defendant answered by a general denial. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff for $5,000, from which the present appeal is taken. Passenger on The first ground of negligence assigned against the company has no weight. According to his own statement plaintiff boarded the train at a way station after seeing and knowing that the train was crowded, and he platformalso knew, from his constant habit of traveling on Negligence the road, that the trains on this day of the week and contribu and hour were customarily crowded. He volun- tory negli tarily took his place on the platform, but he was lawfully there, because he occupied that position when the conductor collected his fare, and the latter made no objection thereto. He was bound to conduct himself with the care and caution which his position suggested and required, and the 47 A. & E. R. Cas.-37 gence. company was bound to protect him from dangers incident to that position arising from its own acts. cause of accldent reviewed. The serious issue of law and fact arises under the second assignment of negligence, viz., in starting the train, when on the point of stopping, with such a jerk as to throw Evidence as to the plaintiff off. Plaintiff produces no evidence as to the accident except that of himself and his companion, Larose. Plaintiff says that he and Larose were going out to the lake to fish; that they boarded the train at a way station; they saw the train was full, but got on the platform; plaintiff carried a basket; he took his seat on the platform of one car, with his feet resting on the step, while Larose sat on the platform of the car in front of him; when the car reached Milneburg and the whistle had blown, he got up and stood with his basket on one arm, and holding the railing with the other hand, to be ready to get down when the train stopped; that while thus standing, and after the motion of the train had become very slow, the train was suddenly started, and gave a violent jerk which threw him off. Larose gives a like account, with some further particulars. He says: "When she got just about a block before the old station she blew, and Charlie says, 'Get ready.' I says, 'No, she is going too fast.' When we reached about the engine house, he says, 'Get ready.' I says, 'No, we can't; she is going too quick.' When we got about the corner she started to slack up, but not enough for us to get down, and when Charlie got right by the hotel he stood up that way, and he told me to get ready, and I says, Leave the car stop; I believe she is going to the wharf.'" He adds that at this point the train gave a violent jerk, and Olivier was thrown off. The engineer denies most positively that he gave the train any forward motion after slowing down, or did anything to cause a jerk. No witness is produced to show that there was any such jerk except Olivier and Larose. Welsh, who was one of the conductors at that time, but who is no longer in the employ of defendant, says that he went to where plaintiff was lying after the accident, and asked Larose, who was with him, how it happened, and Larose said, "It was all his own fault" and that "he was in the act of jumping, or jumped off, and fell." Ross, the other conductor, who also is no longer in defendant's employ, says: "I went to Mr. Olivier. He was sitting on the ground, and he says, 'I went to jump off, and fell down, and my leg went underneath; and he says, 'I do that every Sunday:' and I says, 'You ought not to do that; you ought to wait till the train stops.'" Philibert, the clerk and operator at the police station to which plaintiff was carried, says: "He had been brought in from Milneburg, and put in the station, and the ambulance sent for, and while waiting for the ambulance, so as to make a report to the chief office, as we do in all cases, I asked the man for a statement as to how he got hurt, how his foot was mashed; asked him how it happened; and he said it was his own fault; that he jumped off the car, and the train run over his foot." Habans, a police officer stationed at Milneburg, says: "I was on the rear coach of the train when the coach stopped-I mean the train and I looked out, and saw a lot of people congregated around the hotel gate, and 1 run down there to see what was the matter, and I saw a man sitting on the ground with his face towards the train, and his friend Larose with him. I says to him, Charlie, how did that happen?' and he says, 'I tried to jump off, and I got my foot mashed.' So I went on and notified the engineer that the man was hurt, and he backed the baggage car down to put him in there. He also adds: "His friend told me that Mr. Olivier had his basket on his arm, and the train going in that direction, and, when he attempted to jump off with his basket on his forward arm so, the basket struck the hand rail of the platform of the car, and it threw him down." Olivier and Larose, on re-examination, stoutly deny having made the statements attributed to them. Olivier seems to deny that he was asked any questions, or made any answers to any one. Larose says: "Olivier said it was only bad luck, and I said so myself." It is a significant fact that neither Olivier nor Larose pretend to have said anything at that time about the jerk of the train, rendered more significant by the fact that this suit was not brought until nearly seven months after the accident; and, so far as the record discloses, that was the first time defendant heard anything about a jerk of the train. It is further shown that plaintiff had been a constant traveler on this train for years, and that he had frequently jumped off the train before it stopped. Larose's statement strongly intimates that plaintiff was making preparations to jump, and was only restrained by his remonstrance. We cannot doubt that the conductors and the police officers did question Olivier and Larose as to the cause of the accident. was their official duty to make such inquiries, because they had to render reports to their superior officers. If Olivier and Larose then attributed the accident to the jerk of the train it would have been natural for them to have said so, and it is passing strange that they did not; yet neither of them pretends that they said anything about it. According to their own account they simply said, "It was only bad luck." No motive is suggested why the two police employes should have sworn falsely, and they fully confirm the statements of the It |