home. That the most effective aid to the American cause was contemplated by Vergennes, is proved by the final passages of his report, in which he insisted on the necessity of at once raising the effective force of the two countries (France and Spain) to the height of their real power, as it was most improbable that peace would be preserved, whatever the issue of the war between England and her colonies.

The sentiment of jealousy as regarded England which animated the whole of this State paper, was undoubtedly the prevalent feeling in France, and that which ultimately determined the Government to render military aid to the American insurgents. To accomplish the downfall of English power, Vergennes was willing that his sovereign and his nation should follow a course of deliberate duplicity, and, while adopting a manner of perfect friendliness towards the Cabinet of St. James's, was prepared to aid the Americans in underhand ways until the fitting time had arrived for throwing off the mask. Such, however, were not the views of his colleague, the great Liberal statesman, Turgot, at that time Minister of Finance. Louis XVI. directed Vergennes to communicate his memorial to Turgot, and the written opinion of the latter was required. After three weeks' deliberation, Turgot sent in a paper, the upshot of which was in direct antagonism to that of Vergennes. The Finance Minister saw with clearness the folly and futility of that restrictive policy in commerce which had prevailed for two centuries. An entire freedom of trade was what he desired to establish. "The yearly cost of colonies in peace, the enormous expenditure for their defence in war," reasoned Turgot, "lead to the conclusion that it is more advantageous for us to grant them entire independence, without waiting for the moment when events will compel us to give them up. Wise and happy will be that nation which shall first know how to bend to the new circumstances, and consent to see in its colonies allies and not subjects. When the total separation of America shall have healed the European nations of the jealousy of commerce, there will exist among men one great cause of war the less. In our colonies we shall save many millions; and, if we acquire the liberty of commerce and navigation with all the northern continent, we shall be amply compensated." Yet Turgot was far from advocating a policy of treacherous opposition to England. To aid the Americans with money, he remarked, would excite in the English just complaints. France should limit herself to measures of caution, and precipitate nothing unless the conduct of England should give

occasion to believe that she contemplated hostilities. Every plan of aggression should be rejected, for moral reasons, and from motives of policy. It was clear, in the estimation of Turgot, that the English Ministry did not desire war, nor was either France or Spain in a fit position to draw the sword. As regarded his own country, the Minister of Finance described the army and navy as in a state of weakness that was scarcely to be imagined.

As might be anticipated, the advice of Vergennes, rather than that of Turgot, was adopted by the French King and his Cabinet. France and Spain agreed, in the course of May, to advance the Americans a sum of money which amounted to nearly a million of dollars. The Spanish portion was remitted to Paris, and the money was sent by the French Government under the name of a pretended commercial house which was for that purpose established in Holland, and through which military stores were conveyed to America in the guise of mercantile consignments. In the progress of subsequent negotiations, the Americans endea voured to propitiate the friendship of France by proposing to her an advantageous commercial treaty and the reconquest of Canada. They had even the bad taste and self-stultification to suggest that the time had arrived for France "to obtain satisfaction from Great Britain for the injuries received in the last war, commenced by that nation in a manner contrary to the law of nations." It is sufficient to glance back at the repeated solicitations for the conquest of Canada which the colonies addressed to the English Government during a long series of years, to see how little reason the Americans of 1776 had to taunt the mother country with the conquest of Canada, or to require the sympathy of France on the score of denouncing that act. attempt to obtain favour at the Court of Versailles was, however, as ill-judged as it was dishonest. France no longer desired the re-possession of Cana·la, as its seizure by England had dispelled the chief motive of the colonists for wishing to preserve their connection with the parent State, and had thrown them more towards the side of France as their ally and patron. The Marquis de Montcalm, in the closing days of his life, when it was evident that the whole of that great province would be reduce i by the armies of Amherst and Wolfe, had pro phesied that France would obtain a speedy compensation for her loss in the independence of the Anglo-American colonies, which, being deliverel from the fear of French rivalry, and having longer any motive for seeking the military prote tion of Great Britain, would soon think of emane. pating themselves from every form of subjectio

This

The same idea had occurred to other observers at a still earlier period; and it is not improbable that the colonists themselves had the conception of future independence in their minds when they urged on the Home Government the subjugation of their northern neighbour.

The leaning towards France was now so great that some members of the Continental Congress proposed to transfer to the French ports that monopoly of American commerce which had previously been enjoyed by England. The suggestion was not entertained, but it showed how strong was the disposition in certain quarters to abandon principles for the sake of temporary advantage. America was at this time represented in France by Silas Deane, of Connecticut, who was occasionally assisted by Arthur Lee, an American residing in London, on his flying visits to Paris. Deane was not a man to let niceties of conscience stand in his way. By his instructions, which bear date March 3al, 1776, he was directed to inform the Count de Vergennes "that if we shall, as there is great appearance we shall, come to a total separation from Great Britain, France would be looked upon as the Power whose friendship it would be fittest for us to obtain and cultivate;" and he was to make a request for clothing and arms for twenty-five thousand men, a hundred field-pieces, and a corresponding quantity of ammunition. Following out this general idea, Deane omitted no opportunity of alvancing the interests of his countrymen, and the French Government evinced every disposition to further his views. The intercourse of France with the American insurgents could not be altogether concealed, and Lord Stormont, the English Ambassador at Paris, complained of the transmission of military stores to America- -a fact which he had. discovered by means of his spies. Vergennes utterly denied any knowledge of such doings, and fien threw his own agents into prison. The underhand business, however, went on all the same, and, as the year advanced, the financial and military psition of the colonies was greatly improved, owing to the aid which had been rendered by the Ministers of Louis XVI. But it was not only in France that assistance was obtained. A fervour of A fervour of revolutionary sympathy was kindled in many parts of Europe by the example of America. German officers, of long experience in the art of war, proceded to the New World, to join the patriotic ary. Polish noblemen became nascent Republicans in the militant colonies of England, and the illustrious names of Kosciusko and Pulaski figure among the foreign champions of American freedom. Pulaski had been one of the conspirators who, in

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1771, seized and carried off Stanislaus, King of Poland. His life was a series of daring adventures, and it was destined to close in blood on one of the battle-fields of the West.

Base as were the motives of the French Court in aiding the Anglo-American insurgents, we must not suppose that all Frenchmen who joined their fortunes to those of the rebels were animated by a feeling of mean jealousy, or a desire to avenge old wrongs. It is unquestionable that several obeyed impulses of a noble and generous character, and risked their lives in a cause which they believed to be that of humanity itself. This was especially the case with the illustrious Marquis de Lafayette. His connection with America originated in a circumstance which occurred in the early part of 1776. He was then in the nineteenth year of his age, and was in garrison with his regiment at Metz, where the Duke of Gloucester, brother of George III., was paying a visit. The Duke had offended the King by marrying the Countess Dowager Waldegrave, natural daughter of Sir Edward Walpole, and, being discountenanced at court in consequence of this presumed degradation, had been driven into political opposition, and was fond of displaying opinions which had in them no slight tinge of democratic freedom. One day, when he had accepted an invitation to dine with the French officers, he spoke with great fervour on English tyranny in America, and on the gallant resistance of the colonists, and in this way aroused in Lafayette an ardent desire to give his personal services to a cause which seemed so just and admirable. Fifty-three years afterwards, this anecdote was related by Lafayette himself to Mr. James Grahame, to whose work on the history of the

United States of North America we have had frequent occasion to refer.

The commercial policy which Turgot advocated— that of opening the ports of America to the trade of the whole world- -was debated in the Continental Congress on the 16th of February. This idea had long been present to the minds of leading American statesmen; but it had hitherto been suppressed, for fear of arousing in too high a degree the jealous wrath of England. It was now suggested by many that the time had come when it would be both right and expedient to establish the great principle of commercial freedom. A member of the Congress, named Wythe, argued that they might authorise vessels to arm, might grant letters of marque and reprisal, and might invite foreign Powers to make treaties of commerce; but that, before such measures were adopted, it would be well to consider in what character they were to treat-whether as subjects

was not arrived at without a good deal of dissent. Many still clung to the hope that a change of Government in England would lead to a reversal of the policy that had prevailed for several years; that Chatham and Rockingham would be called to power, and that the chief demands of the colonists would be granted. But Chatham was by this time broken in health, and Rockingham was not sufficiently powerful to supplant Lord North. Besides, the opinion of the majority in Congress was now clearly against any compromise with the mother country. The desire for the redress of 72-VOL. II.

colonies were not sufficiently represented to give their voices; but the unanimous suffrages of the New England provinces, of New York, Virginia, and North Carolina, carried the point. Privateering was sanctioned by the Colonial Parliament; but, as a matter of fact, it had existed for some time, and the army before Boston had been in part supplied with munitions of war through the capture of British vessels by the enterprise of Americans. Notwithstanding this service, however, Washington was far from satisfied with the conduct of these roving combatants. Writing on the 20th of No

vember, 1775, to Joseph Reed, he said:" Our rascally privateersmen go on at the old ratemutinying if they cannot do as they please." But Washington was not prone to overlook defects, or indulge in wild bursts of premature congratulation.

The King was now described, in resolutions of Congress, as having "rejected their petitions with scorn and contempt "-an expression which was held to imply a renunciation of allegiance to the throne, but which was adopted, despite the objections of several delegates. As a concession to humanity, it was resolved, without any qualifications whatever, or any limitations as to time, that no slaves should be imported into the United Colonies. This vote was the more important as it was generally believed that the prohibition of the slave-trade would lead to universal emancipation. How these benevolent forecasts came to be falsified will appear in the further course of this History. It was even suggested by a kindly-natured divine of Rhode Island, named Samuel Hopkins, that public provision should be made for retransporting the negroes to Africa, where he thought they would be able to live better than in any other country; but this rather Utopian idea met with no favour. Questions of abstract right were compelled to give way to considerations of more immediate importance. Of these the most urgent was the condition of the army. Since he had assumed the command, Washington had had frequent occasion to observe the very serious evils which resulted from the system of short enlistments; and on the 9th of February, 1776, he wrote to the President of Congress :

"Since the 1st of December, I have been devising every means in my power to secure these encampments; and though I am sensible that we never have, since that period, been able to act upon the offensive, and at times not in a condition to

defend, yet the cost of marching home one set of men, bringing in another, the havoc and waste occasioned by the first, the repairs necessary for the second, with a thousand incidental charges and inconveniences which have arisen, and which it is scarce possible either to recollect or describe, amount to near as much as the keeping up a respectable body of troops the whole time, ready for any emergency, would have done. To this may be added, that you never can have a well-disciplined army. To bring men to be well-acquainted with the duties of a soldier, requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty, and, in this army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, is to expect what never did and perhaps never will happen. Men who are familiarised to danger, meet it without shrinking; whereas troops unused to service often apprehend danger where no danger is"

Nothing could be more sensible than the sugges tions of Washington; but they were defeated by the hereditary English dread of standing armies, which had been intensified in America to the very highest degree. It was feared that enlistment for a long period would lead to a state of slavery; and the representations of Washington were for the present disregarded. Yet in some respects it was acknowledged that the belligerent position of the country was not what it should be. Accordingly, the five middle colonies, from New York to Maryland, were constituted one military department, and the four south of the Potomac another. The north was already sufficiently provided for. Six new Generals of Brigade were appointed on the 1st of March, and a large addition to the paper currency was ordered. Thus did the United Colonies prepare themselves for a future of doubt and peril.

INDEPENDENCE was close at hand; but a further period of doubt, of hesitation, and of distracted

counsels, had yet to be passed through. During the debate on the proposal to authorise privateer