of Congress. The effect of this measure was to cause considerable disappointment to the holders of the old currency, who, only about half a year before, had been encouraged by Congress to believe that the paper then in circulation would be redeemable at par in hard cash. As, however, the generality of the holders had received the old paper-money at a considerable depreciation, it was considered unfair to the community at large to allow those holders to convert it at what would have been in reality a higher rate. The measure, consequently, The measure, consequently, produced no convulsion, though many persons considered themselves aggrieved.

This was the state of things with which Morris had to deal. That he might fund the public debt, and provide for the regular payment of the interest on it, he proposed, in 1782, a moderate land-tax, a poll-tax, and an excise on distilled liquors, and expressed a desire that the States would consent to Congress imposing a duty of five per cent. on imports. The western lands were to be reserved as security for new loans in Europe; and by these means it was hoped to establish the public credit. It was certainly most desirable to do something to secure an equilibrium, for a condition of things was fast coming on, in which there would have been hardly any revenue at all. The aggregate expenditure of the United States for the war (says a high American authority) had been at the rate of twenty millions of dollars in specie annually. The estimates for 1782 were for eight millions of dollars; yet, in the first five months of the year, the sums received from the States amounted to less than twenty thousand dollars-less, that is, than the estimated expenses for a single day; and of this sum not a shilling had been received from either the Eastern or the Southern States. It was found necessary to send out two Committees of Congress -one to importune the States of the North, and the other those of the South.* Congress could not levy any direct taxes on the people; it could only require of the States certain quotas, which those States were expected to supply, but which very frequently they failed to supply. When they thus failed, Congress was void of all power to enforce

its demands, and there was no resource but to starve the public service (and often those who conducted it), or to make fresh issues of paper-money. Morris now obtained authority, by a vote of Congress, to appoint receivers of taxes; and for this office at New York he selected Alexander Hamilton. The father-in-law of Hamilton, General Schuyler, invited the New York Senate, at Hamil

* Bancroft.

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ton's instigation, to declare that the Federal Government ought to have power to provide revenue for itself; that that important object could never be attained by the deliberations of the States separately; that it was essential to the common welfare that there should be a conference of all the States on the subject; and that it would be advisable for such purpose for Congress to recommend, and for each State to adopt, the measure of assembling a general convention of the States, specially authorised to revise and amend the Confederation, reserving a right to the respective Legislatures to ratify their determinations. The resolutions were carried unanimously in both branches of the New York Legislature; and Hamilton was shortly afterwards elected one of the delegates of New York to Congress. Morris, in welcoming him to that post, said:"A firm, wise, manly system of Federal Government is what I once wished, what I now hope, what I dare not expect, but what I will not despair of." It came in time; but not yet.

The root of the mischief undoubtedly lay in this want of sufficient Federal powers on the part of Congress in the absence of a truly national Government. The Constitution of 1777 conferred but slight prerogatives of rule on the Union; and these, in process of time, and by the dogged resistance of the several States, had become still less. No one saw the evil more clearly than Washington; but at that time Washington had little or no influence in the sphere of politics. In May, 1780, he wrote to a friend who was a delegate in Congress from Virginia: "Certain I am, unless Congress are vested with powers by the several States competent to the great purposes of war, or assume them as matter of right, and they and the States respectively act with more energy than they have hitherto done, our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge on in the old way. By ill-timing in the adoption of measures, by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealousies, we incur enormous expenses, and derive no benefit from them. One State will comply with a requisition of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time that we are always working up hill. While such

a system as the present one, or rather want of one, prevails, we shall ever be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advantage. This, my dear Sir, is plain language to a member of Congress, but it is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of long thinking, close application, and strict observation. I see one head gradually changing into thirteen. I see one army branching into

thirteen, which, instead of looking up to Congress as the supreme controlling power of the United States, are considering themselves as dependent on their respective States. In a word, I see the powers of Congress declining too fast for the consideration and respect which are due to them as the great representative body of America; and I am fearful of the consequences."

His correspondent was equally impressed with the viciousness of the existing system. He replied: "Congress have scarcely a power left but such as concerns foreign transactions; for, as to the army, they are at present little more than the medium through which its wants are conveyed to the States. This body never had, or at least in few instances ever exercised, powers adequate to the purposes of war; and indeed such as they possessed have been frittered away to the States, and it will be found very difficult to recover them. Resolutions are now before us, by one of which the States are desired to give express powers for the common defence. Others go to the assumption of them immediately. The first will sleep with the States; the others will die where they are, so cautious are some of offending the States." To Greene, two years later, it was apparent that the weakness of the American army was due to the want of a complete and genuine political Union. He wished to confer on Congress the power to enforce its requisitions, and gave it as his opinion that without such a power it would be impossible to establish the financial affairs of the nation upon a footing that should answer the public demands. Most of the leading minds of America knew and lamented the absence of efficient power in the States collectively, as represented in Congress. It was the great disease of the time, and nothing but a fortunate conjunction of circumstances prevented its being a great and fatal danger also.

Determined to do the utmost for the promulgation of his views of Federal Union, Morris requested his fellow-countryman, Thomas Paine, to give the service of his literary skill in the same direction. In the meanwhile, he pursued with great energy his projects of financial reform. On the 31st of July, 1782, he sent to Congress his Budget for 1783. It amounted to nine millions of dollars, and he had no alternative but to borrow four millions, and raise the other five millions by quotas. The proposal to endow Congress with the right to levy a duty of five per cent. on imports was pressed on the State Legislatures; but Virginia and some of the other States refused their assent. The poverty of the Federal Government became absolutely desperate. Morris wrote to Greene in the spring

of that eventful year :- "You must continue your exertions with or without men or provisions, clothing or pay." Contracts into which he had entered, for provisioning the Northern army, he was obliged to dissolve, for want of means to meet them. To Washington he wrote: I pray that Heaven may direct your mind to some mode by which we may be yet saved." Fortunately for the Americans, the war was nearly over. Had it continued another year without the assistance of France, the withdrawal of which had been threatened, it seems doubtful whether the cause of the Revolution would not have collapsed. There were not many more than ten thousand men in the Northern army, and the Southern was in a state of rapid dissolution. Washington himself saw that peace was imperative.

With the closing days of 1782, peace was pretty well assured, as far as the United States were concerned. But it still remained doubtful whether France and Spain would come to terms with Great Britain, and many and anxious were the negotiations. Spain was the great obstacle. To obtain the restitution of Gibraltar, the Court of Madrid offered to cede to England any territory of the Spanish Monarchy which could be given up without absolute dismemberment. Amongst the colonies so excepted were Cuba and Porto Rico, together with the Spanish possessions on the American continent; in fact, all the places which would have been in any respect an equivalent for the fortress of the western Mediterranean. Lord Shelburne was not at all impressed with the value of Gibraltar (any more than Lord Chatham had been before him), and would gladly have surrendered it for West Florida, which the Spaniards had conquered during the war. But the Duke of Grafton, Shelburne's Lord Privy Seal, would not agree to the restitution of Gibraltar, unless Trinidad, which Spain refused to yield, were given up, in addition to what had already been offered. Moreover, the opinion of Parliament was clearly against reliquishing a position which the nation had paid so much in blood and treasure to acquire and maintain. The recent magnificent defence of Gibraltar by Elliot and Howe could not be forgotten; and when some hints of the proposed cession were lit fall in the House of Commons, Fox saw in the scheme a capital opportunity for making an effective party attack. Shelburne soon found that he had to choice but to insist on the retention of Gibraltar, and Spain, finding that she could not count on the support of France in pushing matters to extremities, reluctantly agreed to accept the two Floridas in exchange for the rock. Preliminaries of peace

were signed at Versailles, on the 20th of January, 1783, between the Minister of England and the Ministers of France and Spain.

The articles in these Preliminaries which in any way affected America may be briefly stated. By the agreement with France, the right of that Power to fish off the coast of Newfoundland, and on the Gulf of St. Lawrence, was re-established on the same footing as in the treaties of Utrecht (1713) and of Paris (1763), with the additional cession from England of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon.

In the West Indies, England

restored St. Lucia and ceded Tobago; and in return got back Granada, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montserrat. As regards Spain, the British monarch ceded both the Floridas, and the Spanish King granted to the English the right of cutting logwood in the Bay of Honduras, in a district the boundaries of which were afterwards to be fixed. It was also agreed that Providence and the Bahama Isles should be restored to England; but it subsequently turned out that the Bahamas had been already recovered by the British before the close of active warfare. With the Dutch a truce was concluded, followed in time by a definitive treaty.

The three Preliminary Treaties - those with France, Spain, and the United States-were laid before the House of Commons on the 27th of January, and a series of debates ensued which ultimately caused the fall of the Ministry. Fox and Lord North had for some time been approaching one another, with a view to forming a coalition --an agreement for party ends which must have cost each no small sacrifice of pride, since Lord North had always regarded Fox as little better than a rebel, and Fox, only a year before, had said that Lord North and his colleagues were void of every principle of honour and honesty, and that from the moment when he should make any terms with one of them, he would rest satisfied to be called the most infamous of mankind. But the age was one of passionate asseverations and easy compromises. Neither of these eminent politicians had much chance of regaining power without the assistance of the other; and they agreed to forget their mutual affronts, that they might destroy the Government of Lord Shelburne-a man of a more statesmanlike mind than either. On the 17th of February, Mr. Thomas Pitt moved an address of thanks to his Majesty for ordering the preliminary articles of peace to be laid before the House of Commons. The motion was seconded by Mr. Wilberforce, and followed by a violent debate. An amendment, withholding such approba

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tion, yet assuring his Majesty of the firm determination of the House to adhere to the several articles to which the public faith had been pledged, was moved, supported by the leading members of the contemplated coalition, and carried by a majority of 16. A similar amendment was introduced into the House of Lords, where, however, it was rejected by a majority of 13. On the 21st of February, Lord John Cavendish moved -"That the concessions made to the adversaries of Great Britain by the Provisional Treaty and the Preliminary Articles were greater than they were entitled to, either from the actual situation of their respective possessions, or from their comparative strength." Considering that Fox and his party had advocated the most extreme concessions to the United Colonies, it required no small amount of audacity in the members of that political body to condemn the Government for making peace on terms which went no farther than those which had always been supported in opposition to the Government of Lord North. They had even threatened that Minister with capital punishment for continuing the war in America; yet they now condemned Lord Shelburne and his colleagues for putting a stop to hostilities on the only conditions obtainable. Fox argued that France, Spain, Holland, and America, had been reduced to a desperate condition, and that consequently such ample concessions should not have been granted. He was answered by William Pitt, who showed that the Government had no choice in the matter; but the House had made up its mind to vote against the Government, and, on a division, Lord John Cavendish's resolutions were carried by a majority of 17. Lord Shelburne immediately resigned, and a new Ministry was formed, after some delay and considerable difficulty, of which the Duke of Portland was Premier, Lord North Secretary for Home Affairs, and Fox Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The Government consisted for the most part of members of the old Rockingham party, and, on this account alone, did not enjoy the confidence of the King.

That the Allied Powers opposed to England were really, as Fox had asserted, reduced to great extremities, cannot be denied; yet it is equally true that England herself was very far from being in a position to carry on the war. It was shown by Pitt that, exclusive of the annual services, the unfunded debt amounted at that time to thirty millions; and Ministers had found that a force of three thousand men was the utmost that could be

despatched on any foreign expedition. Even if Fox, while out of office, did not know the exact position of

the country, he must, as a public man, have known enough to see the futility of any further prosecution of the struggle; and regard for his own character as a politician should have restrained him from so completely changing sides. Even as it was, he was compelled, a few months later, to assent to those very terms which he first supported, and afterwards condemned. The definitive treaties with France, Spain, and America were signed on the 3rd of September, and the long war with the United States was thus brought to a formal, as well as an actual, termination by the enforced consent of all parties. Previous to this signature, which took place during the autumnal recess of Parliament, the attention of the House of Commons was much occupied by the re-arrangement of commercial intercourse with the United States. Laws which had acted to the restraint of that intercourse were repealed; and a temporary Bill was passed, vesting in the Crown the power of making future regulations. It was also considered proper to make some provision for the American loyalists, as it was very generally feared that those ill-fated enthusiasts would not be allowed by the States to enjoy once more their confiscated property. An Act was therefore passed, appointing commissioners to inquire into their losses and services; and it was agreed in Committee of Supply that all American officers who had borne arms for the King should be allowed half-pay. As it afterwards turned out, this provision was very necessary, for the property of the loyalists was not returned, and large numbers of them quitted their native country, and came to England. The claims made upon Parliament in consequence of this Act were so numerous that the refugees received altogether more than twelve millions of money.

The war thus disastrously terminated had cost the nation an enormous sum, and added to its indebtedness by many millions. At the Peace of 1763, the National Debt of Great Britain amounted to £139,000,000, and the annual charge to £4,600,000. By 1774, as a consequence of prolonged peace, more than ten millions of the debt had been paid off. The American war raised the debt from 129 to 268 millions, and the annual charge to £9,512,232. It has been calculated that, had the struggle continued, it would have been necessary to borrow annually seventeen millions and a half, by which a million per annum would have been added to the taxes, and twenty-five millions to the capital of the public debt. As it was, Great Britain had added to that debt a sum equal to the whole as it existed some twenty years before; and, of English and Americans,

probably not fewer than 150,000 had perished in the contest.

Such had been the cost of maintaining a questionable prerogative, of asserting an impossible power, of seeking to coerce a nation, of striving to keep back the inevitable march of principles and of events. The people of England were burdened in order that the people of America might not be free; and the former had missed even the miserable satisfaction, in exchange for their outlay, of succeeding in the end which they had proposed. During the war, the objects for which it was waged had very considerably altered. In the beginning, it was little more than an attempt on the part of Parliament to assert the supposed right of taxing a people not represented within its walls. As the struggle unfolded itself, questions of a larger kind were gradually developed. The balance of right became more even, and sometimes inclined towards the side of the mother country. It was not unnatural that a great and powerful nation should refuse to yield one of the largest and grandest portions of its dominicus, without at least an effort to retain it. Exasperated by the first fatal mistake, the Americans came in time to deny, not merely the taxing power of Parliament, but all jurisdiction on the part of the Empire over its dependencies; and it cannot be matter of surprise that this denial should have been resisted. One thing is certain that the war was not simply the war of the King, or of the aristocracy, or even of the Parliament, but, as Lord North expressed it, of the people of England themselves. To this rule there were of course some exceptions; but George and his favourite Minister never wanted the support of a large majority in carrying on the war, until, after the disaster at Yorktown, a further continuance of the struggle became hopeless. Still, the contest had grown from an evil root, and partook of the first viciousness which gave it life. Concession after concession was made by England; all really objectionable interference with the colonies was abandoned, privileges of the most valuable nature were offered. But it was too late. The Americans had felt the sting of injustice, and drunk the wild intoxication of independence. They had tasted the elation of success; they had been crowned with the consecration of suffering. In the blood of all the thirteen States was the passionate exultation of a new life; and the ancient and solid force f England recoiled before the sudden spring of a young giant.

The story of those mournful times will always b among the most sorrowful records of the English