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practical knowledge of their profession. Never theless, sufficient old soldiers were found for the chief posts. The Commander-in-Chief was Henry Dearborn, a native of New Hampshire, who accompanied Arnold to Quebec in 1775, and who had served in the campaign which resulted in the capitulation of Burgoyne. Thomas Pinckney was appointed Major-General, and the principal brigadiers were James Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, William. Hull, and Joseph Bloomfield-all of whom, like Dearborn, had been employed during the War of Independence. General Hull was Governor of the Michigan (which had been organised as a Territory in 1805), and, when war was declared, was marching with about two thousand troops from Ohio for the subjugation of the hostile Indians. To this officer were confided discretionary powers for invading Canada, and, thinking he could acquire a great name by that exploit, he determined on attempting it. Crossing the border of the British possessions on the 12th of July, he issued a boastful proclamation; but the progress of events soon showed that he was not equal to the task. Canada was at that time divided into two provinces-Upper and Lower Canada; and the population of the former, amounting to about 100,000, consisted principally of American loyalists who had left the Union at the close of the late war. Each of these provinces had its own Governor and its own Legislature; and, although the regular military force was so small as not to exceed two thousand men, scattered over a space of more than one thousand miles, the country did not present a good object of attack, because it was certain that the loyalists would do their utmost to resist invasion and avenge old wrongs. The English commanders at once called for volunteers, and made overtures to the Indians to act in alliance with them. A respectable force was presently in the field against General Hull; and if that officer had ever had the least chance of success, it was now at an end. Supposing the attempt to have been advisable at all, it should have been pushed forward with the utmost expedition; instead of which, Hull, after his sudden raid into British territory, came to a full pause, and awaited the action of his adversaries. His first proceeding was to have been an attack on Fort Malden, a British post near the present village of Amherstburg; but he encamped himself at Sandwich, on the Canadian side of the river Detroit, and did literally nothing. He had stated in his proclamation that he commanded an army sufficient to "look down all opposition," and that this was but the van of a much greater force. He had offered peace and

protection to all Canadians who should remain at home, and had threatened the extermination of such as should be found in arms associated with the Indians. These statements and menaces had so far produced an effect that some hundreds of the Canadian militia joined the Americans, or returned to their homes under General Hull's protection; but this did little towards securing the success of the expedition.

The invader seems to have supposed that he could subdue Canada by the mere issue of proclamations at any rate, it is only thus that his entire inaction can be accounted for. While he was lying still, the British forces were increasing in number, and even as early as the 17th of July had carried the war into the enemy's territory. On that day, Fort Mackinaw, one of the strongest posts in the North-western part of the United States, situated on an island near the Straits of Mackinaw, was surprised and captured by an allied force of British and Indians; and on the 5th of August a detachment of the American forces, sent by Hull to escort an approaching supply-party to camp, was defeated near Brownstown, on the Huron River. The garrison at Malden had now been reinforced by General Brock, the British Commander-in-Chief in Canada, and Hull thought it prudent to abandon the expedition which he had begun in so high-flown a spirit. He re-crossed the river on the 7th of August, and retired to Detroit, followed, two days later, by General Brock, who appeared before the town at the head of seven hundred English soldiers and six hundred Indians, and demanded the instant surrender of the place. Hull's position was now one of extreme difficulty. His forces were probably not strong enough to defend so advanced a station, and, in the event of defeat, he was threatened with all the horrors of Indian vengeance. He is perhaps not to be blamed for giving up the town; but he is certainly liable to censure for commencing such an expedition with insufficient means and in a vaunting mood, and then remaining inactive when his only chance of safetynot a very good one at the best-lay in the most rapid and vigorous movements.

The fort of Detroit was held by the 4th Regiment, by the Ohio Volunteers, and by a part of the Michigan militia, placed behind the pickets in such a position that the whole flank of the British force was exposed to their fire. The remainder of the militia were stationed in the town, and two four-pounders, loaded with grape, were planted on an eminence, from which they could have acted with great effect on the attacking

1812.]

ACTIONS ON THE FRONTIERS OF CANADA.

His

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A lamentable event occurring near the head of Lake Michigan contributed another element of a disheartening nature to the circumstances of this period. Hull had sent orders to Captain Heald to evacute Fort Dearborn, on the site of the present city of Chicago-a position which he occupied with fifty regulars. At the command of his superior officer, he quitted that post, and proceeded to Detroit, leaving the public property in charge of a body of friendly Indians. While moving along the shore of Lake Michigan, not far from the fort, he was attacked by a number of savages belonging to a hostile tribe. Twenty-six of the regular troops, and all of the militia, were killed, and a number of women and children were murdered and scalped. Captain Heald succeeded in escaping with his wife to Mackinaw; but the lady was severely, though not mortally, wounded. This event occurred the day before Hull's surrender, and so disastrous a commencement of the campaign emboldened the opponents of the war in the expression of their dissatisfaction. They lost no opportunity of prophesying evil, and for awhile exercised some influence over those who were inclined to hesitate. But the nation generally was determined to carry on the campaign with spirit, and, the war being once begun, this no doubt was the wisest course. camp, and The whole North-western fron

parties. Colonels Cass and McArthur, who had
been detached with four hundred men on a separate
expedition, were now returning to Detroit, and had
by this time got sufficiently close to be able to
attack the enemy in the rear. The position, there-
fore, was in some respects not unfavourable to the
Americans; but Hull dreaded the Indian ferocity,
and resolved to make terms with the enemy.
men had for several days been so dissatisfied with
his conduct that the field-officers determined to
arrest him, but were prevented by the absence of
Colonels Cass and McArthur. Hull consequently
pursued his own course. On the British columns
arriving within five hundred yards of the American
line, he ordered the troops to withdraw into the
fort, and the artillery not to fire. A white flag
was then displayed, and, negotiations being opened
with the English, a capitulation was agreed upon,
by which, on the 16th of August, the army, fort,
stores, and garrison, together with the territory of
Michigan, were surrendered to the British, much
to their surprise. The detachment under Cass
and McArthur, and the troops at the river Raisin,
thirty-six miles below Detroit, were included in
the capitulation; but Captain Brush, who had the
command at Raisin, refused to consider himself
bound by Hull's engagement, and, on being sum-
moned to surrender, broke up his
retreated towards Ohio.

The indignation of the American people at this
surrender was unbounded, and certainly not sur-
prising. The army directed by Hull amounted
to 2,500 men (of whom, however, only eight
hundred were effectives), while Brock had under
his orders no more than three hundred and thirty
regulars, four hundred militia, and six hundred
Indians. The American commander acted entirely
on his own sense of what was right. He did not
call any council of his officers, and came to his
determination, it would appear, solely out of app e-
hension of the Indians. In 1814 he was brought
to trial by court-martial, on charges of treason,
cowardice, and neglect of duty. On the two latter
accusations he was found guilty, and sentenced to
be shot; but, in consideration of his services during
the Revolutionary War, his life was spared.
the remainder of his days, Hull lay under the
contempt and detestation of his countrymen; but
in 1824, the year before his death, he published a
vindication of his conduct, and in 1848 his grand-
son printed a large octavo volume, giving, from
official records, an account of the business which
placed the action of his progenitor in a more
favourable light than that in which it had pre-
viously been seen.

For

tier was exposed to the inroads of the British and their red allies, and self-preservation alone dictated a vigorous policy.

The resources of the United States were not well adapted to cope with so strong a Power as Great Britain. England had at that time more than a thousand vessels, manned by 144,000 sailors, the best in the world, long accustomed to victory, and now animated by recent memories of Cape St. Vincent, the Nile, Copenhagen, Trafalgar, and many other illustrious combats. The Americans had barely twenty vessels of war of large size, with an aggregate of guns not exceeding three hundred. A number of gun-boats had recently been built, but they were required for defending the coast, and could not be counted on for service at any great distance. The British army was certainly much less than the British fleet; but it consisted of well-disciplined regulars, whereas the United States had scarcely any professional army at all, and were obliged to create regiments on the spur of the moment, with all the necessary imperfection of raw levies. The regular troops did not number more than 6,000; in 1808 they had been only 3,000; and the bulk of the forces on which the country was now to depend, had been raised since January of the current year. It was expected,

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of militia-the whole not to exceed 100,000 men. The total population of the United States at the latest Census-that of 1810-was 7,239,814, including all races and colours. The population of Great Britain in 1811 was about 12,950,000, exclusive of Ireland. England had therefore several millions more to draw upon than the United States. The difference between the money resources of the two countries was even more disproportionate; so that the chances of the struggle, on a consideration simply of these points, appeared much greater on the side of the old country than on that of the new. On the other hand, it must be remembered that England was at that time engaged

the great ends which they believed to be involved.

Strong in numbers, the army of the United States, being hastily improvised, was weak in discipline, and in every other requisite of a military force. Of the men raised by order of Congress, scarcely a fourth part was enlisted at the time the conflict began. These were ill-trained, unaccustomed to war, and liable to panic at the first sight of an enemy. The volunteers and militia had borne but a poor character during the War of Independence, and it was not likely that they would distinguish themselves more under existing circumstances. The chief dependence of the country

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His

who commanded the Army of the Centre. force consisted of regulars and militia, whom he drew up at Lewistown, on the Niagara, opposite a fortified British post on the heights of Queenstown. Colonel Van Rensselaer, a relative of the General, and a man of courage and determination, crossed the stream on the 13th of October, with a small detachment, who effected their landing under a heavy fire from the British. The colonel himself was wounded at the very outset of the operations; but Captains Ogilvie and Wool led on their troops to the assault. The fortress was captured, and the Americans now established themselves in so strong a position that when General Brock

brought up a reinforcement of six hundred men, they were repulsed with heavy loss, and amongst the killed was the commander himself. Here, however, the success of the attempt came to an end. A fresh detachment of Americans was conveyed over to the British side of the river; but the troops refused to obey their orders, and the British, being again reinforced, wrested the position from their adversaries, after a severe engagement, in which the Americans were almost destroyed, and the remainder driven across the stream. General Van Rensselaer, disgusted with the inefficiency, and in some instances the cowardice, of his men, left the service, and was succeeded by General Alexander Smyth, of Virginia. That officer commenced operations by issuing an address similar to the proclamation of General Hull, and on the 28th of November embarked 4,500 men, with a view to crossing the Niagara. The appearance of the enemy on the opposite shore, however, was so menacing that the invasion was postponed until the 1st of December, when it was finally determined by a council of war not to proceed any further with the enterprise. Almost equally unsuccessful was General Dearborn, of the Army of the North, who felt it expedient to retire after a few unimportant operations. Winter had now arrived-the long and terrible winter of Canada; and the period for active service had passed.

During the battle of October 13th, a detachment of American troops, amounting to fifteen hundred, refused to cross the river, in aid of their comrades who were being cut to pieces before Queenstown Heights, on the plea that the war was properly only a defensive one, and that therefore it was not right to invade the enemy's dominions. Many of the Federal party applauded them for this determination, and in the North-east the feeling against the war gathered force with every day. Adams did not share in this view, believing, on the contrary, that the struggle had been rendered necessary by the action of the English Government; but several of the New Englanders regarded the policy of President Madison and his Administration as unnecessary, unjust, and likely to prove highly injurious to the best interests of the country. The Governors of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut refused to allow the militia of those States to march to the northern frontier on the requisition of the President, alleging that such a requisition was unconstitutional. The Ministerialists denounced this opposition as treason; but the President felt compelled to act with caution, lest he should alienate the North-eastern States altogether. A menacing condition of opinion was noticeable

over the whole of that quarter. The agitators met in convention, passed resolutions condemnatory of the Federal Government, denounced the war with England, proclaimed their preference for one with France, protested against any alliance with Bonaparte (which, however, does not seem to have been contemplated), affirmed that the revocation of the Orders in Council should have been considered sufficient reason for maintaining peace, and laid it down as a rule that the employment of the militia in offensive warfare was a violation of the Federal compact. The body upholding these views was called the Essex Junto, from the locality where its members assembled. Jefferson believed that the object of the malcontents was not separation from the Union, unless as a temporary expedient, but the establishment in New England of a monarchical form of government, which should gradually extend by contagion to the other parts of the country. This astute observer seems herein to have been misled by his local and political prejudices. There may have been a few individuals in all the States who inclined to monarchy; but that New England in the main was desirous of setting up kingly rule, appears in the highest degree improbable. The Republican sentiment had always been stronger in that region of America than in most others. It was a derivative, in those parts, from the old Puritanical principles of magisterial government, brought out by the first settlers, perpetuated by their descendants, and confirmed by the whole internal polity, religious and social, of the States in question. Nothing had occurred to change that predilection, and there is no sufficient evidence to show that it had been changed. The tendency to an English rather than a French alliance was the result of natural affinities of race and faith, and perhaps still more of self-interest, which pointed to England as the best country with which to carry on commercial intercourse. We may, then, pretty safely assume that the difference between the North and South in 1812 was due, not to any heresies as to the form of government, but to a divergence of interests on questions of foreign policy.

The British Government had by this time declared the whole American coast in a state of blockade, with the exception of the New England States an exception dictated, no doubt, by the hope that those States might thus be won over to the British cause. Such an expectation was doomed to disappointment, as the general feeling of the country held in check whatever tendency to a dis loyal course may have existed in particular circles. The reverses which had been experienced on land

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