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President, marked VI. exhibits the course pursu
éd by the bank in this respect.

[No. 4 check which the possession of their notes would local paper. In July, 1817, the debts due from have afforded, to the more extensive increase of the state banks are reduced to $3,972,000, while culation, amounted to $4,754,000, by which it the notes of the bank of the United States, in cirmight have been subjected to embarrassments arising from the calls of the local institutions. volun-The committee think it evident, from this result, that the bank did not exercise, with sufficient energy, the power which it possessed, and might have retained, but rather afforded inducements to the state banks to extend the amount of their cirit was intended to correct. culating notes, and thus increased one of the evils

The bank of the United States received from the Treasury, the notes of the local institutions, in many cases as special deposits, to be paid out in similar bills. From April, 1817, to this time, the amount so received appears, from statement VII. to be $2,752,750, of which 87,341 continues on hand, leaving 2,665,409 as the amount, tarily assumed by the bank of the United States. The committee have not found any evidence of the bank having attempted to oppress the state banks, either by wanton demands of specie, or by the rejection of their netes. indeed existed, but in the instances which have Much complaint has come to the knowledge of the committee, the state banks have been in the wrong, and some of them at the westward have refused the most equitable propositions of the bank, and have met its demands for its just dues with complaints and reproaches. It was not intended to trouble the House with any of the various letters which have passed on that subject, but as the president of the bank transmitted a letter from the office at Charleston, exhibiting the conduct of the local banks in that place, it is presented to the House marked


mittee on this subject to the president of the In answer to an inquiry, addressed by the combank, they were furnished with his views, and a letter from the office at Boston, marked IX, and rectors on the 28th of August, 1818, marked X. were referred to a report of the committee of diThose documents exhibit the reasons of the bank for adopting the resolutions of that date, by which the notes of the offices were refused acceptance. In the letter of the Boston office much stress is placed upon the large accumulation of paper and drafts at Boston, issued by the southern and western offices. And this became an important object of inquiry. The books of the parent bank do not furnish information respecting the drafts made by, and upon, the offices, excepting those which

were made on it. And the committee have not

ascertained their amount, except at the offices in of Baltimore, the statements obtained at that of fice, marked XI. XII. may be considered as furBaltimore and this city. From the local situation nishing sufficient proof of the correctness of the opinion expressed by the Boston office. To the $34,000 and $215,000, until May last, since which it has been indebted to Baltimore from $500 to office at Boston, its debt Auctuated between $57,000. Its debt to the office at New York has varied from $100,000 to $1,947,000, and, until October last, it has generally owed that office more than 1,500,000 dollars. At that time the New York office was brought in debt to Baltimore 97,278 dollars; its debt in November last themtraordinary reductions of the Baltimore debts, is was 10,948 dollars. The explanation of these exgiven from the circumstances of treasury drafts on the north being delivered directly to the Balticity; by a check on New York for more than a more office, or sent to it through the office at this million, given by the parent bank in payment of foreign bills of exchange, hereinafter mentioned. The Baltimore debt to the parent bank has varied from 1,500,000 to 9,000,000, and has generally exceeded 6,000,000. Notwithstanding their heavy debts to New York, Boston, and Philadel

So long as the notes of each office were payable at all the others, and the office issuing was not exclusively liable for their redemption, the discounts at those places, against which there was a balance of trade, became larger in propor tion to their indemnity against demands. As the notes of the offices were rapidly carried off, the payments of these discounts were necessarily made in the notes of the local institutions; and thus it was one inevitable effect of the old system to increase the debts of the state banks to the offices of the bank of the United States at those places The demands of the bank were suffered to accu-phia, the drafts of the Baltimore office on those mulate improperly, instead of being gradually re- places continued uninterrupted, and excessive in duced, as specie was required at other offices, and in small quantities that would not have been felt. amount: that office was originally supplied with Their reduction was not insisted upon sufficiently returned to it from Philadelphia 1,697,000, in its notes to the amount of 872,000 dollars, and had early; and, when the bank began to call for spe- notes, and yet it is stated by the teller, that it necie, its demands were so considerable as not only to expose the local banks, but the citizens in their demands; that they did not remain twenty-four ver had a sufficient quantity of notes to meet its vicinity, generally, to very severe pressure. hours in the office, but were constantly remitted there can be no doubt, on a comparison of the to the north with the drafts which it issued. And facts, that the drafts from Baltimore, given for statements referred to, connected with these "the proceeds of notes discounted, were unwar

The committee are of opinion, that instead of conducting with the alleged rigor towards the state banks, the bank of the United States is liable to the more serious charge of having increased the amount of notes in circulation, by its ance of them in those places, where it was known they would not be redeemed in specie, and by making them, in the manner before mentioned, the only circulating medium in that part of the country. The forbearance of the bank towards the state banks is vindicated on the ground of its being the only means to induce the resumption of specie payments. This effect, if really owing to that cause, has been proved to be but tempo. rary, and experience has shown, that, at the same time, or soon after the refusal of the bank of the United States to receive the notes of its offices, many of the state banks began to suspend and evade their specie payments.

By substituting the credit of individuals for the payment of the second instalment, which will be presently stated, instead of coin or notes of state banks, the bank of the United States in a great measure deprived itself of the early and prompt

rantably large, and much more than the balance | of trade required.

time the Baltimore office was indebted to the parent bank more than six millions of dollars.


In a letter of the president, dated June 27, 1817, he observes, "the directors considering (among other things mentioned) the low state of the specie and individual deposits at your office, and the magnitude of your discounts and those at this bank, as well for Baltimore as this place, and the very inadequate and disproportioned amount of discounts to which the office at New York has been restricted in consequence of the daily and excessive drafts from your office and this bank, which has become the subject of great animad- From these facts it would seem to result, that version," direct that the then amount of discounts the embarrassments of the Bank of the United should not be exceeded. The same language is States, in receiving the notes of all its offices, did held in other letters, (XII. XIV.) but it terminated not arise so much from the fair and ordinary bain unavailing remonstrances; the Baltimore office lance of trade which might have been calculated continued its drafts and its discounts, and drained and provided for, as from the excessive discounts the specie from the northern offices. And such granted at some of the offices, particularly Baltiwas the want of firmness or of foresight in the pa-raore and Philadelphia, and the drafts consequent rent board, that, after finding its repeated re- upon those discounts which were made upon the monstrances disregarded, it never removed one other offices. From the correspondence of the of the offending directors, and took no effectual bank with its offices, it is obvious that this was step to control them, until the adoption of the the opinion of the directors and the officers; it is general resolutions of August 28, 1818, forbid-distinctly assigned as one of the grounds for reding the offices to draw on each other. The ef- fusing the notes of the offices in the report of the fect of these excessive drafts on the northern of committee, X. and it is more strongly urged in fices was to compel the constant remittance of the letter of the Boston office submitted and aspecie there, to cripple them in all their opera- dopted by the president, IX. and is eloquently tions, to limit their discounts to a trifling amount, enforced in several of his letters. to cause the revenue paid there, and which would itself have been a capital for business, to be drawn southward, thus compelling them to deny to the debtors of the government any indulgence or accommodation in their payments; to bring those offices into debt with the state banks, to produce a general depression of credit and a vere pressure for money. Those places were, in fact, made tributary to Baltimore; and all their means and energies were required to supply its extravagant issues.

This committee is not prepared to say that an uniformly equal currency could have been maintained under the most auspicious circumstances: they are inclined to the opinion that such an attempt would be hopeless, but they consider its abandonment at the time as having been proseduced by the causes before stated. The efforts of the bank to meet the payment of its notes at all its offices north of Charleston, were certainly great, and particularly at New York and Boston, as will appear from the resolutions marked XVI. and the account of specie remited XVII. The relinquishment of the attempt was involuntary and reluctant.

It might have been supposed that the pressure of the Baltimore office upon those more north, was owing to its being pressed by the southern and western offices. The fact will however ap pear from the table XI, that until September last it was indebted to the office at Lexington; that the debts of Cincinnati, Chilicothe, and Louisville, to it were small in amount, and that the only office which has constantly owed it is New Orleans, and that office not to a large amount until lately.

A sudden reduction of the Baltimore debt to the northern offices appears to have taken place in March and April last, and within a few months past those offices have been brought in debt to it. This is accounted for by the cashier of that office, by saying that it arose principally from treasury drafts, and by the sale of foreign bills of exchange. Drafts were given, in some instances, and to considerable amounts, directly to Baltimore on the northern offices, and, in other instances, such drafts went through the office in this city. It is not to be presumed that these drafts were given by the treasury with a knowledge of all the circumstances, or with a view to draw the revenue collected at the north to Baltimore, merely to aid that office in paying its debts. Yet such was the effect, and, although it enabled Baltimore to continue its large discounts, it impoverished the northern offices, and the cities where they were established were made to feel the pressure. The Baltimore debt to the parent bank will be found to have regularly increased with the reduction of its debts to the other offices, until it remitted For this change of system, which placed the 1,007,000 dollars in bills of exchange on London; notes of the offices on the same footing with those which remittance is connected, by the testimony of the local banks in their vicinity, resulted a of J. W. M'Culloch, esq. with the negotiation ex- greater difference in the exchange between the plained in the letter of the president, XV. The different parts of the Union. The offices at New loan which resulted from that negotiation was on Orleans, Savannah, and Charleston, had never been pledge of stock that had been pledged at Balti-included in the plan of equalizing the currency. more; the bank assumed it and received the bills They had always been left to their own discretion, of exchange, and paid for them, by giving a check in receiving or refusing the notes of the other on the New York office for the amount, at the offices. In May, 1817, the offices at Charleston,

From the testimony of the cashier and teller of the bank, the teller of the Bank of North America, and of the cashier and teller of the office at Baltimore, it will appear, very satisfactorily, that the conduct of the bank and that office in adopting the new system of refusing the notes of the branches, was perfectly fair and equitable; that the bank and the Baltimore office promptly paid and received all the notes of the other offices which they had paid out previous to the change of the system, whenever application was made for the purpose, and that in no instance have they refused to do so. Injury probably was suf fered by those who had received the depreciated notes in the usual course of business, but the committee cannot perceive how the bank could haye changed its system in any manner less injurious to itself and less inconvenient to the public than that which was adopted


legality and propriety of such purchases is expressed. No evidence, however, has been obtained, that they have actually been made. The practice, in the opinion of the committee, would be highly improper and dangerous, and contrary to the spirit, if not the words, of the 9th fundamental article.

and Savannah were authorized to draw on those at the north, at a premium. In April, those at Lexington and Cincinnati were authorized to purchase bills on the eastern and northern cities. In December, 1817, the southern offices were au thorized to draw at a premium on Philadelphia, and the offices south of it; and it appears that the offices at Lexington and Cincinnati, before Fe- Among the resolutions of the directors, are two bruary, 1818, were in the practice of drawing on on the subject of discounts, on a pledge of stock, the eastern cities. These facts show that the|| marked XXII and XXIII, passed the 18th and 27th bank, and most of its offices, soll drafts upon each December, 1816. These resolutions obviously other long before the adoption of the resolution contemplate only discounts to the stockholders, of the 28th August, 1818, refusing the notes of the and one avowed object was to facilitate the payoffices; and establish that, while the bank was at- ment of the specie part of the second instalment, tempting to equalize the currency, by the pay-which was ten dollars on a share, and to be paid ment of its notes at all its offices north of Charles-by the 22d January, 1817. The loans were to be ton, it was at the same time selling drafts between confined to the proportions of the coin part of those offices at a premium. A system of domes- the second instalment, on the shares which had tic exchange was adopted by the bank on the been subscribed at the places where offices were 13th of July, 1817, marked XVIII. It contains || then in operation, New York, Boston, and Balțisome provisions which appear exceptionable; but,|| more. The total amount of these loans to pay as the plan never was acted upon, it is not deemed the specie part of the said instalment on the necessary to notice them. It has been impracti-20th of February, 1817, at Philadelphia, was cable for the committee to ascertain the amount, $199,129 37, and at Baltimore, at that date, was or the rates of the drafts, sold by and upon the $138,320 00. offices. On examination of the books of the parent bank, it appears that drafts were sold by it on Charleston, New Orleans, and Savannah, within a few days of each other, at very different rates; on one day at one per cent. and on another day at five per cent. on the same office. It would be in vain to attempt to account for these fluctuations. However dangerous to the community may be the power of selling drafts, in the hands of an institution whose resources may be adequate to the control of domestic exchange, according to its in-ful; terest or caprice, yet the committee cannot enter. tain a doubt that the bank possesses the power. Excepting the fluctuations before noticed, the rate of premium has not hitherto been extortionate, in any instance which has come to the knowledge of the committee. The proceedings of the bank The amount paid by checks, also, appears from and its offices, and the reasons and views enter-abstracts, the most, if not the whole, of which tained by them, are exhibited in the report XVIII, were to draw the proceeds of notes discounted in the letter of the President, XIX, and in ex- for the purpose. And it appears, that in many tracts from his correspondence, XX. instances, particularly in one related in Mr. Various opinions are entertained on the expe- || M'Euen's testimony,hereinafter referred to, and in diency of the bank's selling its drafts. While another referred to in the president's letter of many suppose that it would consult its own dignity May 27, 1817, marked XXV, that the directors did and interest, in refraining from the practice, and not confine themselves to the amount prescribed would receive an equivalent for the loss of pre. in the resolution of the 27th December, that is to mium in the confidence and support of the com- the proportion of the coin part of the second instalmercial community, by delivering its drafts gra.ment, but discounted to the full value of the stock, tuitously, when it was convenient to draw at all; which was paid for by the proceeds of the same others contend that the system of gratuitous discounts; and the discount, the payment of the drafts would open an avenue to favoriteism, and, second instalment, the payment of the price to the at all events, would expose the bank, to the owner, the transfer and the pledge of the stock, charge in a greater degree than if it soldfits drafts. were, as it is termed, simultaneous acts. All the Without expressing any opinion upon these sub-discounts on stock, after the 20th February, 1817, jects, upon which the community is much divid were made at the par value of the shares, which ed, and to which the attention of the committee enabled the discounter not only to pay the whole has not been particularly directed, they content of his instalments, including the specie part and themselves with observing, that, if drafts are sold, the funded debt part, but also to draw out of the they ought to be at fixed, known, and permanent bank the amount which might have been paid in prices, not exceeding the price of transportation on his shares. It is alleged, in justification of of specie, on the fair AGTO of business: the want those discounts, that specie bore a very high preof these fixed prices in the bank and its offices,mium, and that the bank could not have commen. appears to your committee censurable. ced business, unless that mode of detaining the specie payment had been adopted. With respect to the price of specie, it appears to have been six per cent. at Philadelphia, on the 6th January 1817, and about the same price at Baltimore; and that it had been much higher. Admitting, however,

The committee have not obtained information of the amount at New York and Boston, but they are informed by the officers of the bank, that the discounts at those places were to a very trifling amount, if any. The committee can see no reason to justify these premature efforts, to aid the payment of the second instalment, before it fell due, and before the experiment was made to ascertain how much could be paid in specie. Those efforts do not appear to have been very success. for 859,085 dollars were paid during the month of January, 1817, while 1,078,319 was paid after that period, the greatest proportion in May and June, as will appear from an abstract prepared by the committee, and now submitted, marked XXİV.



Connected with the subject of exchange, is that of dealing in the notes of the state banks. In a letter of the President to the Charleston office, which received the sanction of the board of directors, marked XXI, an opinion in favor of the

scarcity of specie, that it could not have been obtained, and that, without facilitating the payments by making discounts, the bank could not have gone into operation-the committee observe that they are at a loss to perceive how the simple act of discounting could make the specie more plen ty; that, if it was not actually in the bank at the time of making those discounts, the checks of the discounters could not be considered as equivalent to specie.

that the price would have been much enhanced, || in consequence of its being understood that the coin payment on the second instalment would be rigidly exacted, yet the committee cannot perceive the justice of enabling some of the stockholders to evade that payment, and the conse. quent loss of the premium on specie, while the majority had been compelled to incur the same loss, in order strictly to comply with the law and their engagements; particularly unjust was it to those who resided at such a distance from the bank that they could not avail themselves of the privilege granted. And the injustice appears the greater, when it is known, that the expense of the specie afterwards imported by the bank, in order to supply the deficiency produced by the evasion it had authorized, was assessed equally upon those stockholders who had neglected to pay, upon those who had already, at considerable loss, furnished their quota of coin, and upon the government. Seven millions was the whole sum required to be paid in coin-the specie part of the first instalment, amounting to 1,400,000 dollars was paid; of the $2,800,000, which was to have been paid at the second instalment, it is impossible to say what amount was actually paid


in coin.

The amount of the specie in the bank of the United States, in January, 1817, was 1,724,109 dollars, 324,000 dollars more than the coin part of the first instalment and which may fairly be presumed to have been received from the second If then the checks of stockholders instalment. founded upon discounts were equivalent to specie, they were by them authorized to draw out of the bank the very coin which had been paid in by other stockholders, in order to pay it into the bank again, for their own benefit, and to complete the payment of the specie part of the second instalment-an operation of more potency, in creating specie, than was ever ascribed to the fabled finger of Midas. The general statement, in Fe bruary, 1817, shows that the total amount of bills discounted, was 2,930,067 dollars, making an excess of 1,205,958 dollars of discounts over the From which it would respecie in the bank. sult, that the checks for the proceeds of those discounts were not in all cases equivalent to specie. As to the difficulty of the bank going into operation without those discounts being made, to facilitate the payment of the second instalment, it is not perceived how that measure removed the difficulty for it is obvious that it did not add a single cent to the specie in the vaults of the institution. What other difficulty than the want of specie the bank had to encounter, is not known, as all other obstructions seem to have yielded almost without an effort.


The statement before referred to, marked XXIV, will show the payments in coin at Phila delphia; and abstract marked XXVI, will exhibit the nominal payments on all the instalments, of which 13,872,610 dollars was paid by the stock holders in funded debt, (exclusive of the 7,000,000 subscribed by the government,) instead of twenty-one millions which were required by the law; and 14,100,167 dollars was paid, as stated in the abstract, in coin. But, in that abstract, a check on the bank, or on other banks supposed to pay specie, is deemed a payment in coin; and as the payments on the second instalment continued to be made and received for six months and more, The effect of these discounts was, very obvious. after it was due, and, as during that time, large discounts on stock were constantly made, it is ob- ly, to enable those who had made large purchases to retain their stock without paying for it, and to vious that the abstract cannot be relied on as exhibiting an actual amount paid in specie. Nor, derive a benefit from its probable advancement in on the other hand, could the whole amount of specie. Had the bank rigidly required the pay. the discounts on stock be considered as having ment of the instalment, the large stockholders been applied to the payment of the second in. must have sold that portion of their shares which their real means did not enable them to hold; or, stalment. By statement marked (B) referred to in the cashier's answer, and by this committee if the bank had not exacted the instaliments, and had not afforded the means of substituting credit marked XXVII, it appears that the discounts on for payment, the stock would not have advanced S0th July, 1817, on pledged stock, amounted to 8,046,932 dollars: of that amount, a part was ap-inaterially in price, and the large holders of it plied to the payment of the third instalment, and would have had no inducement to retain it. a part drawn out of the bank by the discounters. either event, a more equal diffusion of the shares would have been the consequence, and it would A large portion of it is believed, however, to have been used to pay the second instalment. have reached the hands of solid capitalists, who would have held only what they could pay for. Of the 2,800,000 dollars, which was to have been It is believed that the loss of the dividends, and paid at the third instalment, it is believed that a very trifling amount was paid in coin, and as lit- the liability to pay interest on the instalments due tle of the funded debt, but that nearly the whole would have been suflicient to compel even the of both was paid by the proceeds of notes dis- stock jobber to sell. Although, if those discounts counted on the pledge of stock. The total amount had not been made, the immediate profits of the of specie imported from Europe by the bank bank would not have been so large; yet it would not have had an unwieldy capital to manage: it since its institution to this time, appears, by a statement marked XXVII, to be 7,311,750 53, could have proceeded gradually, growing with the expense of which, including interest, pre- the growth, and strengthening with the strength, mium, and 20,000 dollars paid to the agent for of the nation, as it emerged from the evils of the going to London, amounts to 525,297 28. The flood of paper issued by the local institutions. The bank could have felt its way, and increased contract made for a part of that specie, and the authority to Mr. Sergeant, the agent, are submit-its means, with the increasing demands of the ted, marked XXIX. XXX. To the reason urged country. Such a cautions,roceeding would have by the officers of the bank, that such was the "enabled it to render invaluable service in check



payments for the second instalment in funded debt and in coin, which probably was purchased at a premium. The committee find it difficult to reconcile those resolutions with the views professed in their adoption, aud are satisfied that they were connected intimately with other measures, calculated to affect the price of stock, and particularly with discounts of a similar character, soon


ing the issues of state banks, and bringing them
to the alternative of avowed bankruptcy, or to the
per nanent resumption of specie payments. The
evi of the country was the immense amount of
bank notes and credits; the bank of the United
States increased it, by its credits to stockholders.
That course did, indeed, enable the directors to
declare a large dividend; but, that the apparent
prosperity was temporary and fallacious, is de-after made.
monstrated by the recent dividend of two and a
half per cent.

It might have been supposed, as it has been urged, that the discounting on stock was the only means in the power of the bank to enforce the payment of the second instalment It is believed that the engagement on the part of the stockhol-who had been appointed to consider the subject, ders could have been enforced without difficulty authorizing John Sergeant, Esq. to make arrangeby the courts of law; decisions to that effect have ments in Europe for the payment of the bank dibeen made in the courts of the states of Pennsyl-vidends, at the par of exchange, and at the risk vania, Massachusetts and New York And when and expense of the bank. Such an arrangement the stockholder's note was taken without an en- was made, by which it was stipulated to make the dorser or any other collateral security, but the payments six months after the dividends were depledge of the stock, it is not perceived how his clared; the papers on this subject are marked legal liability was increased. In the state of the XXXIX, XL, XLI. How far it was objectionable stock pledged there was indeed a prospect of in- thus to offer inducements to foreigners to become demnity, which depended however wholly on the interested in our stock, and semi annually to withprice of shares in the market. The same circum-draw from the country the amount of their divistances that prevented the actual payment of the den:ds, the committee do not undertake to decide, instalment would have interfered, it is presumed, as they consider it one of those general and abto obstruct the liquidation of the note given in stract subjects to which the resolution of the lieu of it. And in the emergency which would house does not direct their attention. But, thus have compelled the bank to reduce its discounts to compel American stockholders, and the governit would most 'require a good price for the stock; ment, to contribute to the possible loss of paying and the very necessity of the times which would the dividends to those abroad, appears unjust. force an unusual quantity of it into the market, The nearly equal division of directors on this imwould probably defeat the object of security. In portant subject, and the able reasons assigned in fact, a large part of the amount thus discounted the report of the committee against the measure, was not paid at the maturity of the notes: videought at least to have prevented the precipitate statement XXVII: but were renewed. Of the adoption of the resolution. And when the comstill larger proportion, which appears from thatmittee find among the eleven who voted in the statement to have been paid, it is wholly impossi-affirmative the names of directors who have been ble to determine what part was converted into constantly and largely engaged in the purchase notes, on personal security, or what part assumed and sale of stock, and that of the ten who voted in the new shape, which was given to notes discount. the negative, not one has been ascertained to have ed on pledged stock after the 20th February, dealt in those transactions, they are almost irre1817 it ought to be remarked that many persistibly impelled to the conclusion, that the mea-. sons, after finding the disposition of the board, ob- sure was adopted more with a view to enhance tained discounts who were perfectly prepared to the price of shares, than for the permanent benepay and would have paid their instalments if the fit of the institution. inducement to credit had not been offered to them.

One of the acts, obviously intended to give the bank stock a high price in the European market, was the establishment of an agency there, to pay the dividends. On the 28th November, 1816, a resolution was passed, by the casting vote of the president, and against the report of a committee

The practice of discounting on stock, to the full mount paid upon the shares, appears to have commenced early at the parent bank, under the..

They authorize discounts without an endorser

Had the bank resorted to its remedy through the courts to obtain the payment of the second in-fourth by-law, which is similar to the 15th regulastalment, it would probably have obtained some- tion for the government of the offices, both of thing from the stockholders; it could have lost no- which were adopted at the commencement of the thing-and at all events would have saved the di-institution. vidends upon the delinquent stock. But by taking the note of the owner it admitted that the instal-on the stock of the bank, or the funded debt of the ment was paid, and abandoned the means of co- U. States, or such other property as shall be apercion given by the charter in withholding the proved, when pledged to an amount sufficient to dividends, and obtained nothing. It did not in secure the payment of the notes. By a statement crease the responsibility of the stockholder, while referred to in the cashier's examination, XXVII, it exposed the bank to the certain loss of the di- it appears that the total amount of discounts on vidends, and to the chance of loss if the stock pledged stock, up to the 30th July, 1817, was should be forced into the market in large quanti-8,046,932 64, of which there had been paid, at that time, 2,815,665 04; those loans, it is presumed, were made chiefly at Philadelphia, as the Baltimore loans on stock had not commenced to a large


The committee are of the opinion that those resolutions, and the practices of discounting before mentioned, were incorrect. That they are parti-extent at that time. On the 25th July, 1817, a cularly objectionable, from their partial operation resolution, marked XXXI, was adopted, autho in affording facilities to some stockholders, which rizing the offices to discount notes, secured by a could not be enjoyed by those at a distance. pledge of bank stock or funded debt, with a reEven at Richmond, the stockholders made their cital, that it might be desirable to many persons

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