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guaranteed by the United States,' and Polk was doubtful whether this was in accord with the settled policy to "cultivate friendly relation with all nations, entangling alliances with none"; but the treaty was finally ratified, July 12, 1848.

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The Panama route was not the only one regarded as available for communication between the Atlantic and Pacific. Great Britain was most interested in the Nicaragua route; but there were many others, and the most northerly was across the isthmus of Tehuantepec, lying wholly within the republic of Mexico. The first letter of instructions to Commissioner Trist in 1847 was accompanied by the projet of a treaty, of which the eighth article secured to the government of the United States the right of way across the isthmus of Tehuantepec. For New Mexico and California, together with this concession, he was authorized to pay thirty million dollars; and for the same territory without the concession twenty-five million dollars. When the instructions were being considered in the cabinet, Walker expressed himself as valuing the right of way across the isthmus of Tehuantepec more highly than he did New Mexico and California, and as wishing to make it a sine qua non of peace; but he was overruled. Buchanan desired that the five

1 U. S. Treaties and Conventions, 204. Polk, MS. Diary, January 30, 1847.

3 Keasbey, Nicaragua Canal and Monroe Doctrine, map, frontispiece.

4 Senate Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII., No. 52, p. 87.

million dollars to be paid for the concession should be retained until Mexico had constructed a railway or canal across the isthmus; but the majority was against him also.1

When Trist met the Mexican commissioners and presented his terms they offered a counter projet which did not include the transit privilege. They explained that the Mexican government had made, several years before, a grant "with reference to this object" which had been transferred with the consent of the government to English subjects, of whose rights Mexico could not dispose. Here the effort to deal with the subject appears to have dropped. Whether it played any part in the further negotiations, there is nothing to show; but in any case it did not enter into the treaty. On July 15, 1847, Anthony Butler, the former United States minister in Mexico, called on the president and apparently made an effort to sell him some information concerning the Tehuantepec route; but Polk took little interest in the matter, and seems to have been very glad to get rid of Butler."

The failure of the Tehuantepec scheme centred attention on the more southerly routes. In order to utilize the concession obtained from New Granada in the treaty of 1848, a company of United States capitalists was organized to build a railway

1 Polk, MS. Diary, April 13, 1847.

'Senate Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII., No. 52, p. 337. Polk, MS. Diary, July 15, 1847.

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across the isthmus of Panama, and began operations at once.1 Another company obtained a contract from the Nicaraguan government to open an interoceanic waterway through that state. President Polk sent a special envoy-Elijah Hise-to Nicaragua to inquire into British aggressions there; and Mr. Hise concluded an unauthorized treaty by which the United States government, or a company of its citizens, was given the exclusive right to construct and operate a transit-way across the state, on condition that the United States should guarantee the neutrality of the way and protect the sovereign rights of Nicaragua over territory which she justly claimed. This treaty, however, was not submitted to the Senate.

The Whig administration which began in 1849 seemed to be more desirous of obtaining the facilities for isthmian transit than of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. In that year Mr. E. G. Squier, who was sent out in place of Mr. Hise, obtained for a new company of United States capitalists a concession for an interoceanic canal,' and negotiated a treaty by which the company was given the right of way for the purpose, on condition that the United States should guarantee the neutrality of the canal and the sovereignty of Nica

1 Niles' Register, LXXIV., 385; cf. Smith, Parties and Slavery (Am. Nation, XVIII.), chap. vi.

2 Senate Exec. Docs., 47 Cong., 1 Sess., VI., No. 194, pp. 4149, 55; Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 59.

3 Ibid., 49-55.

ragua over the territory along the line of it. By this treaty like privileges on the same terms were offered to other nations that might care for them. Then, in order to facilitate the canal project and to neutralize the efforts of the British government, which already controlled the eastern terminus of the Nicaragua route, and was aiming to get control of the Pacific terminus also, Squier obtained from Honduras the cession to the United States of the island of Tigre, in the Gulf of Fonseca. The island was immediately seized by British troops to satisfy a debt of Honduras to British subjects. Squier gave notice that the island belonged to the United States, and ordered its evacuation, but was refused. The matter was now taken up by the two governments concerned, and their isthmian relations were readjusted on a new basis.1

The readjustment consisted in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which was signed April 19, 1850, and mutually ratified on July 5 of the same year. By this treaty Great Britain and the United States agreed to join in promoting the construction of a shipcanal across the isthmus by the Nicaragua route, promising that neither would "ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal," or assume or exercise any dominion

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over any part of Central America," or use its connections with any state to acquire rights in relation to the canal not offered on the same terms 1 Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, chap. vi.

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to citizens or subjects of the other party to the convention. The two governments guaranteed the neutrality and security" of the canal so long as there should be no "unfair discriminations" or "oppressive exactions" in its management, and engaged to invite every state with which either contracting party had friendly intercourse to join in the agreement and "share in the honor and advantage" of contributing to such an important work. Both pledged their "support and encouragement" to the first person or company beginning its construction under satisfactory conditions. In addition, article v. distinctly applied the principle of neutrality to any means of transit over the isthmus route.1

The significance of the treaty was somewhat confused by a correspondence between the negotiators that took place just previous to the exchange of ratifications. June 29, Sir Henry Bulwer, the British envoy, wrote Secretary of State Clayton that he did not understand the obligations of the treaty to apply to British Honduras or its dependencies— that is, in promising not to assume or exercise dominion over any part of Central America, the British government did not have British Honduras or its dependencies in mind. The "dependencies" must have been Mosquitia and one or two islands to which Great Britain had some claim in the Bay of Honduras. Clayton acknowledged in reply that 1 U. S. Treaties and Conventions, 440–444.

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