laisser faire legislators. It postponed the interest of the individual to the interest of the class to which he belongs, while it demanded legislative interference on behalf of that class; and thus both from their internal constitution, and in their demands, trade-unions have found comparatively little sympathy from any parliamentary party. It was clear that the policy which the Unions pursued was often distinct from the line of conduct which the selfinterest of any individual member would have led him to follow. Economists argued that for this very reason. it was impossible for Unions to succeed in raising wages: each individual would find it his interest to accept work at a low rate, rather than to insist on obtaining a general rise by striking for it if need be. But as a matter of fact men did pursue this course; and the Unions were able to put effective pressure on their employers. Such a result could only be accounted for by supposing that the Unions were tyrannical bodies which enforced a blind obedience from their miserable members: and hence the opponents of trade-unions have posed as the defenders of the liberty of the individual citizen, and have hinted that the leaders were unscrupulous agitators who succeeded in deluding their followers. Time has reversed this judgment also: but the accusation accounts for a great deal of the suspicion with which these associations were long viewed by the public.

For the bitterness with which they have been attacked by the employers there is no need to account: the scheme of industrial life for which the unionists worked was quite incompatible with the conditions in which the capitalist could best drive a large trade. He is anxious to enlarge his operations rapidly when prices are favourable and to regulate his production with reference to the

constant fluctuations of the market: it is thus that he can reap a substantial profit even after working for some months at a loss: but to do this he must be able to call up additional labour from the ranks of the unemployed, and it is thus an advantage to him that in the normal condition of trade there should be a greater or smaller number of work-people within reach who are suffering the misery of being out of work.1 But even when trade is dull the head of a factory cannot afford to let his machinery stand idle; he loses by every minute in which it is not working, and is thus tempted to lengthen the hours of labour so far as possible, by working early and late and by cutting down the intervals for meals. On the other hand as the main part of the work is done by the machinery, he is able to get women and children to look after it as well, and at a much lower rate of pay, than men would require; and thus the line of policy which tends to the most rapid gain for the employer is at every point opposed to the policy which would bring about regular employment for the artisan. In so far as the trade-unions hoped to succeed, they could only do so by getting the legislature to interfere with the employers in that method of carrying on their business which had proved most profitable; and thus they were brought into direct conflict with the principle of laisser faire.

It is unnecessary to recall forgotten animosities or to record the bitter language in which this animosity was expressed. The middle class who had acquired supreme influence in parliament, were becoming deeply interested in the repeal of the Corn Laws, but the accredited leaders of the working classes looked on the movement with suspicion; as they feared that if corn was cheaper, wages would only 1 On the industrial "Reserve Army " see Marx, Kapital, 657.

be beaten down to a correspondingly lower level, and that while the capitalists had less expense in hiring labour, the workman would not gain any increased comfort. As the Anti-Corn Law League was desirous of enlisting philanthropic influences for their campaign, this apathy on the part of the workmen was most irritating to men who were firmly convinced of their own benevolence. On the other hand the limitations of the working day which the Unionists so cordially desired touched the wealthy middle-class employers directly, as it seemed to them thoroughly unwise, from the possible danger of successful foreign competition.

The Factory Acts proved to be the field where the two conflicting schemes of industrial life came into most direct opposition and where the battle was really fought out. The ineffective measures which had been placed on the Statute Book from 1802 onwards showed the intentions of the legislature, but good intentions do not serve to render the path of progress smooth, and the real battle was fought from 1844 to 1852. The brunt of the public conflict was borne by philanthropists like Lords Shaftesbury and Michael Sadler, and by philanthropic employers like Fielden but the pressure which the unionists brought to bear in the war-despite all the disadvantages for organisation under which they were placed even after the repeal of the Combination Laws in 1824-was undoubtedly a potent factor. The earlier Factory Acts were philanthropic in character, they attempted to define the conditions under which work should be done but when the Ten Hours Bill became law the State was beginning to accept the trade-union policy of limiting the labours of individuals in the interest of the class to which they belonged. The conditions of

factory employment rendered it necessary that all should work for the same length of time: henceforward that length of time was to be decided after careful inquiries in the interests of the class, not by the arrangements which employers could make with individual workmen in turn. The most tough and wiry might have their power of earning curtailed by the limitation, but the class as a whole enjoyed better conditions of life.

In this partial acceptance of a new principle of action. by the legislature, and this regard to the wellbeing of a class, we find the first of these measures of exceptional legislation of which we often hear. For the moment however we may note that the end in view in this piece of industrial legislation is not national wealth in the sense we have hitherto considered it: the factory acts appeared likely to limit the aggregate of individual possessions, and to give an equivalent in leisure which cannot be assessed in our estimates of pecuniary gain and loss. We thus find a recognition by the legislature of the fact that the object which the statesman must consider includes something more than the aggregate of individual wealth, and that the whole conception which lay at the basis of the laisser faire system was at least inadequate. How far it is possible to replace it by a more complete account of the nature of national wealth, and one that shall give a real justification for such Acts as the Ten Hours Bill we shall presently see.1

4. General Interest.

33. There is one other great movement about which a few words must be said before we are fully in a position See below, § 35, 36.

1

to discuss Economic Principles for the present day. The great agitation against the Corn Laws which triumphed in 1847 was perfectly in harmony with the laisser faire principles which had been in vogue since the early part of the century, and it might seem that it was sufficient to take this agitation as another illustration of the same influences. But this would be an entire mistake. There was no novelty in the purely economic principles of the Anti-Corn Law League, but there was a new departure of another sort the importance of the movement lies in its political1 and not in its economic aspect. So far as its purely economic aspect is concerned the chief interest is in its being a return to the medieval policy of care for the consumer. In the time of Edward III. the whole industrial regulation both by statute law and through the gilds was primarily concerned with securing good wares at fair prices for the consumer. In the later middle ages the English artisan demanded protection against the alien whose prosperity did not really enrich the country, and when the State began to concern itself with stimulating the industry of the country by planting new trades and forcing new markets abroad, it was supposed that if wealth were only produced the whole of the citizens would benefit by it. On the face of it too there is much to be said for benefiting the producers and letting the consumers take care of themselves, especially in a society where there is a large class of consumers who do not produce at all. But there are grave practical difficulties in carrying out this programme: producers can only be protected by elaborate regulations which are expensive to work and

1 Another side of its political character,—as democratic-was well expounded by M. Leon Say in his address to the Cercle Saint Simon, 15th Jan. 1884.