punishment of those who there aid or abet, incite or procure the commission of crime in other States.1 In August, 1889, Governor Lowry, of Mississippi, demanded of Governor Foraker, of Ohio, the surrender of Richard Carroll, general superintendent of the Queen and Crescent line of railway, running from Cincinnati, Ohio, to New Orleans, Louisiana, on the charge of having aided and abetted a prize-fight between Sullivan and Kilrain, in Mississippi, the railway company in question having transported the parties to the appointed place. Governor Foraker, after considering the case, refused to comply with the demand, on the ground that Mr. Carroll was not in the State of Mississippi at the time, nor in any way connected with the fight or responsible for it.2

§ 584. False Pretences. The question of constructive presence at the commission of a crime has frequently arisen in the case of obtaining money or goods by false pretences, and it has been held that such presence in the demanding State is not sufficient as a basis for a requisition for the surrender of a person as a fugitive from justice, although, if the person charged were to come within the jurisdiction of that State, he might be arrested and punished for the false pretences there committed while he was corporeally elsewhere. Thus where a resident of Iowa made false pretences in a letter to a firm in Boston, it was held that he could not be surrendered in response to a requisition of the governor of Massachusetts, demanding him as a fugitive from justice. The

1 Storey's case, 3 Cent. L. J. 636.

2 New York Times, August 14, 1889. In 1877, Governor Bedle, of New Jersey, made a requisition upon Governor Robinson, of New York, for the surrender of one Baldwin, a resident of the latter State, who was charged, with other directors of a New Jersey insurance company, with "conspiracy to defraud," alleged to have been committed in New Jersey on a day on which Baldwin was in fact in the State of New York, though not long before he had visited New Jersey on business connected with matters out of which the conspiracy was alleged to have arisen. Governor Robinson held that the crime, if any, committed by Baldwin, was committed in the State of New York, and on that ground refused to surrender him as a fugitive from justice. Cited as from public papers of Lucius Robinson, pp. 170-177, by Governor Hill, in matter of Mitchell, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 596, 602.

3 Jones v. Leonard, 50 Iowa, 106; 1878.

supreme court of Ohio made the same decision in regard to a demand of the governor of New York, it being proved that the false pretences, if any, were made to an agent of the New York firm in Cleveland, Ohio, and that the person charged had not since been in New York. In In re Mohr, before the supreme court of Alabama, in 1883, the relator was arrested on a warrant of the governor of that State issued upon a requisition of the governor of Pennsylvania accompanied with a duly authenticated indictment charging the crime of obtaining goods by false pretences.2 It was shown that the prisoner was not in Pennsylvania at the time the false pretences were alleged to have been committed, and had not been there since; and that the goods were obtained by purchase from an agent of the prosecutor in the State of New York, to whom the false representations, if any, were made. It was held that as the prisoner had not, either at or after the commission of the crime, been in the State of Pennsylvania, he was not a fugitive from its justice, and was entitled to be discharged. In the State of Tennessee v. Jackson, the defendant, Jackson, who resided in Chicago, in the State of Illinois, advertised a horse for sale. A resident of Chattanooga, in the State of Tennessee, seeing the advertisement, entered into a correspondence with Jackson, and in the end purchased the horse, which was duly shipped to Chattanooga, and remitted the purchase-money to Jackson by mail. When the purchaser tried the horse, he pronounced him worthless, and alleged that the money paid. for him had been obtained by false and fraudulent pretences, on which charge a warrant for Jackson's arrest was obtained from a justice of the peace in Chattanooga. The matter was then placed in the hands of a detective, who made an affidavit before a magistrate in Tennessee charging that Jackson had committed the crime of obtaining money by false pretences against the laws of Tennessee, and that he had fled from that State and taken refuge in Illinois. On this affidavit the governor of Tennessee made a requisition upon the governor of

1 Wilcox v. Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520.

2 In re Mohr, 73 Ala. 503. See also 12 Wash. L. R. 209; 18 Cent. L. J. 8 36 Fed. Rep. 258; 1888.

Illinois, and, with these papers, the detective obtained from the latter a warrant of surrender, on which he took Jackson and hurried him off to Tennessee, where he had him examined before a justice of the peace and committed to jail. Judge Key, of the United States district court, Eastern District of Tennessee, discharged the prisoner on habeas corpus, on the ground that Jackson, not having been in Tennessee, had never fled from it. Judge Key said that the oath of the detective was false and the governors of two States had been imposed on. He pronounced the whole proceeding to be a fraud upon the law, and ordered the prisoner to be discharged.1 On August 25, 1890, a question as to flight in respect to the offence of obtaining money by false pretences was decided by Judge Bradley, of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, in the case of one Robert B. Bulliss, who was arrested for rendition on a warrant issued by the chief justice of that court, acting as chief executive of the District, in compliance with a requisition of the governor of Utah. Bulliss applied to Judge Bradley for a writ of habeas corpus and asked to be discharged from the custody of the agent of Utah, on the ground that he was improperly and illegally held, and that there was a conspiracy between the agent and certain persons in that Territory to obtain possession of him for malicious

1 In In re Miles, 52 Vt. 609 (1880), the relator, who had been brought from New York to Vermont, alleged that when he was arrested in New York on a warrant issued by the governor of that State in compliance with a requisition of the governor of Vermont, he applied to a judge of the city of New York for discharge on a writ of habeas corpus. The judge having refused to discharge him, proceedings by certiorari were brought before another court for a revision of that decision, and an order of stay was made upon the sheriff. This order was discharged by still another judge while the certiorari proceedings were yet pending, and Miles was delivered up to the agent of Vermont and taken to that State, where he was arrested on an indictment there pending against him. He alleged that the discharge of the order of stay was procured by fraud, and on this ground asked for his discharge on habeas corpus by the Vermont court. A copy of the record of the proceedings showing the discharge of the order being produced and the rendition proceedings appearing to be regular, the supreme court of Vermont held that the relator could not set up the manner by which he was brought into New York, and also that the validity of the record of the New York court showing the discharge of the order of stay could not be impeached or countervailed on habeas corpus by evidence aliunde the record.

purposes. Judge Bradley said that he should first determine whether the papers sufficiently showed that a crime had been committed in Utah; secondly, whether Bulliss was a fugitive; and, thirdly, whether the process had been abused, — whether it was used for an unlawful or a malicious purpose. Accompanying the requisition were two affidavits, and in this relation Judge Bradley said that where an affidavit was used it justified a stricter examination than where the charge was made by an indictment. One of the affidavits did not substantially charge an offence in Utah. In the other it was charged that the false representations were made on divers days from the 1st to the 29th of September, 1889, and that the money was paid to Bulliss on the 19th. It appeared also that he left Utah on the 16th or 17th, and the affidavit did not precisely state what the pretences were that induced the payment of the money, or when they were made. There was thus repugnance in the affidavit in alleging false pretences on the 29th of September in respect to money obtained on the 19th, and also defectiveness in the allegation of the commission of the offence in Utah. Judge Bradley said that the allegations did not show that Bulliss was in Utah at the commission of the offence, in any other than a constructive sense, and if he was not, he could not be called a fugitive from justice. It also appeared that the money was actually received by Bulliss in the District of Columbia, whither it was sent to him by mail from Utah, after his departure from that Territory; and in this relation Judge Bradley is reported to have said that the completed offence was not committed by the relator in Utah so as to constitute him a fugitive from her justice, the false pretences having been made there, but the money having been received when he was elsewhere. Whether or no the report is accurate, we desire to suggest a different view from that stated. "Where," says Wharton, "a false pretence is uttered in A., and the money obtained in B., the venue may be laid either in A. or B. This, in England, is finally settled by statute, which, however, is in this respect affirmatory of the common law. In several instances it has been held that the forum that first

1 The Evening Star (Washington), August 25, 1890.

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takes cognizance of the offence, whether it be the forum of the uttering of the pretence, or that of the forwarding of the goods, attaches to itself jurisdiction." This rule does not apply to false pretences only, but obtains in regard to various other crimes to the commission of which several facts, which may occur at different times and places, are essential. In such a case it may be held that a man may be regarded as a fugitive from the justice of the State where, being corporeally present, he commits any of the criminal acts that respectively give jurisdiction to punish the offence. Thus where a man is stricken in one State and dies in another, we should not suppose it to be doubtful that the person who committed the injury could be demanded as a fugitive from justice on a charge of murder by the State in which the mortal wound was inflicted; or if, upon the theory that, the injury being a continuously operative cause, the victim is murdered wherever he dies, the courts of the State where the death occurs should take jurisdiction of the offence, we should suppose that the culprit might, by his presence in and departure from that State, become a fugitive from its justice and be demanded as such on a charge of murder.2 As the law does not separate

1 Wharton's Crim. L. § 1206. In a note to the passage above quoted, the learned author says: "See this ruled as to the forum in which the pretences were uttered in Skiff v. People, 2 Parker C. R. 139; R. v. Cooke, 1 F. & F. 64; R. v. Leech, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 539; Dears. C. C. 642; 7 Cox C. C. 100; and as to the forum in which the money was obtained in R. v. Jones, 1 Den. C. C. 551; 4 Cox C. C. 198; where the county in which the money was mailed to the defendant, living in another county, was said to have jurisdiction. In R. v. Garret, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 607; 6 Cox C. C. 260; Dears. C. C. 232; People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 190; 1 Comst. 173; Com. v. Van Tuyl, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 1, it was held that the place of the receipt of the property has jurisdiction, although the pretence on which the money was obtained was uttered in another State."

In Norris v. State, 25 Ohio St. 217, it was held that the place where goods were delivered to a carrier had jurisdiction.

2 See Report on Extraterritorial Crime, pp. 30-34, 78, by author of the present work; Government Printing Office, 1887. Wharton's Crim. L., § 292; Bishop's Crim. L., vol. i. § 113; Riley v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 646; State v. Kelly, 76 Maine, 331; State v. Carter, 3 Dutcher, 499. A well-known authority for the position that the murder is committed where the injury is inflicted, though the victim die elsewhere, is the case of Guiteau, the assassin of President Garfield. The jurisdictional difficulties which existed in the old English law on this subject