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England and Russia were somewhat strained, they commenced long before, and continued long after. The danger arising from such relations must be greatly increased by the nearer approach of Russian troops to Afghan territory, and if Russia set her foot in Afghanistan it would only be for the purpose of making it a vantage-ground to embarrass us. Admitting that the late Government had not contemplated the retention of Candahar when the Peace of Gandamak was made, he pointed out that the failure of Yakoob Khan had entirely altered the circumstances, and he called on the Government to state what were their plans for excluding Russian influence from Afghanistan. He objected to the withdrawal, because it was inopportune, and in opposition to the pledges given to the people of Candahar, as well as against the weight of authority. In its hurry to get away from Candahar the Government had made no arrangements for the future, and displayed its strength only by a policy of masterly surrender.

The defence of the Government policy was opened by Sir C. Dilke, who, referring to the Russian advance, pointed out that the first act of the Czar had been to stop it, and to recall General Skobeleff; and, in reply to the argument of the loss of prestige, he asked whether the late Government had sacrificed prestige when it left Cabul, and whether Russia had lost prestige when she abandoned some of her Central Asian conquests. As to the pledges, the people of Candahar had forfeited them by their hostility to our troops after the disaster of Maiwand; and he showed by reference to the "Candahar Official Journal "that the late Government never determined permanently to remain there. All the difficulties with which this Government had to deal sprang from the vacillation of their predecessors, on which he dwelt at length, and on the point of opportuneness he maintained that if we did not withdraw now we should be unable to withdraw at all, and the arrangements they had made, though not the best in the abstract, were the best that could be made under the circumstances which they found existing. Discussing the authorities, he pointed out that Sir G. Wolseley and Sir D. Stewart said that Candahar was useless as a military station; and that we could go there at any time if we wanted was shown by the late war. To occupy it in time of peace, he showed, would impose a strain on the Indian finances which they could ill bear. Next he contended that the position was useless for purposes of trade, as a centre for counter-working intrigue, and as an outwork against a Russian advance. India, he asserted, was stronger for distant operations than Russia herself, and the best security against an invasion was good government in India and a thrifty management of her finances.

The son of the leader of the Opposition (Mr. Northcote) was followed by the son of the leader of the House (Mr. H. Gladstone), who in his maiden speech thoroughly justified the hopes entertained of his ability as a speaker. The chief point of his argument was to prove that it was neither the intention nor the interest

of kumar India and that the difficulties in the way wome Wel-17 ISWer the sent, might at the delete the che numa El met 20% treang kamilton, whe devoted himsəli We win a the authorities, m.biar anë, palijom, On Vine de Sevenmer died. AS TE The dunger from Russių, it VIS I DASHI NI MIZI, we hat, te fent ; anà, đầuting on this De i marimet that the the survivals of the Connei, wha hat signed Lori Lavrene: - tumous minute - Si: H. Visina Sh 8. Tennie, and Sr &. Strachet-upnrover, of the Aigchan policy of the the mer because they beh: ved that the masterly inn zury pohry nač falted. As it was commor, grond with both parties that Bussin finemer must be exolnàoà from AichsnINLAT be asked the Government to state what was their plan for attain ing is NOPA. The general direction of Lord G. Ramilion's See hi that of Mr. Stanhope, his successor at the India Cave mder the late Administration, pointed to a permanent w tention of Candahar, necessitated by the attitude of Russia. Lond Harington's reply was altogether on the theme that, if we wer ever to abandon Candahar, the sooner we did so the better; and that as the resolution did not attack the policy of the Government, but merely its opportuneness, he maintained that whilst Candahar might in some circumstances be strategically valuable, the first condition was its occupation with the consent of the Afghans and of their allies. Sir Stafford Northcote pointed out that the Government had given no reasons for not abiding by the promise contained in the Queen's speech, that the troops would not be recalled until a settled government had been established, The policy pursued by the Government was full of peril; it would inflict a serious blow on our reputation in India; and it gave grounds. for apprehending that if a Liberal Government remained in office for twenty years, very little of the British Empire would be left. The division which immediately followed was a strictly party one, Out of a House of which the full complement was 639, no leag than 579 voted or paired. The minority voting was composed of 208 Conservatives, three Home Rulers, and five Liberals, including Mr. J. Cowen; whilst the majority comprised 306 Liberals and 30 Home Rulers. Amongst the absentees were 30 Home Rulers, including Messrs. Parnell, Biggar, Dillon, and Finigan. The judg ment of the House of Lords having been thus emphatically reversed by the Commons, Indian affairs occupied but little more of the attention of Parliament-the evacuation of Candahar and the Pishin Valley, which was completed before the prorogation, attract ing but little notice. The Indian Budget, postponed until nearly the last day of a protracted session (August 22), called forth no serious discussion in an almost empty house. It was chiefly inte resting for its summary of the cost of the Afghan war. The total war expenditure (including the frontier railways) was set down at 23,412,000l., of which 5,000,000l. was to be borne by England, leaving 18,412,000l. as the financial burden thrown upon India. A#

late as February 1880, Sir J. Strachey had estimated the total expenditure on the war as little over 10,000,000l. Lord Hartington's estimate was somewhat different:-'If there had been no war charge and no construction of frontier railways, and, at the same time, provision of 1,500,000l. had been made in each year for the relief of famine, there would have been in each of the years of the war the following surpluses;-In 1878-9, a surplus of 1,523,885l.; in 1879-80, of 3,521,515l. ; in 1880-1, of 3,623,174l.; and in 1881-2, of 855,000l.; or a surplus during the four years of 9,523,574. Of course, these surpluses, amounting to nine millions and a half, have gone for payment of the war; the balances of the famine insurance, amounting to 4,035,309l., have been appropriated to payment of the war. There were also contributions from the British Treasury, amounting to 5,000,000l., towards payment of the war; and there was taken from cash balances for the same purpose a sum of 4,513,470l.

With regard to the Indian expenditure of 1879-80, the latest year for which the accounts were made up, Lord Hartington showed that the revenue was 68,484,666l., and the expenditure 69,667,615l., showing a deficit of 1,182,949l. The first or Budget estimate had put the revenue at 64,562,000l., and the expenditure at 65,917,000l., both of them nearly 4,000,000l. short of the truth. For 1880-1, the regular (i.e. not the Budget, but the revised) estimate gave revenue, 70,783,615l. (including 2,000,000l. contributed by England), and expenditure, 77,003,382l., showing a deficit of no less than 6,219,7677., in spite of the English contribution towards the revenue. The Budget estimate for 1881–2 showed a revenue of 70,981,000l., and an expenditure of 70,126,000l., giving an anticipated surplus of 855,000l. Lord Hartington stated that the Government fully accepted the obligation of providing 1,500,000l. a year as an insurance fund against famine, and that the whole of any balance not used in any year for the actual relief of famine is to be spent either on protective works or on the reduction of debt,-a canal in the Deccan, a railway in the Punjab, and minor relief works in Madras and Bombay, being the first protective works selected for execution.


The Berlin Treaty and the Greek Demands-Settlement of the Frontier Question. In the Speech from the Throne, the settlement of the new frontier line of Greece was declared to be under discussion, whilst other portions of the Treaty of Berlin, still unfulfilled, were simply the objects of anxious attention. Lord Beaconsfield, in reviewing the Ministerial position, touched but lightly on its foreign affairs, and contented himself by asserting that, whereas the Treaty of Berlin might have affected or left unsettled various points, it nevertheless secured the peace of Europe; whereas the result of the Conference of Berlin, which seemed to have in view to upset the work

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Austria-Hungary garded with but little favou The Lurneal e lysed; a compromise wat weet in Frans via tvo set the water drawal of the proties to Greve bad our in and endorsed by the Bera Condens. 71 avut the colu which threatened to folow of the slaps of European inter in the Balkan peninsula, Fraus propost it won agail i dipiomacy, and the Conference of Cosaurope we agreed upon to assign afresh the time of the Greer Kinggon For many weeks the issue remained in suspense, and rumoure of the fallure of uegotiations were more frequer and abuuart tual hope of their success. Greece had mobileet ner fores, aud Turkey sent uer most experienced general to the frontier ; willst at Constantinople the feeling that the negotiation were unrea Gally gained ground in spite of Mr. Gowder & effort to find a modré rovenci murder of the Czar postoy mut more that anything else to induce a change of attitut of the part of work Powere. The Greeks were in doubt better the Pan-Scavore question might not be on the point of solution, in a sense which gave then fair Lopes of obtaining terms from the revolutionists; wulst the Turke, aware that the passive attitude of France and Austria migut at any moment be abandoned tastened to pater up a truce with their neighbour in

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atue to face future eventualities with their hands free.

On April the ambassadors of the Powers at Constantinople were at length a tie to draw up a draft agreement, by which, although the wire of Thessaly was conceded to Greece, more than half of left to Turer: and the Cabinet of Athens was forced under presEpirus, iding the coveted fortresses of Janina and Metzovo, was sure to agree to the new frontier line, which deprived Greece of Dear Gard of the territory promised to her at Berlin. It

was admitted by all the Powers that the assent of Turkey to these terms was obtained chiefly through the persistence and firmness of Mr. Goschen, who throughout the negotiations found himself supported not only by the active aid of Lord Granville, but by the dignified attitude of the Opposition in Parliament. At the end of July the Turkish troops had evacuated the last portion of the territory assigned to Greece, whilst the annexation of the new provinces to that kingdom was celebrated by general rejoicings, and had been sullied by no insults or injuries to the Moslem population.

It was rather the manner in which the Tunis business was managed than the annexation itself which disturbed the English public, or offended its responsible leaders. As late as the middle of May, M. Jules Ferry had declared in both Chambers that the French Government had no design on the throne or territory of Tunis, and repudiated all ideas of annexation or conquest. Within eight-and-forty hours of his speech, news was received that the Bey had been forced to sign a treaty which practically left him a powerless puppet in the hands of France. The French Minister Resident became the Bey's Chancellor, and directed the whole business of the kingdom, whilst Italian influence was summarily extinguished. The reply given by French apologists to the outcry of English newspapers was that the annexation was the carrying out of an arrangement made between M. Waddington and Lord Salisbury at the Berlin Congress; and although Lord Salisbury denied that his words bore the interpretation put upon them, the official documents which were published at all events admitted the plausibility of this plea.

The grounds upon which French statesmen based their views were shortly afterwards laid before Parliament. They referred principally to the period immediately following the Berlin Congress and the disclosure of the Anglo-Turkish convention by which Cyprus was placed under the administration of Great Britain. On July 25, 1878, M. Waddington wrote to the French Ambassador in London, informing him that the relations of the Mediterranean Powers had been the subject of much discussion between the French and English Plenipotentiaries at Berlin; and that with regard to Tunis, Lord Salisbury had of his own free will stated that in that quarter no obstacle would be raised to the extension of French influence; "et que le Gouvernement de la Reine acceptait d'avance toutes les conséquences que pouvait impliquer pour la destination ultérieure du territoire Tunisien, le développement naturel de notre politique." M. Waddington added that he did not think that the French Government would at that moment undertake the annexation of the country at once, but he claimed full liberty to take up the question at the point to which it had been brought at such time as suited the interests of France. Although Lord Salisbury repudiated the imputation that he had suggested "une annexion pure et simple" of Tunisian territory, he

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