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suggested by some of the conclusions obtained on our first line of inquiry. Having perceived that the intellectual progress, or increase in representative capacity, which distinguishes man from brute, is so intimately connected with man's capacity for social combination, it became needful to search for the circumstances which begot in the progenitors of mankind the capacity for a kind of social combination more definite in the character of its relationships than that quasi-social combination, not uncommon among mammals, which is known as gregariousness. In other words, seeing that such thinkers as Sir Henry Maine have shown that the primordial unit of society, by the manifold compounding of which great tribes and nations have come into existence, was the aboriginal family group, with its nascently ethical relationships between the members, how shall we explain the genesis of these family groups, which have nothing strictly answering to them, either among, non-human primates or among other gregarious mammals?

The feature by which the most rudimentary human family group is distinguished from any collocation of kindred individuals among gregarious mammals is the permanent character of the relationships between its constituent members. Enduring from birth until death, these relationships acquire a traditionary value which passes on from generation to generation, and thus there arise reciprocal necessities of behavior between parents and children, husbands and wives, brethren and sisters, in which reciprocal necessities of behavior we have discerned the requisite conditions for the genesis of those ego-altruistic impulses which, when further modified by the expansion of the sympathetic feelings, give birth to moral sentiments. Accordingly the phenomenon which demands explanation is the existence of permanent relationships, giving rise to reciprocal necessities of behavior, among a group of individuals associated for the performance of sexual and parental functions.

The explanation, as I have shown, is to be found in that gradual prolongation of the period of infancy, which is one of the consequences, as yet but partially understood, of increasing intelligence. Let us observe the causal connections, so far as we can trace them out, repeating, in brief, some of the conclusions reached in the chapter on the Evolution of Mind.

In an animal whose relations with its environment are very simple, resulting in an experience which is but slightly varied, the combinations of acts requisite for supporting life take place with a regularity and monotony approaching the monotonous regularity with which the functions of the viscera are performed. Hence the tendency to perform these actions is completely established at birth in each individual, just as the tendency of the viscera to perform their several functions is pre-established, all that is required in addition being simply the direct stimulus of outward physical opportunity. And the psychical life of such an animal we call purely instinctive or automatic. In such an animal the organized experience of the race counts for everything, the experience of the individual for nothing, save as contributing its mite toward the cumulated experience of the race. But in an animal whose relations with its environment are very complex, resulting in an experience which is necessarily varied to a considerable extent from generation to generation, the combinations of acts requisite for supporting life must occur severally with far less frequency than in the case of the lower animal just considered. Hence the tendency to perform any particular group of these actions will not be completely established at birth in each individual, like the tendency of the viscera to perform their several functions. On the other hand, there will be a multitude of conflicting tendencies, and it will be left for the circumstances subsequent to birth to determine which groups of tendencies shall be carried out into action. The psychical life of such an animal is no longer purely automatic or instinctive. A portion of its life is spent in giving direction to its future career, and in thus further modifying the inherited tendencies with which its offspring start in life. In such an animal the organized experience of the race counts for much, but the special experience of the individual counts for something in altering the future career of the race. Such an animal is capable of psychical progress, and such an animal must begin life, not with matured faculties, but as an infant. Instead of a few actually realized capacities, it starts with a host of potential capacities, of which the play of circumstance must determine what ones shall be realizable.

Manifestly, therefore, the very state of things which made psychical variation more advantageous to the progenitors of mankind than physical variation, this very state of things simultaneously conspired to enhance the progressiveness of primeval man and to prolong the period of his infancy, until the plastic or malleable part of his life came to extend over several years, instead of terminating in rigidity in the course of four or five months, as with the orang-outang. Upon the consequences of this state of things, in gradually bringing about that capacity for progress which distinguishes man from all lower animals, I need not further enlarge. What we have here especially to note, amid the entanglement of all these causes conspiring to educe humanity from animality, is the fact, illustrated above, that this prolongation of infancy was manifestly the circumstance which knit those permanent relationships, giving rise to reciprocal necessities of behavior, which distinguish the rudest imaginable family group of men from the highest imaginable association of gregarious nonhuman primates.

In this line of inquiry, which, so far as I know, has never yet been noticed by any of the able writers who have dealt with the origin of the human race, it seems to me that we have the clew to the solution of the entire problem. In this new suggestion as to the causes and the effects of the prolonged infancy of man, it seems to me that we have a suggestion as fruitful as the one which we owe to Mr. Wallace. And the most beautiful and striking feature in this treatment of the problem is the way in which all the suggestions hitherto made agree in helping us to the solution. That same increase in representativeness, which is at the bottom of intellectual progressiveness, is also at the bottom of sociality, since it necessitates that prolongation of infancy to which the genesis of sociality, as distinguished from mere gregariousness, must look for its explanation. In this phenomenon of the prolonging of the period of infancy we find the bond of connection between the problems which occupy such thinkers as Mr. Wallace and those which occupy such thinkers as Sir Henry Maine. We bridge the gulf which seems, on a superficial view, forever to divide the human from the brute world. And not least, in

the grand result, is the profound meaning which is given to the phenomena of helpless babyhood. From of old we have heard the monition, "Except ye be as babes, ye cannot enter the kingdom of heaven." The latest science now shows us though in a very different sense of the words that, unless we had been as babes, the ethical phenomena which give all its significance to the phrase "kingdom of heaven" would have been non-existent for us. Without the circumstances of

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infancy we might have become formidable among animals through sheer force of sharp-wittedness. But, except for these circumstances, we should never have comprehended the meaning of such phrases as "self-sacrifice" or "devotion." The phenomena of social life would have been omitted from the history of the world, and with them the phenomena of ethics and of religion.

JOHN FISKE.

ART. II.-THE MEANING AND CAUSES OF VALUE.

ALTHOUGH the term "value" plays a most conspicuous part in political economy, yet many economic writers have neglected to define it carefully and correctly, as though the term were of little importance. In consequence of this neglect, they have greatly multiplied the errors to be found in this department of study, which were numerous enough before.

It is certain that the leading terms in political economy must be definitely settled before any progress in it can be made. Macleod has made some remarks upon this subject which are well worthy of a place here. He asks, "Why has political economy not yet attained the same rank as mechanics as an exact science? Because the same care has never yet been given to settle its definitions and axioms. Economic science is now, like mechanics in its early stages, overrun and infested with words, whose meaning has never yet been settled on certain principles, and which are scarcely ever used by any two writers in the same sense, nay, few even of the best writers are consistent with themselves. The men who have cultivated economic science are probably of as great natural ability as those who

have cultivated physical science; of course, with the exception of certain unapproachable examples. Why, then, have they not come to the same unanimity as their brethren? The simple reason is, that they have not adopted the only means that could by any possibility insure success, namely, a thorough discussion and settlement of the meanings of words, nay, they have systematically despised it." We think, therefore, that we are justified in using considerable space to define the meaning of value, if thereby we make the meaning plain; and the more justified, because it is the essential term, the deepest root, in the science of political economy.

At the outset, let it be deeply engraven on the mind that value is not a quality inhering in any object whatever. This truth will appear very clearly from Professor Perry's illustration. "If I take up a new lead-pencil from my table, for the purpose of examining all its qualities, I shall immediately perceive those which are visible and tangible. The pencil has length, a cylindrical form, a black color, is hard to the touch, is composed of wood and plumbago in certain relations to each other, and has the quality, when sharpened at the end, of making black marks upon white paper. These qualities, and such as these, may be learned by a study of the pencil itself. But can I learn, by a study of the pencil itself, the value of the pencil? Is value a quality? By any examination of its mechanical, or by any analysis of its chemical, properties, can I detect how much the pencil is worth? No. The questioning of the senses, however minute, the test of the laboratory, however delicate, applied to the pencil alone can never determine how much it is worth."† Value, then, is not a quality of a thing. It can never be found in any object. The mistakes of economists who have not kept this truth clearly in view have been most deplorable.

Before going further towards value, let us stop to define utility.

finding out the meaning of For this is another difficulty

which must be removed before the way to the meaning of value can be easily travelled. Nothing, therefore, is lost by stopping to define it.

* Theory and Practice of Banking, Vol. I., Intro., p. 29 (2d ed.).

Elements of Polit. Economy, p. 46.

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