Freiheit, Verantwortung, Kompetenz: ausgewählte Abhandlungen

agency costs agents analysis applicant approach assume behavior Cambridge capital cartels common property competition constraints consumers contract corner solution courts crime rate Cuanajo culture daimyō demand Dictator Game discussed distribution economists effect efficiency empirical employer equilibrium example exist external factor firms function game theory gesamte Staatswissenschaft incentive income increase individual industry information asymmetry innovation Institutional and Theoretical Institutional Economics integration intermediate International John Rawls Journal of Economic Journal of Institutional labor land liability M₁ megaorganizations Microeconomics moral hazard Nash equilibrium nomic norms optimal organization output paper Paragominas Pareto optimal payoff political pollution problem production profit property rights protection punishment rationality region regulation result retail Review risk Roman rules social solution squatters standard strategy structure Superfund Tailândia Theoretical Economics theory tion trade transaction costs TÜBINGEN wage Zeitschrift