Freiheit, Verantwortung, Kompetenz: ausgewählte Abhandlungen |
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Page 53
... contract may specify for each outcome the payoff for each participant . Just as markets determine the equilibrium price for a homogeneous product , markets also determine equilibrium contract terms . The equilibrium array of prices and ...
... contract may specify for each outcome the payoff for each participant . Just as markets determine the equilibrium price for a homogeneous product , markets also determine equilibrium contract terms . The equilibrium array of prices and ...
Page 56
... contract that is caveat venditor and ( 2 ) if the seller desires , seller may also offer a caveat emptor contract of sale in which the buyer assumes the risk , but seller must also offer the caveat venditor contract . The second ...
... contract that is caveat venditor and ( 2 ) if the seller desires , seller may also offer a caveat emptor contract of sale in which the buyer assumes the risk , but seller must also offer the caveat venditor contract . The second ...
Page 663
... contract is as- sumed to involve lower negotiating costs ( n ) per time period . For contract length t , average per - period negotiating costs are n / t . We treat monitoring costs as a constant function of time and also as a function ...
... contract is as- sumed to involve lower negotiating costs ( n ) per time period . For contract length t , average per - period negotiating costs are n / t . We treat monitoring costs as a constant function of time and also as a function ...
Contents
Economic Organization and Conflict | 218 |
The New Institutional Economics Alternative Approaches | 248 |
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol 151 No 1 March 1995 | 267 |
Copyright | |
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