Freiheit, Verantwortung, Kompetenz: ausgewählte Abhandlungen |
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Page 35
... doctrine . This doctrine holds that a firm is liable for accidents its products cause unless it took the degree of care that the law maker set . This degree of care is referred to as " the negligence standard . " The negligence standard ...
... doctrine . This doctrine holds that a firm is liable for accidents its products cause unless it took the degree of care that the law maker set . This degree of care is referred to as " the negligence standard . " The negligence standard ...
Page 53
... doctrine for liability would be " caveat emptor . " On the other hand , consider the case where the seller's delivery of the product could impose risk on the buyer . If a seller's behavior is unobservable , then the argument immediately ...
... doctrine for liability would be " caveat emptor . " On the other hand , consider the case where the seller's delivery of the product could impose risk on the buyer . If a seller's behavior is unobservable , then the argument immediately ...
Page 616
... doctrines . For one , it sheds different light on the " reasonable man " doctrine of tort law . This doctrine is usually attributed to the ex post cost of ascertaining the injurer's particular precautionary skills . If the information ...
... doctrines . For one , it sheds different light on the " reasonable man " doctrine of tort law . This doctrine is usually attributed to the ex post cost of ascertaining the injurer's particular precautionary skills . If the information ...
Contents
Economic Organization and Conflict | 218 |
The New Institutional Economics Alternative Approaches | 248 |
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol 151 No 1 March 1995 | 267 |
Copyright | |
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