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the Puget Sound Agricultural Company on the north side of the Columbia river shall be confirmed to the said company. In case, however, the situation of those farms and lands should be considered by the United States to be of public and political importance, and the United States government should signify a desire to obtain possession of the whole, or of any part thereof, the property so required shall be transferred to the said government, at a proper valuation, to be agreed upon between the parties.

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The present treaty shall be ratified by the president of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the senate thereof, and by her Britannic majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London, at the expiration of six months from the date hereof, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at Washington, the fifteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord. one thousand eight hundred and forty-six.

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And whereas, the said treaty has been duly ratified on both parts, and the respective ratifications of the same were exchanged at London, on the seventeenth ultimo, by Louis McLane, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States, and Viscount Palmerston, her Britannic majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, on the part of their respective governments,-

Now, therefore, be it known, that I, James K. Polk, president of the United States of America, have caused the said treaty to be made public, to the end that the same, and every clause and article thereof, may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this fifth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-six, and of the independence of the United States, the seventy-first.

[L. S.]

By the President:

JAMES BUCHANAN, Secretary of State.



[This constitution was framed by a convention of sixty delegates chosen by the people at the general election on the first Monday of June, 1857. The convention met on the third Monday of August of the same year, and adjourned on the 18th of September. On the second Monday of November, 1857, the constitution was ratified by a majority vote of the electors of the territory, as provided by Art. XVIII, and the act of congress admitting Oregon into the Union was approved February 14, 1859, on which date the constitution went into effect.]


We, the people of the state of Oregon, to the end that justice be estabished, order maintained, and liberty perpetuated, do ordain this constitution.



§ 1. Principles of Social Compact.

We declare that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; and they have at all times a right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper.

§ 2. Freedom of Worship.

All men shall be secured in their natural right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.

§ 3. Freedom of Religious Opinion.

No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.

$ 4. No Religious Qualification for Office.

No religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit.

§ 5. No Money to be Appropriated for Religion.

No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for the payment of any religious services in either house of the legislative assembly.

$ 6. No Religious Test of Witnesses.

No person shall be rendered incompetent as a witness or juror in consequence of his opinions on matters of religion, nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious belief, to affect the weight of his testimony.

DYING DECLARATIONS.-This inhibition extends as well to the competency of persons to make dying declarations which shall be received in evidence as to competency to testify in courts. Dying declarations, when otherwise admissible in evidence, are not to be excluded because the

$ 7.

Manner of Swearing Witnesses.

person making them was a pagan and did not believe in his accountability to God: State v. Ah Lee, 8 Or. 214. A man's disbelief in a future punishment, however, may be shown in order to affect the credit to be given his dying declaration: Goodale v. State, 1 Or. 335.

The mode of administering an oath or affirmation shall be such as may be most consistent with, and binding upon, the conscience of the person to whom such oath or affirmation may be administered.

§ 8. Freedom of Speech.

No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.

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No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

The warrant here prohibited from being issued without cause shown on oath or affirmation is process for the arrest of a person on a criminal charge for the purpose of bringing him to trial, or answer there

for and does not include an order of the county court requiring an alleged lunatic to be brought before it for examination for the purpose of being committed to an asylum: Sprigg v. Stump, 8 Fed. 215.

§ 10. Justice to be Open and Without Price.

No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in person, property, or reputation.

An act requiring certain reasonable court fees to be paid by parties is not prohibited by this section. Such prohibition is aimed at bribes and fees so exorbitant as to practically close the doors of justice: Bailey v. Frush, 5 Or. 137; Northern Counties Trust Co. v. Sears, 30 Or. 404, 41 Pac. 931; Farwell v. Needham, 31 Or. 583, 41 Pac. 936.

The provision that "every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him," etc., does not prohibit the legislature from repealing a statute under which a right of action might accrue to the person; hence there is no liability on the part of a county under a statute granting a right of action for injuries caused by defective highways, where such statute

was repealed before the injury occurred: Templeton v. Linn County, 22 Or. 315, 29 Pac. 795. By the law of 1893 (§ —, Vol. II of this code) a right of action against a county for injuries by reason of defective bridges was expressly conferred, and this statute is construed in McFerren v. Umatilla County, 27 Or. 311, 40 Pac. 1013, and Gardner v. Wasco County, 37 Or. 392, 61 Pac. 834.

Where, however, the statute was in force when the injury occurred, this provision of the constitution precluded the legislature from taking away the remedy for such injury: Eastman v. Clackamas County, 32 Fed. 32. See note to § 360, post.

The legislature has power to exempt a

city from liability for injury to persons caused by defective streets and highways within the municipality and such an exemption from liability is not a violation of this section of the constitution: O'Hara v. City of Portland, 3 Or. 525; Matson v. City of Astoria, 39 Or. -, 65 Pac. 1066; but a charter which exempts both the city and its officers from liability is violative of this section, and therefore void: Matson

v. City of Astoria, 39 Or., 65 Pac. 1066. This provision guarantees the preservation of one's good name and gives a remedy for any detraction of it. A newspaper, therefore, cannot make injurious comments about parties to actions in court, but since justice is to be administered openly it may publish a fair account of what actually takes place there: Thomas v. Bowen, 29 Or. 264, 45 Pac. 768.

§ 11. Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.

The law permitting district attorneys to file informations instead of presentments by the grand jury does not contravene this section: State v. Tucker, 36 Or. 302, 61 Pac. 894.

When it appears that the sentiment in a county is so strong against an accused as to make it improbable that he will get a fair trial he has a right to a change of venue by virtue of this section: State v. Olds. 19 Or. 427, 24 Pac. 394.

The fact that the sheriff who selected the talesmen had expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, but was to receive no compensation for a conviction, did not prevent the accused from having a fair trial by "an impartial jury": State v. Savage. 36 Or. 200, 60 Pac. 610.

The preliminary examination of an accused is a part or stage of the prosecution and must be had in the county in which the offense was committed: In re Kelly, 46 Fed. 659.

The guarantee to an accused person of the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him" is not infringed by charging an accessory before the fact as though he had directly committed the act: State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 88, 43 Pac. 947; so. too, in regard to a person present. aiding and abetting: State V. Kirk. 10 Or. 505; so, too, whether the accessory is indicted jointly with the principal or separately: State v. Branton, 33

$12. Twice in Jeopardy.

Or. 540, 56 Pac. 267; State v. Moran, 15 Or. 275, 14 Pac. 419.

The right to meet the witnesses face to face does not preclude the admission in evidence of dying declarations: State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 304, 12 Pac. 441.

The provision regarding the right of an accused to meet the witnesses face to face precludes testimony of the witnesses of a co-conspirator made after the crime was fully committed: State v. Hinkle, 33 Or. 97, 54 Pac. 155.

Written statements of a co-defendant cannot be introduced at the trial of the accused: State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 102, 43 Pac.. 947.

The requirement that the accused may meet the witnesses against him face to face is satisfied when at some stage of the case in a proceeding authorized by law the accused is confronted with the witness and given an opportunity to cross-examine him: State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 102, 43 Pac. 947.

Where the defendant expressly consents that the deposition of a witness may be taken under § 1380, post, of the code, and such deposition is subsequently taken in the presence of defendant and his counsel, who cross-examines the witness, there is no infringement of this constitutional provision: State v. Bowker, 26 Or. 313, 38 Pac. 124.

No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense, nor be compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.

GENERALLY.-The stealing at the same time of a horse, bridle and saddle belonging to the same person constitutes but one crime and will support but one indictment. The conviction or acquittal of one may be successfully pleaded as a bar to the prosecution for another: State v. McCormack, 8 Or. 240.

Where, however, the same act constitutes two or more offenses, the conviction or acquittal of one offense does not bar a prosecution for the other. Thus, a conviction on a charge of kidnapping does not bar a prosecution on a charge of assault and battery constituted by the same act: State v. Stewart, 11 Or. 52, 4 Pac. 128. Acquittal of a charge of malicious destruction of personal property of another,

is no bar to a prosecution for the illegal disinterment of a human body, though the former prosecution related to the casket in which it was enclosed: State v. Magone, 33 Or. 570, 56 Pac. 648.

The acts enumerated in the third subdivision of § 1807. constitute separate offenses: State v. Howe, 27 Or. 141.

The same act which violates the state law and the United States law, constitutes two offenses: United States v. Barnhart, 22 Fed. 238.

SECOND TRIAL.-A second trial, after failure of a jury to agree, is not twice in jeopardy: State v. Shaffer, 23 Or. 556, 32 Pac. 545; State v. Reinhart, 26 Or. 474, 38 Pac. 822.

A conviction of a degree of crime in

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