But perhaps the important point is that instability, radicalization, the overthrow of existing governments is in the interest both of the Soviets and of the Chinese as well as the extreme radicals in Africa itself.

I said that the Soviets have returned because of the Chinese. One sees this, of course, most clearly in the Congo. As the rebellion began, in the Kwilu Province, its leader, Mulele, had just returned from several years' training in Peiping. The Chinese aided him as they aided such other rebel leaders as Soumaliot, with money, with a certain amount of technical training; but the Chinese have neither the capability in delivery of weapons or of any other resources to provide the kind of aid which the rebels have needed.

Nor do they have sufficient capability to aid exclusively such radical African powers as the United Arab Republic or Algeria. Because Sino-Soviet competition in 1963 became so violent, because one of the issues in the competition was the revolutionary strategy to be followed toward underdeveloped areas, with the Soviets preferring more economic and the Chinese more revolutionary violence, and because the Chinese made such rapid progress in the situation, the Soviets have apparently felt compelled to return to the African scene. They have done so primarily by making up to Algeria and the United Arab Republic the arms aid which these two powers have been sending to the rebels in the Congo. They have done it also, as have the Chinese, again in a very competitive fashion, in arms aid to Somaliland and even more strikingly to Tanzania.

The island of Zanzibar, where the most violent revolution broke out, is one of the most striking scenes of the Sino-Soviet confrontation in Africa. But more generally, as African exiles from the White Redoubt come north, as they receive training, including guerrilla, sabotage, and terrorist training in Algeria, or in the Soviet Union or China, as they attempt to renew the struggle against the whites, and as they are defeated, they quite naturally turn in frustration and bitterness toward Soviet or Chinese support.

It would not be accurate to say, I think, that in the middle run, let us say in the next decade, China is the major danger to stability in Africa. It is rather the case that the Soviet Union may well become the major danger because of the Chinese, the more so because African disunity seems to make it increasingly unlikely that such organizations as the OAU will be able to provide any peace keeping substitute for the U.N. Forces.

There arises, then, the increasing prospect, given the effective resistance of the White Redoubt, of polarization in Africa, of the probability of the continuation or the revival of such rebellions as the one in the Congo. This, then, raises the question of which American policy with respect to Africa would be the most useful for our interests. I think two preliminary points here should be made. There are certain areas of Africa which, with respect to military strategy, economic resources, or political significance are certainly of much more importance than others.

One must deal with this obviously on a country-by-country basis. There is one other aspect which I presume most of us will realize more clearly a decade from now than we do at the present time, and that is the increasing concern of the American Negro community toward American policy toward Africa.

One need only remember the role played in the formation of Israel by the American Jewish community to realize that as racial integration

proceeds in this country, and as the new, younger, and more political Negro intelligentsia develops, its interest in American policy toward Africa is likely to increase and its influence upon it as well.

Given these facts, then, it would seem to me that we must confront the problem primarily from the point of view of what one might call minimal American vital interests in Africa. I would define these as the denial of strategic areas, military, economic, or even-in the case of Nigeria-political, to Soviet or Chinese influence.

This may well involve, as it does at present in the Congo, the commitment in some form or another of American military as well as economic resources, hopefully in some multilateral context, toward increasing the peacekeeping potential toward the African states themselves. At the same time, given the problem of the White Redoubt and in particular perhaps the most difficult political problem in all of Africa, that of the white rule in South Africa, it would seem to me that it will become increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain support even among moderate Africans, such states for example as Nigeria, if the United States takes a position which, whatever our words may say, places it on the side of the White Redoubt by our deeds. Again to cite the example of the Congo: as I said before, the policies of the United States there, whatever their justification may be-and I happen to think their justification is considerable have certainly tended to increase the power potential of the whites to the south. I would suggest therefore, particularly in a country such as ours, which is increasingly committed to integration at home, that it would be difficult for us to base our policy on an assumption that the White Redoubt will continue indefinitely under white control, nor should we identify our interests in Africa primarily with powers committed to the opposite of our policies here at home.

If, however, one wishes to maintain some support among the moderate African states (among the radical ones we will never have it anyway, I would suppose) our policies toward the White Redoubt, if only to limit the extent of the Soviet and Chinese presence in Africa, will have to strengthen verbal condemnations with deeds.

I would close here by attempting to call the attention of the committee to one particular problem which, within the next year or two is likely to concern the United States more intimately with respect to Africa than any other: the issue of southwest Africa. Last week the oral hearings of the International Court of Justice in The Hague began on the complaint of Liberia and Ethiopia with respect to the South African mandate over southwest Africa. There is at least a 50-50 chance, and I have the impression most experts feel more, that South Africa will be judged to have violated the mandate.

When and if this occurs, the responsibility will lie upon the United Nations Security Council to undertake action to force compliance with the mandate, which would mean specifically, of course, the abolition of apartheid in southwest Africa, or to deprive South Africa of the mandate.

It seems to me very unlikely this can be done without at least the credible threat of military force. In other words, it seems to me unlikely that the South Africans are going to bow to the decision of the Court if anything less than that is done.

We will then be faced with the problem of an overwhelming majority of the Afro-Asian states in the United Nations calling for economic and military sanctions to enforce a decision of the Court.

What is perhaps more serious, and the reason why it seems to me that this problem might involve at some time vital American interests, this would seem to me to offer remarkable opportunities for the Russians if they wish to turn the tables on us.

I can envisage that the Russians might feel it desirable to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation against South Africa in this context. I think it might be difficult for us to prevent this from happening, or to stop it if and when it occurs. By convincing the Africans that they cannot overcome this and other parts of the White Redoubt except by major foreign military aid and that they are unlikely to get this from anyone except the Russians and the Chinese, the continuation of the White Redoubt offers the Russians and the Chinese even more opportunities in Africa than they have or will have in any case from continuing African radicalization and instability.

May I request that my more detailed testimony be incorporated into the record?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Griffith. It will be incorporated at this point in the record.

(Additional statement of Dr. Griffith follows:)

Moscow, PEKING, AND AFRICA

(By William E. Griffith, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, International Communism Project)

INTRODUCTION 1

More than three years ago Walter Laqueur wrote of tropical Africa : **** Almost overnight Communism in Africa has become an international problem of the first magnitude *** Now in 1961, Africa has replaced the Middle East as the world's trouble center, and it is likely to remain the main area of contest between West and East for many years to come ** **

Since then many more African states have become independent; instability in independent black Africa, particularly in the Congo, has grown greater; guerrilla war in Angola turned first against, but more recently in favor of its Portuguese colonizers; and the independence of Malawi and Zambia has for the first time brought black African nationalism to the northern boundary of the White Redoubt.

During 1962 and 1963 the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rift, the Cuban and Sino-Indian crises, and increased guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam seemed to push Africa off the center of the world stage. What is more, the intensity of East-West and of black-white confrontation in Africa itself appeared to decline. Soviet influence in Cairo decreased; neither Moscow nor Peking gained predominance in Algiers; the Congo appeared more stabilized or at least less anarchic; there were no major destabilizing developments in other black African states; and after the December 1961 crisis in Conakry, Sekou Touré cut back sharply on Soviet, Chinese, and East European activity in Guinea and began a rapprochement with West Germany, the United States, and France. Moreover, neither the 1960 Sharpeville flareup in South Africa nor the 1961 outbreak of the Angolan rebellion marked, as so many at first anticipated, the beginning of major crises in the southern African White Redoubt, which includes the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Moçambique, the self-governing British colony of Southern Rhodesia, and the Republic of South Africa. On the contrary, after initial confusion and some flight of

I have profited much from two trips to Africa, to West and East Africa in 1962 and to Southern Africa in 1963, in connection with which I should like to record my gratitude to the Center of International Studies at MIT and to the Carnegie Corporation for making the trips possible, and from discussions about Africa with many friends, in particular Professors John Marcum, Edwin Munger, and John Spencer, Dr. Robert Rotberg, M. Philippe Decraene, and my colleague Dr. Willard Johnson. I have also been greatly aided by my research assistant. Miss Robin Remington.

2 Walter Laqueur, "Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, 4 (July 1961), pp. 610-621, at p. 610.

foreign capital, and in spite of increased African unity activities after the 1963 Addis Ababa conference set up the Organisation of African states (OAU), by the end of 1963 the tide in Angola had begun to turn in favor of the Portuguese, and Dr. Verwoerd's regime was stronger and more defiant, enjoying more white African support, and apparently less dangerously menaced by black African nationalism than before.3

In 1964 the stability of the black African states has again come more seriously into question-a development which must have pleased Moscow, Peking, Lisbon, Salisbury and Pretoria as much as it worried Washington, London, and Paris. The January 1964 coup in Zanzibar, followed by the abortive military mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya, made British and American public opinion more aware of the looming dangers while simultaneously increasing Soviet and Chinese awareness of the tempting opportunities for a “second revolution” in black Africa. (A series of coups, some successful, in the French-speaking African states had earlier signalled the fragility of their governments. Further more, the late 1963 massive Soviet arms aid to Somaliland and Khrushchev's May 1964 visit to Cairo indicated that in spite of previous setbacks in Guinea and the Congo, but probably this time more to forestall Chinese than American influence, Moscow was again ready to fish in troubled African waters. Chou Enlai's spring 1964 African tour signalled the stepping up of Chinese activity there. and, as it turned out, the transfer of Chinese emphasis from the Casablanca group (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria and the UAR) to the more unstable areas of East and Central Africa and the two Congo states.

COMMUNISM IN AFRICA "

Communism came to Africa from Europe, along with and as a part of European culture and politics. Africa's Communist parties and groups were originally established by Europeans; they have long remained multiracial; and like other European political movements they have never obtained any serious African mass support. The Marxist-Leninist emphases on the proletariat, on multiracial internationalism, and on atheism have always run contrary to African traditions and culture; and the few Western-educated intellectuals who have become Communists have been largely submerged in, when not suppressed by. the rising wave of anticolonialism and radical pan-African nationalism which characterizes the new, modernizing African intelligentsia. To most black Africans the Russians are as European as any other whites; moreover, manipulation of European and African Communist parties and groups by the Russians for purely Soviet purposes soon disillusioned most of their early African sympahizers. Furthermore, the (ostensibly) rationalist ideology of Marxism-Leninism, or indeed any political ideology, has little appeal to any but the most Westernized Africans, who, as was most strikingly shown by the severance in the early 1950's by the Rassemblement démocratique africaine (RDA) of its ties with French Communism, are fully prepared to give lipservice to Communist ideological and policy formulas when it serves their purposes, only to abandor them when that seems more in accord with their interests. Specifically, Africans tend to be undogmatic and pragmatic and to prefer the achievement of consensus to prolonged ideological struggle. South of the Sahara and even in North Africa, therefore, political theories and ideologies mean much less than north of the Mediterranean. Those African intellectuals and radical leaders

3 Anthony Sampson, "South Africa-The Time Bomb Ticks," New York Times Magazine, April 12, 1964, pp. 11, 108-113. Waldemar A. Nielson, "Africa Is Poised on the Razor's Edge," The New York Times Magazine, February 9, 1964, pp. 11, 61-62; "Africa: Wounds of Change," The Economist, February 1, 1964, pp. 394-403. For the French-speaking African states see especially the excellent running coverage by Philippe Decraene in Le Monde and for developments until 1960, Franz Ansprenger, Politik im schwarzen Afrika (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1961) For the English-speaking states, see the excellent regular coverage by Colin Legin in The Observer. It should be noted that some of the young radical African intellectuals strongly criticise the authoritarian one-party rule, radical or traditionalist, of most black African states. See Russell Warren Howe, "The Second Revolution," The New Leader, XLVII, 14 (July 20, 1964), pp. 12-15.

5 For discussion of Communism in Africa see Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., Africa and the Communist World (Stanford, Cal.; Standford U., 1963); George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? (New York: Roy, 1956); David L. Morison, The U.S.S.R. and Africa (NY.: Oxford U., 1964), and "Moscow's First Steps," Problems of Communism, X, 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1961), pp. 8-15; Fritz Schatten, Afrika-Schwarz oder Rot? (Munich: R. Piper, 1951and "Africa: Nationalism and Communism," Survey, N. 42 (June 1962), pp. 148-160, Ansprenger, op. cit.

Padmore, op. cit.

who have been much influenced by Marxism-Leninism have been so first by its organisational aspects and then by such general Marxist-Leninist concepts as state ownership and control of the economy and economic determinism, which they see as simultaneously allowing both the recovery of preindustrial communal virtues and modernization via industrialization. Most of them have not taken over Marxism's hostility to religion, its stress on the "leading role of the working class." or the belief in the necessity of an elite, rather than a mass party, oriented toward an urban proletariat rather than the peasantry. (This last omission makes particularly clear the preference of many radical Africans for Chinese, as opposed to Soviet policy positions.) Finally, some radical African nationalist leaders influenced by Marxist-Leninist concepts (I am thinking particularly of those in Guinea and Mali) probably by now think of themselves (as Castro in all likelihood does as well) as Marxist-Leninists who have successfully adapted the best of that doctrine to their national circumstances.

Indeed they may even envision the Russians and the Chinese as also trying to adapt ideological Marxism to specific conditions and thereby both contributing to and influencing for the better a much looser, more permissive current in the international Communist movement than that which previously existed. That the Sino-Soviet split itself is moving all Communist parties toward differentiation further encourages such thinking.

It is true that some African students who were fed strong doses of leftist, including Communist, ideology while being educated in London and Paris in the 1940's and 1950's retained a liking for both Communist terminology and its organisational aspects. This was particularly true of the organisational aspect when it continued to reach them via leftwing trade union channels. However, for these young African intellectuals Communism was primarily a method of rapid modernization; of the establishment, organisation, and discipline of a new, modernizing intellectual African élite; and of obtaining aid from Communist states. Thus state ownership and central planning, the Leninist model of one-party organisation and economic and sometimes political ties with the Soviet Union have remained characteristic of some new African states, notably Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. (This is not the first time that the organisational aspects of Leninism have outlived the rest of its ideology; the same thing happened with the Kuomintang after 1927.) Yet when in 1961 Soviet meddling and some native intellectual Communism appeared to Sekou Touré to menace his control of Guinea, he struck fast and ruthlessly to crush dissidence at home and return to a neutralist posture abroad, while keeping (as did Chiang Kai-shek in 1927) the Leninist organisational and economic model for his own one-party state. In Ghana the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) today has at least as many features of fascism as Communism. Indeed, the prevalence of Marxist rather than Fascist doctrine in Africa has been primarily caused by the fact that the European colonizing powers were largely anti-Communist, as a result of which the anticolonialist Africans were naturally attracted to the enemy of their enemy, the Soviets. (Had the Italian Fascists not themselves been colonialists in Africa, and the Nazis clearly desirous of becoming so as well, the same kind of attraction might have held true for fascism, as indeed it did for so many Arabs in the Middle East.) In any case, what primarily attracted the new African élite to Communism (as it might have but did not attract them to fascism) was the concept and organisational methods of an authoritarian modernizing élite (an Entwicklungsdiktatur).8

Finally, the primary focus of the African élites-pan-African nationalism— did not come from Communism. Being modernizers and thus determined to depose the traditional African tribal élites, the new élites could not base their power upon the tribes, while the colonial boundaries were creations of the colonizers and could thus only with difficulty serve as their rallying symbol for modernization and independence. Their goal of a united black Africa was the result. In turn, pan-Africanism plus modernization has led to such general concepts as "African socialism", a varying mixture of Marxism and utopian socialism combined with such African attitudes as consensus, the charismatic

7 Walter Kolarz, "The West African Scene," Problems of Communism, X, 6 (NovemberDecember 1961), pp. 15-24.

Ernst Nolte. Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich: Piper, 1963).

William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., African Socialism (Standford, Cal.: Stanford U., 1964): Special Issue on African Socialism, Africa Report, VIII, 5 (May 1963). especially Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, "African Socialism: Declaration of Ideological Independence," pp. 3-7.