whose stability, we have most recently seen, is not without question. but which has pulled itself together and is far more important than perhaps any 10 or 15 other African states.

Those of us who have been in Nigeria know that the United States far from being unpopular in Nigeria, is thought quite well of; they are very serious about economic aid. There is less corruption about it than there was in the United States in 1885 when European money was pouring in here to build the Union Pacific Railroad. All in all, we should often think more of such countries as Nigeria.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. This is exactly what we are doing. That is why. though our aid in Africa, overall total has not fallen, it has become more selective.

We have increased our aid to Nigeria. Also, our overall aid to Africa for the last 5 years has not been declining. It is just that we have become more selective. I think we are following, Doctor, what you are advocating.

Mr. GRIFFITHS. My recollection is, Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't want to swear to it, that aid has declined.

Mr. MURPHY. I agree with you. I believe it has.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We can check that.

Without objection we will have the staff consultant, Mr. Harry C. Cromer, obtain the amount of U.S. assistance to Africa for the past 5 years and make it a part of the record at this point.

(The information follows:)

The following figures were taken from a special report on U.S. oversea loans and grants for the period July 1, 1945, to June 30, 1964, prepared for the use of the House Foreign Affairs Committee by the Agency for International Development.

Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to direct my question to Dr. Brzezinski. I think a case in point in line with your presentation today is Czechoslovakia in reference to liberalism. At the 22d Red Congress, the Russian Government became more liberal in their relationship with the satellites of Eastern Europe.

The satellite countries took advantage of liberalism and "polemics" with Red China was used. I understand, I think it was from your book, Dr. Griffith, that you had stated that this wave of liberalism. especially in Czechoslovakia, rose from below, the reverse of the case in Hungary, especially by the Slovaks, who were striving for more liberalism. I was in Prague last December and the Czechs were discussing the new economic policy. The restrictions were becoming eased and the people had more liberal action within the country.

Would you care to comment on this new philosophy in Czechoslovakia, Dr. Brzezinski?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I wouldn't entirely call it a new philosophy, Congressman. I would say there have been these changes that you have mentioned. They are now in the process of implementing a new economic model which has as its objective a higher degree of decentralized decisionmaking, less political interference. They have considerably loosened political controls over public discussions, particularly in the newspapers. They are attempting to diminish the relative inequality under which the Slovaks have suffered in Czechoslovakia. All of that is transforming the Czech regime into a relatively more moderate one in relationship to what it had been before.

However, I am not certain that this is an irreversible trend. The Czechs did experiment somewhat along those lines in the past, most recently in 1958. They ran into considerable economic difficulties with their then decentralized economic model. My economic friends are not certain that their new economic model will be any more successful and, as in the case of the last time, it is not inconceivable that the liberalization will create political tensions which the new ruling elements will become fearful of and will attempt to suppress. This is why I return to this broader theme which we are discussing; it seems to me futile to bank on developmental trends within individual Communist states on a bilateral basis. It is all the more important to seek broader solutions in a wider framework in order to determine the course of future evolution, to make certain that such retrogressive trends do not become dominant.

Mr. MURPHY. Dr. Griffith, I don't know where I read this, but I understand the students, especially in France, are moving toward the Chinese line more than the Soviet line.

Mr. GRIFFITH. Some of them are. There has been a major controversy developing over the last 2 or 3 years between the leadership of the French Communist Party and the Communist student organization. This has most recently come out at a Congress where the party leadership again seemed to restore some authority over the students. There are essentially three groups within the Communist student organization in France. Perhaps the strongest one is neither pro-Soviet nor pro-Chinese, but in favor of the ideas of the Italian Communist party, much greater liberalization, more discussion. greater unified action with the Socialists and the general complex of Italian Communist ideas.

The second group is the pro-Soviet group, the group that really is under the firm control of the leadership of the French Communist Party.

The third and smallest group, but, of course, the most fanatical group is the group which is infected with pro-Chinese ideas. I should add, however, that among the French-speaking African students in Paris, the pro-Chinese group is in the majority, and that indeed many of the ideas, the pro-Chinese ideas among the French-speaking African students in Paris are held by the kind of people who went back to Brazzaville and set up this government. There is a small group which split away entirely from the PCF, and there is this magazine in Paris called Revolucion which is one of the major elements or instruments of essentially pro-Chinese propaganda.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, I realize the hour is getting late, but since you have spelled out several of the future U.S. policies that

should be undertaken, I would like to ask a couple of questions of them-the so-called Johnson plan.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. It isn't named after Howard Johnson.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Brzezinski, one of the American policy issues that you suggest for Europe is West German assurance to the Russians that under no circumstance will they ever seek a national nuclear deterrent. What about joining a multilateral nuclear force such as was proposed for NATO? Do you believe the Russians want assurance in this regard as well?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think they do. In this case I am more inclined to question their motives. It seems to me that the Russian attitude toward the MLF has been part of their overall effort to prevent European integration. You will remember, Mr. Chairman, they were against the EDC on the grounds that the EDC would provide for German access to conventional weapons. The defeat of the EDC led to the armament of a national German Army. The Russians were in error and should have learned by it. They are repeating the same process now.

They should realize that in 1965 it is impossible to maintain an alliance system in which a major ally is discriminated against and treated as an inferior. So the long-range problem is, what will be the distribution of nuclear weapons in the western alliance system?

I prefer the MLF because the MLF, it seems to me, meets the need of political and military equality in the Western alliance without at the same time providing for the proliferation of nuclear systems and without Germany entering into the nuclear club which from my point of view would be negative from Western interest and from long-range German interests because it would prevent reunification.

I don't know what the Russian motives are, but the Russian game to me seems to be dangerous, inimical to our interests, and we should be quite clear about its possible implications. The MLF, in my view, does not provide for the creation of a German national deterrent. It does not provide for direct German access.

It provides for less access than under the two-key system as to the rockets stationed in Germany.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In your second point, you stated the American initiative should be designed to promote German-Polish reconciliation somewhat on the model of the Franco-German reconciliation in the fifties. There you had Schuman, who was a key personality. Do you see such a personality on the scene today that could help in nurturing a German-Polish reconciliation along to success?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I do not and I do not for reasons that I think are specific and peculiar to the German-Polish relationship. In the present Government of Poland, it is to its interest to maintain GermanPolish hostility.

In the case of the Soviet Government, it is even more to its interest to maintain such hostility.

In Germany I do not see anyone on the political scene with such vision and imagination to realize that German-Polish reconciliation is the first step toward German reunification. This is why I think the United States could play a part.

It seems to me the present incumbent could because of his prestige and the power he wields, undertake such a step.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In other words, Doctor, you do not believe that there need be a Schuman on the scene?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I do, but I don't believe he need to be a German or Pole. He could be an American.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You believe it ought to be a Johnson?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I don't see anyone else whose job qualifications entitle him to take such an initiative.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In view of your statements that there are difficulties between Germany and Poland

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. To put it mildly.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. How do you explain the Krupp industrial activities and agreements for the Krupp industry to move into Poland? What significance do you see in that?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I know the man who has taken this initiative, Mr. Berthold Beitz. He is a man who is dedicated to the notion of German-Polish reconciliation. He cannot play the role that Schuman did because he is outside the political framework. He does not participate in German policies. A great many German politicians would be inclined to view with suspicion any intervention on his part. Beitz was in Poland during the war. He is one of the few Germans who demonstrated at that time humanity at the risk of personal security and apparently became dedicated to the notion of doing something constructive.

In recent times he has been acting on behalf of Krupp in order to develop close economic ties with Poland and now Hungary. I see this very much as a personal venture on his part and insofar as the Krupp firm is concerned, there are undeniable economic benefits that follow from such initiative, and there may be broader corporate interests that are compatible with his interests.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You don't see this as a beginning of further economic ties?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. The Germans already have undertaken such steps. They have signed a trade agreement with Poland. The basic problem in Germany, whatever the Germans do in regard to Poland or with Poland on economic planning, their efforts will be defeated unless they recognize they have to give the Poles assurance on the issue of the frontier because it is the absence of that assurance that plays into the hands of the Soviet Union and the Communist government in Poland.

As I say, the ideal position for the Polish Government is to continually demand, but not obtain the recognition of its present frontiers while obtaining economic aid. Then it meets all of its needs.

We ought to give them economic aid and give them a guarantee on the frontier because by diminishing Polish insecurity on the territorial issue we diminish Polish dependence on Moscow.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. To broaden the question to cover all of Eastern Europe, Doctor, you stated that it should be an explicit goal of American policy to promote multilateral political and economic relations with Eastern European countries? Can this be possible under the Warsaw Pact?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes; I believe it can. The European states, some of them, have already shown an interest in GATT. Some of them have shown an interest in OEEC. If step-by-step policies are de

signed, I can see how the East European states would see an interest for themselves in multilateral undertakings which permit them to meet some of their enormous difficulties.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. To come to your European personality, how do you think President de Gaulle would react to a strong American initiative in Europe such as you propose?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. This is precisely what General de Gaulle would like us not to do. The reason that he has been as successful as he has been in Europe is that there has been no American initiative. We keep talking to the Europeans in terms meaningful a decade ago. This plays beautifully into De Gaulle's hands. An ideal posture of the United States and West Germany to maintain from the standpoint of De Gaulle is to talk about German reunification abstractly, to maintain East European fears of a reunified Germany, not to reassure the Poles about the Oder-Neisse Line and to do nothing about the EastWest relationship. This leaves the field open to De Gaulle.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. How do the nations of Eastern Europe look on the Sino-Soviet split? Do they want it exacerbated or

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I am speculating here, but I think you mean the ruling elites or the people at large

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The governments.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I would suspect from their point of view the most ideal relationship between the Soviets and Chinese is one of intense acrimony, hostility but not total, complete hostile break.

As long as there is this continuing acrimony and hostility but not a total break, they can take advantage of it a little bit to play both sides and certainly to make-if there was a total break, they would have to line up. I think they prefer not to line up.

I think although they back Moscow, they derive advantages from the fact that the break has not been total and they can threaten perhaps they will not back Moscow as much as Moscow would like to be backed, the way Rumania has been doing.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Griffith, in your statement outlining what some of the U.S. contributions to Africa, could be you made reference to what contributions that the U.S. Negro could make. You cited the fact that many American citizens of Jewish faith have contributed so much to the development of the State of Israel.

Could you repeat what the nature of the contribution is that you said the U.S. Negro could make to Africa?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Aside from the obvious problem of personal contact and so on, I was thinking not so much of a contribution in the sense of financial aid, but in terms of a perfectly legitimate interest on the part of American Negroes in American foreign policy toward the area concerned.

The point I was trying to make was that as I supposed American foreign policy with respect to Israel or the Arab States is to some extent influenced by the views of Americans of Jewish faith, I should suppose 15 years from now American policy toward Africa is likely to be more influenced than it is now by the views of American Negroes. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you think it is good for our form of government that U.S. citizens limit their interest in international affairs to those with which they have nationalistic or racial affinities? Personally, I hope all Americans become deeply interested in all U.S. foreign policy matters.