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than to lose. I should think we could well afford to be somewhat relaxed about it. But I would, if I might, like to add a word about this subject of trade. I don't think I made my position entirely clear. When I spoke the other day before the Senate committee here, I drew the distinction between normal trade, where people come in and pay, in effect, cash on the barrelhead for something that is for sale over here, on the one hand, and situations, on the other hand where we go out of our way to make it easy for them or give them unilateral favors, such as aid or long-term credits or anything like that.

Let me put it this way: I see no reason why we should take any initiative today to further Chinese Communist trade with this country. I wouldn't absolutely rule it out. If they want to come in here and pay the going price, and if these are things that are not on our list as strategic materials, I don't see that any great harm is done. I don't think they are going to have much money to spend. So I don't think that the volume will be of any great importance. I would certainly oppose our doing anything on our own account to further economic relations with Communist China at this time.

As for the rest of it, I don't think there is much we can do. I don't think the Chinese Communists would respond today to any friendly gestures from our side, particularly so as long as we have this situation in Vietnam. Even then I am not sure. I hear a great deal of talk about whether they should be admitted to the United Nations. I don't think they would accept membership in the United Nations today, unless the Republic of Taiwan was eliminated from the organization. I think a lot of these issues are unreal.

Mr. CAMERON. No dissent?

Mr. WOLFE. I am quite in accord.

Mr. CAMERON. The one thing that I mentioned

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We do not want to encourage a dispute

Mr. CAMERON. I just wanted to know if there was any.

Mr. DALLIN. I quite agree with the Ambassador's position here. It seems to me the whole question of diplomatic relations, trade, and so on, has become far more sensitive than it should. But given this fact, to formalize any ties would mean to reward misbehavior. At the same time, if one projects into the future, it is probably inevitable, short of having a showdown with Communist China, that some relations will have to be established.

You mentioned disarmament. There are other areas over which contacts have been maintained. There are the Warsaw conversations. There were the Geneva talks.

It seems to me this is not so much a matter of fundamental principle but of political effect. There very well may come times when, in whatever form, increased contacts might very well be salutary, may be salutary also in terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but clearly this is not the time.

Mr. CAMERON. This is not the time to invite them to participate in disarmament negotiations.

Mr. DALLIN. As the New York Times this morning reports, one of the first prices to pay for the situation in Vietnam is a rapid loss of interest in serious disarmament negotiations on the part of the Soviet Union and, except on its own terms, on the part of Communist

China. So I think this becomes a more unreal proposition for the immediate future.

Mr. CAMERON. Mr. Ambassador, on this same point of trade, you indicate a cash-on-the-barrelhead transaction, that maybe this might be acceptable, but certainly not extending any special consideration. As to the U.S.S.R., should we be extending more special consideration to them than we are at the present time with respect to trade, in your view, or to the other Eastern European Communist countries?

Mr. KENNAN. With regard to these countries, it is my belief that we ought to extend normal trading facilities to them. Not so much because this is a great privilege or would lead to a great expansion of trade or anything like that, but because the denial of it seems to me simply needlessly offensive and doesn't do any good.

I would like to see them treated just like anybody else, no favors, but also no special handicaps on their trade. This, incidentally, Mr. Thomson, is my position with regard to Yugoslavia, too. I didn't see why we should handicap them or why we should give them any special form of aid, either. I would like to say, "Look here, we have our market for both buyers and sellers. If you want to observe the rules of the game and pay the going price, this market is open to you. We will neither handicap you nor try to favor you in any way." Mr. THOMSON. What about the most-favored-nation treatment of Yugoslavia; is that different from what you would give to Red China? Mr. KENNAN. Yes. We have diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, and we have quite an acceptable bilateral relationship with them on the political field. I see no reason to deny most-favored-nation treatment to them. It seems to me in the case of Communist China, where we don't have diplomatic relations, there would have to be a clarification of our political relations before we extend normal trading privileges.

Mr. CAMERON. There are a number of obligations of the various Eastern European Communist countries due to citizens of the United States and due to the U.S. Government which have been accrued over the years which have not been discharged or even recognized by these governments. Would you feel that normal trade would include Export-Import Bank facilities and things of this nature, without their recognizing their dollar obligations to our citizens and to our country? Mr. KENNAN. I would want to personally screen those obligations very carefully and see just what they are. If they are ones really that have been incurred in a manner that gives a real responsibility on the part of these governments, then I think they should be required

to meet them.

There is always a question about the prewar indebtedness. We had this problem for many years with the Soviet Government. The Soviet, to my knowledge, has never reneged on any commercial obligations which it, itself, incurred. It has objected to paying the debts of the previous Russian governments. I think one must draw a distinction there, in practice if not morally.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to address my remarks to the panel.

Dr. Dallin, you mention that the Communist movement is probably breaking into two factions, left and right. Would you say that an indication of this was the fact that only 18 parties participated in the meeting that was held in Moscow on the world Communist Party in March of this year? Yet, in December of 1960, at another meeting of the same nature, they had 81 members. Would you say that most of the people participating this year were mainly from the West and indicated a boycott from Asian nations?

Mr. DALLIN. I believe that the meeting called this month was to consist of the 26 Communist Parties which had met in Moscow at a preparatory meeting prior to the November-December 1960 meeting. They met a month earlier. At that time, they were the drafting commission for the final statement that emerged in December out of those 26. Nineteen, in effect, did meet in Moscow. The Russians did not attend. The others Communist China, the North Vietnamese, the Albanians, the Japanese, the Indonesian party-represent the other Peiping wing of the movement. This does not give us a full picture of the split in the movement, since there are in fact 81 or probably over 90 parties involved, in many of which, from India to Brazil, you have the two separate organizations by now, one oriented toward Peiping and the other toward Moscow. Even among the ones who attended the recent meeting in Moscow, which did not get very far, there were very different views represented both on general policy, say the Cubans were at one pole and the Italian Communist Party representing another pole. Also on the question of how to deal with the Chinese question. Some of those who did side very much with the Russians differ from the Soviet position with regard as to how to handle Peiping. There are substantially more than two positions in the movement now. And it is, I believe, a very profound and

permanent split.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

Mr. Kennan, there was an article in the Washington Post on March 7, 1965, which our subcommittee chairman had inserted in the Congressional Record

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If there is no objection, we will insert that article at this point in the record.

(The information is as follows:)

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, OF WISCONSIN, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MONDAY, MARCH 8, 1965

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, at this point I include an article by the Honorable George Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and currently a professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton University.

Ambassador Kennan, who has been dscribed as the Nation's top Kremlinologist, puts forth his views on the Sino-Soviet conflict and its implications for U.S. policy in the article, which appeared in the Sunday, March 7, Washington Post.

I direct the attention of my colleagues to Ambassador Kennan's views: [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Mar. 7, 1965]

"A CASE FOR SPARING THE SPURS: FORCING RUSSIA'S HAND ON BIG

COULD PUSH KREMLIN INTO SIDING WITH CHINA ON VIETNAM

"(By George F. Kennan)

ISSUES

"Moscow is faced today with Chinese pressures of the heaviest possible sort which not only demand an immediate deterioration in Russia's relations with the West but obviously have as their concealed aim the provocation of actual hostilities between Russia and the West at the earliest possible moment.

"The Soviet leaders are well aware of this. They understand its dangers. They propose, I am sure, to resist these pressures to the best of their ability. But there is one area of world affairs where they are extremely vulnerable, where the Chinese have important tactical advantages and where the Soviet leaders can be, and are being pressed constantly into positions and actions that compromise their relations with the United States in particular. This is the area of the so-called anti-imperialist movement.

"What is involved here is the question of leadership among the various antiWestern and anti-American political forces now competing for ascendancy in the newer or less developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. To the extent that these conflicts, these so-called anti-imperialist struggles, are highlighted before world opinion; to the extent that they engage the attention of the great powers and become theaters and testing grounds of great power rivalries; to the extent that it becomes impossible for the Soviet Union to ignore or remain aloof from them, Moscow sees no choice but to come down strongly on the anti-Western side, even at the cost of damage to its relations with leading Western countries.

"ITS ONLY FUTURE

"One may well ask why this should be so; what importance these new countries have for Moscow that could justify so costly a reaction. I can give you only a partial answer, because I myself believe this reaction to be exaggerated, oversensitive, and not fully warranted even by the political self-interest of the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, to a certain extent one can see and understand, if not approve, its rationale.

"In Europe and North America, the Communist movement, as a dynamic advancing political force, is dead. If it has a future anywhere, it is in these developing areas and particularly in the new states, where firm political traditions and institutions have not yet formed; and here the possibilities, from Moscow's standpoint, lie less in the prospect of creating real Communist systems (for this, the prerequisites are lacking) than in the possibility of dominant influences being exerted from some Communist center over these inexperienced regimes; of their being developed as instruments of major Communist policy in the game of international policies.

"Moscow believes-Moscow is almost obliged by doctrinal conviction to believe that these anti-Western forces, euphonistically referred to as the antiimperialist ones, are bound to be generally successful, politically, on the local scene, at least in the struggle against Western influences; and noting the fumbling, ineffective quality of our own response, I must say I think they have some reason for this belief, insofar as it is we Americans who are primarily involved at the Western end.

"The great question, in their view, is: Which Communist center is to preside over these various victories and to reap the various fruits? To abandon this field of political contest, or even to neglect it, means, as they see it, to present it on a silver platter to the Chinese. For this, they are not prepared.

"DANGEROUS INDIFFERENCE

"Their foreign relations operate in three great areas: the world Communist movement, the underdeveloped and new nations, and the Western World. In the Communist movement, their position is already under heavy and effective Chinese attack. Their relations with the West, while valuable to them, cannot, at this historical juncture, at any rate, be expected to carry the entire burden of their international position. A Soviet foreign policy based exclusively on rela

tions with the West would practically undermine the rationale for the maintenance of Soviet power in Russia itself.

"Aside, therefore, from the fact that they regard the governments of the new nations as their natural and traditional clients, the Soviet leaders cannot afford, for wider reasons, to stand aside from the struggle for predominance over them. Any such passivity could easily be made to look like indifference to the prospering of the Communist cause generally and would at once be exploited by the Chinese as a means of discrediting Soviet policy and completing the destruction of Moscow's influence and leadership in the world Communist movement.

"And beyond that, it would risk the loss of access to this entire theater of international politics, where a continued Soviet presence could alone make the difference between effective Soviet participation in world affairs and a total and ruinous isolation.

"In summary, then, we have before us, in the person of the Soviet leadership, a regime subject to strong compulsions toward better relations with the West, yet conscious of having an extremely sensitive flank in Asia and Africa which it can protect only at the expense of its relations with the West; walking a very narrow tightrope among these conflicting pressures; vacillating, weaving this way and that; responsive to the shifts in the world scene; its behavior, for this reason, in part the product of the way we ourselves play our hand and in this sense susceptible in some degree to our influence.

"PEIPING'S DIRECTION

"Two possibilities now present themselves. One is that our relationship with Moscow deteriorates; that Moscow, as a consequence, finds it necessary to hold more closely to Peiping in order to compensate for the loss of its Western card; that Moscow then throws itself even more frantically and, having little to lose, even more recklessly and wholeheartedly, into the anti-imperialist struggle, heedless of the effect on Soviet-American relations, coming to regard as its major objective not the preservation of an effective balance between the Chinese and ourselves as factors in Russia's external situation, but rather, successful competition with the Chinese for leadership in the political struggle for our destruction.

"This alternative would not satisfy in all respects Chinese desiderata, for the Chinese-Soviet rivalry would continue to be operable in many forms. But it represents in general the direction in which the Chinese, as well as many neoStalinists in the Soviet Union, would like to see Soviet policy move.

"It would militate for increased unity throughout the Communist bloc as well as for sharper and more uncompromising tactics toward the West. It would compound the effectiveness of the forces now marshaled against us. It is difficult to see what ultimate conclusion it could have other than a world war. "The other possibility is, of course, a continued improvement of Russia's relations with ourselves. This is one that would strengthen the hands of both powers with relation to the Chinese. The Russian hand, because the value of the Soviet alternative to the acceptance of Chinese pressures would be enhanced; our own hand, because the intensity of the forces ranged against us would be reduced and because Soviet interests might even work in many ways to reinforce our own position.

"In drawing the picture of these alternatives, I should like to avoid the impression that they are absolutes. There is nothing I can conceive of, short of a world war, which could throw the Russians entirely into the Chinese camp. Conversely, any improvement in Russia's relations with the West should not be expected to go so far as to produce any total break with Peiping.

"What I am talking about here are tendencies rather than finalities; but they are tendencies of great importance, and the fact that neither would be likely to be carried to a point of absolute finality does not obviate the enormous significance that attaches to the choice between them.

"We should recall at this point that the present unhappy state of our relations with China, hopelessly anchored as it appears to be in the circumstances of the moment, should not and must not be regarded as a final and permanent state of affairs. The Chinese are one of the world's great peoples, intelligent and industrious, endowed with enormous civilizing power and with formidable talents,. cultural and otherwise. It is wholly unnatural that the relations between such a people and our own should be as they are today.

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