Page images
PDF
EPUB
[merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small]
[ocr errors]

-

Botschafter in Konstantinopel über die elfte Sitzung.

Conferenz

A la onzième séance tenue aujourd'hui, le Ministre des Affaires Étran- Nr. 8019. gères, après un échange d'idées préliminaires, a déclaré que les troupes Otto- Staaten. manes étaient sur le point de partir pour l'Égypte. || Son Excellence a admis 26. Juli 1882. que l'envoi des troupes ne pouvait être que le résultat d'une entente convenue avec les Puissances. Il a examiné ensuite chaque point de la note identique du 15 Juillet, et s'est montré assez satisfait des explications qui lui ont été données. À ce moment de la séance, les Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France ont fait la communication suivante, en demandant à la Conférence d'en prendre acte: "La France et l'Angleterre, ayant saisi la Conférence de leurs vues, qui ont été également communiquées aux différents Cabinets, et leurs propositions n'ayant pas rencontré d'objections soit de la part des Cabinets, soit de la part de leurs Représentants à la Conférence, les deux Puissances sont, quant à présent, convenues que, dans l'état actuel des choses, elles sont prêtes, si la nécessité se produit, à s'employer pour protéger le Canal de Suez, soit seules, soit avec l'adjonction de toute Puissance qui voudrait prêter son concours." || Les deux Délégués Ottomans, s'étant consultés entre eux, nous ont déclaré qu'ils acceptaient la proposition de la Conférence, telle qu'elle avait été formulée, que l'intervention militaire des Puissances Étrangères en Égypte ne serait plus considérée comme nécessaire. || Ils se sont, d'ailleurs, réservé de nous adresser, probablement demain, une note dans ce sens.

Nr. 8020. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Min. d. Ausw. (Granville) an den engl. Botschafter in Konstantinopel (Dufferin). Erklärung, betreffend die Mitwirkung türkischer Truppen.

Foreign Office, July 28, 1882.

My Lord, The Turkish Ambassador communicated to me yesterday a tele- Nr. 8020. gram from the Porte, of which I inclose a copy. It is to the effect that,

*) Eine fortlaufende Darstellung der Ereignisse in Aegypten und der bezüglichen diplomatischen Verhandlungen geben die beiden Depeschen Granville's an den englischen Botschafter in Konstantinopel vom 11. Juli 1882 (Bd. XLI. No. 7936) und vom 5. October 1882 (8048).

Grossbritannien. 28. Juli 1882.

Nr. 8020. being resolved to use its incontestable sovereign rights over Egypt in an effec

Grossbritannien.

tive manner, and thereby to assure, without delay, the return of quietude, the 28. Juli 1882. Porte has decided upon the immediate dispatch of a sufficient number of

troops to Egypt.

Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government desire that your Excellency will make to the Conference a declaration on their part in the following terms: "The destruction of the forts of Alexandria, necessitated by considerations of self-defence, and under circumstances constituting a case of force majeure, has been followed by occurrences which made it incumbent on the Commanders of Her Majesty's Forces to take further steps to insure the safety to the Khedive and to restore peace and order in the town and neighbourhood. || "The hostile attitude of the rebel forces and the great importance of protecting the free navigation of the Suez Canal, have necessitated further preparations, which Her Majesty's Government believe will be sufficient. of themselves for the restoration of the authority of the Khedive and the establishment of settled order in Egypt. || While reserving to themselves the liberty of action which the pressure of events may render expedient and necessary, Her Majesty's Government will be glad to receive the co-operation of any Powers who are ready to afford it. || They are accordingly prepared to accept frankly the assistance which the Sultan has now announced his readiness to give in the restoration of order by sending troops to Egypt in accordance with the invitation addressed to His Majesty by the Powers, and subject to the conditions proposed by them. || They now desire to learn what number of troops the Sultan intends to send, the date of their probable departure and the proposed disposition of them. In the meanwhile, the delay which has occurred in the adoption of measures by the Porte, and the feeling of uncertainty which has unfortunately prevailed as to the real intentions of the Sultan, and which has been strengthened by the action of His Majesty in conferring on Arabi-Pasha an important decoration and mark of his favour, make it in the view of Her Majesty's Government essential, both for the assertion of the Sultan's own authority and of that of the Khedive, that His Majesty should at once, and before the dispatch of the troops, issue a Proclamation upholding Tewfik Pasha and denouncing Arabi as a rebel." I am, &c. Granville.

Nr. 8021.

Nr. 8021. GROSSBRITANNIEN. -Botschafter in Konstantinopel an den engl. Min. d. Ausw. Bedingungen der Pforte

im Fall ihrer Intervention.

Therapia, July 28, 1882.

My Lord, Last night the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs read to Gross- us unofficially the Sultan's communication, which he intended to have made to the Conference, had it held its sitting, and which he proposes to convey

britannien.

28. Juli 1882.

Gross

to us to-day in a note. It appeared to be a repetition of the statement Nr. 8021. already conveyed to your Lordship in the identic telegram recording the eleventh britannien. meeting, on the 26th instant, a copy of which was inclosed in my despatch 28. Juli 1882. of that day's date, except that instead of concluding with a hope that the military intervention of Europe would go no further, it implied, as a condition, that the foreign troops in Egypt should evacuate the country on the arrival of the Turkish forces. Saïd - Pasha also read me another paper proposing that the reorganization of the Egyptian army should be concerted between the Porte and the Khedive alone, and not in concert with the Powers. I have already explained to your Lordship, that we had provided that the reorganization of the Egyptian army should be conducted in some degree under European supervision, in order that the Khedive might not be left at the mercy of a military Turco-Circassian party, instead of a Mameluke party. || I have, &c. Dufferin.

Nr. 8022. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Botschafter in Rom (Paget) an den engl. Min. d. Ausw. Unterredung mit Mancini über die Intervention in Aegypten.

Rome, July 28, 1882.

Gross

My Lord, I called upon M. Mancini to-day, and executed the instructions Nr. 8022. conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th instant. || I began britannien. the interview by saying, that I believed his Excellency must have been already 28. Juli 1880. prepared by General Menabrea for the communication I was about to make to him. It was simply this: that, while Her Majesty's Government would be glad if Italy would join England and France in securing the safety of the Suez Canal, Her Majesty's Government would also welcome her ("serait aussi bien aise") if she would co-operate in a movement in the interior, which they were of opinion could be no longer delayed, and for which they were actively preparing, but in which the French Government appeared disinclined to join. M. Mancini, after requesting me to express to your Lordship the thanks of the Italian Government for this further proof of confidence and friendship, confessed that he had heard of this communication from General Menabrea, and that he had desired him at once (the night before last, I believe) to represent to your Lordship, that he (M. Mancini) presumed that your Lordship had made it before you were aware of the answer of the Porte to the identic note. I said, that I had reason to think that this might be so; but, at the same, I was enabled to state to his Excellency, that I knew for a fact that this answer had not in any way changed the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, or made them think the employment of a British force less necessary than before. How, I asked, was it possible to have confidence in this tardy acquiescence of the Porte in the demands of Europe? It might

Gross

Nr. 8022. be quite true that preparations were now, at the eleventh hour, being made britannien. to dispatch a Turkish force to Egypt, but who would answer that those troops 28. Juli 1882. would be employed for the desired purpose when once they got there? The policy of the Porte throughout the whole of this Egyptian business had been marked with so much equivocation that it was impossible to place the slightest reliance upon it as regards the future. As an instance, I said, only in the very last meeting of the Conference, when the proposal had been brought forward by Lord Dufferin, and supported by all his colleagues, that the Sultan should declare Arabi a rebel, the Turkish Commissioner had met it by one of the usual motions of postponement. Then, again, quite lately, a secret agent of Arabi's had been arrested by the English authorities at Alexandria, on his return from Constantinople, with the most compromising documents in his possession, and, if the reports were correct, he had made avowals which proved complicity between Constantinople and the head of the rebels. || I appealed, therefore, to M. Mancini to say whether Her Majesty's Government were not justified in their mistrust of the Sultan's intentions, and, at all events, in taking such measures themselves as might effectually thwart any evil designs. My belief was, I added, that Her Majesty's Government would accept the cooperation of Turkey, but that they would proceed with their own measures as originally intended. M. Mancini, without disputing any of the facts which I had brought before him, or the logical deduction to be drawn from them, replied that, whatever reasons for mistrust might exist, it would appear to be a contradiction, at the moment when the Porte had accepted without reserve all the conditions of a note to which Italy and England were parties, for those two Powers to enter into engagements as to another mode of intervention. Time should, at all events, be allowed, in his opinion, to test the good faith with which the Turks were now acting. If there were evidences of their not carrying out faithfully the programme which they had accepted from the Powers, if there was any indication of their showing favour to the party in rebellion, or of their not acting energetically with a view to its suppression, the complexion of things would change, and the new situation would have to be considered by the Powers. His Excellency admitted, however, that the position of England was different from that of Italy and the other Powers. England had already got her troops in Egypt, and he quite understood her intending to have a sufficient force there to control the conduct of the Turks; but for Italy to enter at this moment into an agreement with England such as that now suggested would be for her a new departure, which would not be justified by the circumstances; but he must wait, he said, to see the course of events, what answer your Lordship would give to General Menabrea, and the public declarations which might be made by Her Majesty's Ministers in regard to this new phase of the question, before giving a positive answer for the Italian Government to the present proposal. || In reply to this, I expressed the hope that the offer now made to the Italian Government would not be

forgotten, so that Her Majesty's Government might not at any time be accused Nr. 8022. of having followed an exclusive policy. I have, &c.

A. Paget.

Grossbritannien. 28. Juli 1882.

Nr. 8023. GROSSBRITANNIEN.

Min. d. Ausw. an den engl. Geschäftsträger in Berlin (Walsham). Bismarck's Ansicht über den Schutz des Suez-Canals.

Foreign Office, July 28, 1882.

Gross

28. Juli 1882.

Sir, The German Chargé d'Affaires called upon me yesterday, and said Nr. 8023. that in answer to questions which had been put to him by different Govern- britannien. ments as to the protection of the Suez Canal, Prince Bismarck was of opinion that the Sultan had the first claim to exercise this protection. In the event of his being unwilling or unable to do so, the Powers interested in the Canal would be justified in acting themselves. If those Powers had the intention of protecting their own interests in the Canal, Germany could not take upon herself any responsibility for the measures to be taken for this purpose. Germany could not consent to a vote in the Conference involving a modification of existing Treaty arrangements. Prince Bismarck was not in favour of the co-operation of all the Powers in the form of a mandate to some of them, because the result of such a mandate would be to create an unlimited responsibility for the measures resorted to, without control over them, and without the possibility of withdrawal. || Supposing the Conference to come to an agreement, that the protection of the Canal must be undertaken by the European Powers for an unlimited period, Prince Bismarck thinks such an arrangement could only be accepted unanimously on condition that all the Powers interested should take part in it, with equal rights as to measures of police for the Canal. These measures of police should, in his Highness' opinion, be maritime, and any steps for guarding the Canal ought to be the subject of discussion in each individual case. Prince Bismarck thought, that public opinion would be in favour of an arrangement of this kind, and Germany would be ready to take part in it. The Austrian, Italian and Russian Governments also shared his views. I saw M. Stumm again to-day, and told him that the communication of Prince Bismarck's views which he had made to me appeared to me to be based upon a misunderstanding. In making the proposal we had laid before the Conference it was not our intention to settle any scheme for the protection of the Suez Canal for an unlimited time. We considered the permanent obligation to maintain its security rests upon the Egyptian Government. In its default recurrence may be had to the sovereign Power. || The present, I said, is an abnormal state of things. The Egyptian de jure Government is not in a position to assert its rights. The de facto Government is the principal quarter from which danger to the Canal may be apprehended.

« PreviousContinue »