A trial at bar thereon. It was then believed that Pickering had found means to insinuate to the Chief Justice, that this was a malicious prosecution, and raised up against him by a pert young lawyer, of a different persuasion and tendency from him, but that he himself was innocent; but, however it happened, the chief justice took in violently on the side of Pickering, assuredly believing better of him than he deserved. It is always a hard cause upon a lawyer, when he is to manage against the prejudice of a court, for what is to be said or done, when presumptions pass on the one side, and the other side is held to positive proof, and no less than demonstration ? The chief justice was so very hard upon his lordship and his cause, that if there had not been an uncontrollable evidence of the fraud, the cause had miscarried. But it happened that as his lordship upon the bench was going to direct the jury (as every one expected) to acquit Pickering, one of the counsel mentioned another witness they had to prove Pickering's own confession, that when the will was first opened, those words were in. The witness came in, and swore it positively. "Well," said the chief, "now you shall hear what Mr. Pickering will say to that." He thereupon being called came down into the court, and stood directly opposite to the witness that confronted him. "Now what say you to this?" said the chief. "My lord," said he, "I was not bound to say what the truth was to him." There was an instance of the value of face to face. The answer was so knavish andsilly withal, that the chief justice let fall his countenance, and knocking his stick, left the cause to the jury's cognisance, without a word of direction given them one way or other; and they without going from the bar, found Pickering author of the rasure since the will published. Such cutting discoveries knaves will make of themselves, when surprised and not allowed time to dress up their answers in the best accoutrements, especially before sagacious men. And none was ever more so than that famous chief justice, who although subject, as most mortal men are, to prejudices, yet upon a clear conviction, sacrificed his proposition to truth. Chief Jus his great learning, the respect It was the Lord Keeper North's good fortune to The Lord enter his practice in the circuits under this judge, tice Hales, whose reputation for his great ability in the law, and rigorous justice, will be very long-lived in failings, and Westminster Hall, and the Inns of Court and toward his lordship. Chancery; for there was a conjunction of characters; his and the times conspiring to aggrandize it. After having improved his knowledge, as a student, by reporting from him when he sat as judge of the Common Pleas, and as a practiser in the Northern circuits, it so happened that, in the unaccountable rolling of preferments in the law, it became his lordship's province to judge of, and, for cause apparent, to correct the errors of that great man. The truth is, his lordship took early into a course diametrically opposite to that approved by Hales: for the principles of the former, being demagogical, could not allow much favour to one who rose a monarchist declared. Then, after the latter, by being made Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, together with the other judges of that court, and those of the Exchequer, had jurisdiction of errors in judgment given by the court of King's Bench, the separation was wider; and the old judge, by a certain formal overlooking of him, and refining of arguments against all he appeared for, affected to show it. And to say truth, that judge had acquired an authority so transcendent, that his opinions were, by most lawyers and others, thought incontestable; and he was habituated in not bearing contradiction, and had no value for any person whatever that did not subscribe to him. His lordship knew him perfectly well, and revered him for his great learning in the history, law, and records of the English constitution. I have heard him say that, while Hales was chief baron of the Exchequer, by means of his great learning, even against his inclination, he did the crown more justice in that court, than any others in his place had done with all their good will and less knowledge. But his lordship knew His manner viour at trials. He was an upright judge, if taken within himself; and when he appeared, as he often did, and of behareally was, partial, his inclination or prejudice, insensibly to himself, drew his judgment aside. His bias lay strangely for, and against, characters and denominations; and sometimes, the very habits of persons. If one party was a courtier, and well dressed, and the other a sort of puritan, with a black cap and plain clothes, he insensibly thought the justice of the cause with the latter. If the dissenting, or anti-court party was at the back of a cause, he was very seldom impartial; and the loyalists had always a great disadvantage before him. And he ever sat hard upon his lordship, in his practice, in causes of that nature, as may be observed in the cases of Cuts and Pickering, just before, and of Soams and Bernardiston elsewhere related. It is said he was once caught. A courtier, who had a cause to be tried before him, got one to go to him, as from the king, to speak for favour to his adversary, and so carried his point; His excel lent expression and seeming courage, that is, as to the court, for the chief justice could not think any person to be in the right, that came so unduly recommended. He became the cushion exceedingly well: his manner of hearing patient, his directions pertinent, and his discourses copious, and, although he hesitated often, fluent. His stop, for a word, by but popu- the produce, always paid for the delay; and, on larly timid. some occasions, he would utter sentences heroic. One of the bankers, a courtier, by name Sir Robert Viner, when he was Lord Mayor of London, delayed making a return to a mandamus, and the prosecutor moved for an attachment against him.* The recorder Howel appeared; and to avert the rule for an attachment, alleged the greatness of his magistracy; and the disorder that might happen in the city, if the mayor were imprisoned. The chief justice put his thumbs in his girdle, as his way was, and, "Tell me of the mayor of London?" said he; " tell me of the mayor of Queenborough:" but still this was against the court: he put on the show of much valour, as if the danger seemed to lie on that side, from whence either loss of his place (of which he really made no great account) or some more violent, or, as they pretended, arbitrary infliction might fall upon him. Whereas, in truth, that side was safe, which he This transaction arose out of the case of Emerton v. Hyde, mentioned post, p. 128. |