U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office ISBN 978-0-16-078401-9 Preface The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991. Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.). The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing. Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This specific volume documents the U.S. policy on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from January 1969 until October 1972. While the editor believes this volume and its annotation stand on its own, it is best read in conjunction with several other volumes: Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969-October 1970; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971; volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972; and volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972. Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XXXII This volume is organized chronologically and divided into eight chapters. The first chapter documents the nine-month period of preparation before SALT began and documents the obstacles created by the Soviet SS-9 and MIRV controversy, as well as the potential conflict between SALT and ABM. A preponderance of the documents printed were generated in the National Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the White House. The first chapter also documents the first meetings of NSC Verification Panel, created in July 1969, to evaluate the feasibility of monitoring Soviet military activity under any agreement. In time, the Verification Panel's mandate broadened to become the principal forum for reviewing all technical aspects of SALT. The subsequent chapters coincide with the numerous SALT rounds that alternated among Helsinki, Geneva and Vienna and document internal U.S. policy discussions as well as breakthroughs in the talks. Because there were nearly fifty Verification Panel meetings (with the meeting minutes averaging between 12-20 pages) during the period covered by this volume, the editor chose to account for all the meetings by printing either extracts in editorial notes or by printing only the summary of conclusions. The seventeen National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) on instructions for the SALT delegation, which contained the results of the interagency deliberative process documented by the Verification Panel, Review Group, and NSC, are printed in full. Throughout the volume, the editor included extracts from memoranda of conversation between Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that pertain to SALT, demonstrating not only how heavily President Nixon relied on Kissinger to move the negotiations forward but also how Nixon and Kissinger viewed SALT as a détente tool for achieving policy linkage, or diplomatic and political leverage with the Soviets. Chapters four through eight are enriched by a unique source—the White House tapes-and the twenty-five transcripts included in the volume reinforce the view that Nixon and Kissinger sought to control SALT. In many respects, however, the White House transcripts reveal as much about the personalities and bureaucratic politics of SALT as they do about the substance of the negotiations. To offset the NSC and White House-based perspective on the SALT negotiations, the editor made a conscientious effort to include as many relevant ACDA records as possible. Chapters two through eight contain numerous telephone transcripts and meeting memoranda prepared by chief SALT negotiator, Gerard Smith, as well as backchannel messages between Smith and Kissinger. These exchanges often show a dialogue of miscommunication, if not outright misunderstanding. Much of the documentation for chapters seven and eight on the period covering Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow in April 1972, culminating with the Moscow Summit at the end of May 1972, is printed in extract in this volume and printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972. This volume ends with the Nixon administration's securing congressional approval of the SALT agreement and ratification of the ABM treaty. Editorial Methodology The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted. Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. |