A few minutes before the 52nd began to retire a Cuirassier Colonel galloped out from the French Cavalry, which were hovering about, shouting "Vive le Roi" (Louis XVIII) and riding up to Sir John Colborne, and Colonel C. Rowan said that Napoleon was advancing there (pointing to the road leading to La Haye Sainte) with his columns.

This officer afterwards said that he expected to have been followed by some more of his regiment, and he evidently thought that he was engaged in a losing cause. Sir John Colborne then retired with this officer (keeping him beside him to get information) in rear of the 52nd passing through the batteries commanded by Colonel Gould, and after posting the 52nd in line seeing a number of wounded men lying in front, and having occasion to look at his watch said to the adjutant "the wounded had better be left where they are the action must be over-in-half an hour." It was then nearly seven o'clock.

The 52nd being behind the slight ridge, Sir John Colborne rode out in front, and remained watching closely and anxiously the movements of the masses of troops towards La Belle Alliance, these were the columns of the Imperial Guards and they moved in two dark and heavy columns towards La Haye Sainte and parallel to the Charleroi road as if to break through the Anglo-Allied centre; they were preceded by skirmishers as usual, the guns, as was afterwards ascertained which were on their right flank, were to assist in breaking through the lines of their opponents.

The French skirmishers ran forward up the slope, firing towards Maitland's Brigade of Guards, who rising up from behind the ridge advanced and firing into the skirmishers, (it is said by direction of the Duke, who was close in rear and who called out "drive off these fellows!") drove them back. There being a cry of cavalry, the Guards retired to form squares.

The heavy dark columns kept moving on rapidly and steadily, one ofter the other, a short interval between them. Sir John Colborne saw that not a moment was to be lost, as though there was firing towards Planchenoit, Lobau's troops opposing there the attack of the Prussians from the direction of Wavre, yet along the Anglo-Allied line though there was no giving way but there was comparative silence resulting from natural exhaustion and the expenditure of ammunition after eight hours' fighting, it was now eight o'clock the moment was critical; it was truly "the Crisis of Waterloo."

Extracts from a memorandum by Field-Marshal Lord Seaton.

"While the columns of Napoleon that made the unsuccessful attack on the point which is usually called our right centre, advanced in full march towards our troops occupying the centre, the Brunswickers retiring, and the British Guards closing in, no one who was looking steadfastly at the movements of the Imperial Guard, at that time could say that the battle did not look critical,

or but that the Imperial Guards had the appearance of success, and that our centre was on the point of being penetrated." "No change for the better on our side had taken place, the guns under Colonel Gould on the cross road were all silent, and there was scarcely any firing except on the rear of La Haye Sainte and on that part of our centre, the dense columns of the French were in full march on the plateau."

Sir John Colborne turning towards his regiment which was, as compared with others, fresh, waved his handkerchief to Colonel Rowan to advance the two lines in which it was drawn up, then wheeling the regiment to the left, on the left company, the 52nd was brought parallel to the columns of the Imperial Guard, seen passing on to their front, at the distance of several hundred yards.

52nd commanded by Lieutenant

A strong company of the Anderson was now ordered to extend and skirmish in front and feel the enemy, at this moment the Brigadier Sir F. Adam rode up and asked Sir John Colborne what he was going to do; the reply was "to make that column feel our fire," meaning the leading column. Sir Frederick then rode away towards the 71st to direct them.

The 52nd Regiment advanced, and a look out for cavalry was kept on the right flank, which otherwise was unprotected and en l'air. The whole movement was bold, most wise and of great value.

It will be here observed that the 52nd in a long line was able to deal with effect on the massed columns of the Imperial Guards, though many thousand strong, say 8,000. The 52nd descending the slope towards the French, advanced for several hundred yards diagonally across the front of the Anglo-Allied line, all this was easily understood by an inspection of the ground.

Lord Hill was at this time in rear of Maitland's Guards, and saw, as he afterwards said, the gallant advance of the 52nd down the slope, across the plain below and up the opposite ascent. Maitland's Guards did not move at this time, their ammunition being expended, as Sir John Byng afterwards stated to Sir John Colborne.

The 52nd, as they closed on the French, saw only in their front the troops opposed to them. The regiment was not molested by cavalry on the right flank, for the French cavalry had retired, having probably been withdrawn when the Prussians first appeared marching on Planchenoit.

The skirmishers of the 52nd soon opened fire on the left flank of the Imperial Guards, who harrassed by this unexpected attack, like a giant by a fierce mastiff, and unable under the fire to deploy, halted and returned the fire, by which the 52nd suffered severely.

There is no doubt that the fire from the 52nd skirmishers on

the flank of the leading French column and the appearance of a general attack on the flank from Sir F. Adam's Brigade and Sir H. Clinton's division, was the cause of the first check received, and the halt made by the Imperial Guards.

The loss of the 52nd skirmishers was severe, and the two officers of this company were wounded. The right wing of the 52nd lost nearly 120 men during the advance and the officer carrying the regimental colour was killed.

During the advance of the 52nd, two or three squadrons of the 23rd Light Dragoons appeared directly in the front of the left of the 52nd, and approaching rapidly towards the line. The companies on the left halted and fired into them, supposing them to be the enemy's cavalry, as they were not in red jackets. Sir John Colborne's horse was now wounded, and he called out to the Adjutant to stop the fire, whilst he rectified the mistake which had occurred, the only one that had happened during the day and which interrupted the march. The Duke of Wellington now came to the left of the line, and in rear of the two companies that had fired, and Sir John said to him "It is our cavalry that has caused this firing." His Grace replied, "Never mind go on, go

on !"

The advance had soon brought the 52nd close under the hill or ascent on which the Imperial Guards were moving to the north, and the regiment was protected for a time from the fire by the hill. The inequality of the ground, and the interruption just alluded to had thrown the two right companies into some disorder, and Sir John Colborne suspecting that the French cavalry were not far from the right, called out to the officers com. manding Nos. 1 and 2 companies to halt, and bring up their companies in good line, and he restrained the somewhat disorderly impetuosity of these companies under great and natural excitement, whilst Colonels Churchill and Chalmers were cheering and waving their caps in front.

The 71st under Colonel Reynell at this time were formed on the right flank, the 95th Rifles on the left rear, Sir A. F. Barnard commanding. Sir John Colborne ordering the bugles to sound the advance, the whole charged up the slope, then halting most of the companies, the 52nd poured a destructive fire into the flank of the Imperial Guards. The enemy were now observed in great confusion, some firing, others throwing away their packs and running to the rear. The attacking columns gave way, and were pursued by the 52nd to the Charleroi road, when a portion appeared inclined to make a stand.

Captain Cross, 52nd, then called out that the French soldiers near were going to surrender, but on their continuing to fire on the 52nd, Sir John ordered the regiment to charge, crossed the Charleroi road, and the whole regiment passed through the French guns and carriages on it, and continued their march,

then formed in a column of companies on the east side of the road, the right resting on it. Some companies of the Imperial Guards had again rallied, and attempted to make a stand on the east side of the road, yet they also gave way.

Moving in column, the 52nd passed about eighty guns and carriages in about ten minutes. The 71st did not cross the Charleroi road, but moved parallel to it on the right and in pursuit, also Halkett's Osnabruck battalion, Vivian's and Vandeleur's dragoons, as well as the rest of Sir Henry Clinton's division.

At the junction of the road from Wavre with the Charleroi road, the skirmishers of the 52nd and some of the advanced guard of the Prussians mixed. It was now nearly dark, the 52nd was halted a few hundred yards from the junction of the Wavre Road, and the whole of General Bulow's corps passed on the road to Genappe.

The Duke of Wellington, on returning from the direction of La Belle Alliance, passed the left of the 52nd column, and inquired for the commanding officer, (who had gone on to observe the French retreat,) he left a message that the Regiment was to halt for the night, it did so by itself, at Rosomme, three miles in front of its former position in the general line.

The principal error into which Captain Siborne and other writers have fallen with regard to the crisis, (and to try to rectify which I have entered into the above minute details), was the endeavour to make it appear that the Imperial Guards made two separate attacks on the Anglo-Allied line. Whilst I was in France I communicated with many parties on this point, heads of Military Departments, &c., and old officers and soldiers of the Imperial Guards were questioned as to this matter, and from none of them could I learn that more than one attack took place.

Sir John Colborne, an officer of the highest sense of honour, extraordinary coolness under fire, and of military experience and knowledge of the first order, sitting on his horse in front of the general line, and watching closely in the direction of Belle Alliance the movements of the enemy, did not see two attacks of the Imperial Guards; but an attack such as I have attempted to describe from private and reliable sources of information, and he was not the man to withold any credit where it was due, or to assume too much for himself or his noble regiment.

In conclusion, this is noteworthy. In volume X, of the Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington, at page 546, at the end of Sir H. Clinton's despatch to Lord Hill, (who commanded the 2nd Corps, in which Clinton's Division and Adam's Brigade were,) the following sentence occurs, "I beg, too, that your Lordship, in making your report to the Commander of the Forces, will have the enclosed letter from General Adam laid before His Grace."

General Lambert's despatch, (who, like Adam, commanded a

brigade,) was forwarded by Sir James Kempt, who commanded the Division after Picton's death, to Lord Hill, and by him to the Duke, and is given at page 537 same volume (X), but Adam's does not appear. It cannot be found at the War Office or Horse Guards, and I have corresponded with every person whom I thought might assist to trace it, as yet the search is in vain, still I hope it will yet see the light. Its importance is considerable for the military historian, and it would probably further explain what occurred at an important period of the battle which has been imperfectly and incorrectly understood.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING TROOPS.

BY AN OLD INFANTRY MAN.

A recent paper in the Revue des Deux Mondes has suggested to me certain considerations which I propose to submit to the readers of the United Service Magazine. The article in question is from the pen of M. Reybaud, of the Institut,' and treats of the operations of the French Experimental Squadron exercised in the Mediterranean in 1868-70, under the orders of Vice-Admiral Jurrien de la Gravière. I shall give a few extracts as nearly as possible in the writer's own words, and append thereto some remarks which they appear to me to suggest.

M. Reybaud tells us that during the cruises of the squadron great attention was paid to the exercise of the seamen in Compagnies de débarquements-anglice, as a Naval Brigade-in operations on shore. Professional prejudices, he adds, were opposed to this arrangement, as it was believed that although useful enough when acting in combination with infantry of the line or marines, French sailors had not sufficient solidarity to enable them to act efficiently on land without such extraneous support. Let me here state that the squadron was composed of six vessels, the 'Magenta' line-of-battle ship, and the frigates Provence,' 'Heroine,' Couronne,' Revanche' and Valeureuse,'-all ironclads. At the outset a couple of battalions of ships riflemen were formed, each battalion, commanded by a lieutenant de vaisseau, consisting of six platoons of sixteen files each. There were also three sections of field artillery, each section provided with two field howitzers of 4 centim. calibre. For the above purpose each ship contributed eighty men, a number sufficient to allow for the platoon serre-files and the crews of the field-howitzers, subsequently a battalion of seamen-pioneers (sapeurs-abordeurs) was added, composed also of six companies of sixteen files each. These men were armed with