Pherson; Captains Johnson, Manly, (Waterloo) Amsinck, Sleator, Stamford, Maclean, Goodman, Byrne, Fawkes, Smith, (Waterloo) Durnford, Butler, Lonsdale, Vereker; Roberts and Williamson; Lieutenants Butler, Neynol, Touzal, Cholmely, Edden (Adjutant) Jones, Smith, Forster, McCall and Watson; Ensigns Vignolles, Lewes, King, Hare, and Truro; Paymaster Raymond; Quartermaster Thompson; Surgeon Mostyn, (Waterloo) and AssistantSurgeons O'Callaghan and Dolmege.

An imposing ceremony took place on the 24th May, 1837. The then Princess (now our Queen) Victoria's Birthday, as likewise the anniversary of the capture of St. Lucia in 1796, it was selected for the occasion to present a set of new colours to the regiment. At 12 noon on that date, the 27th paraded at Cape Town for this purpose.

Lady Catherine Bell, sister-in-law to Sir Lowry Cole, colonel of the 27th Regiment, to whom the honour of the presentation of the colours had been deputed, made an admirable speech to the corps on this occasion, it being in fact an epitome of the gallant services of the regiment from the period of its first formation down to the time when she addressed them; and to which Lieutenant-Colonel Hare, C.B. K.H., commanding the 27th, made an appropriate reply.

The Reverend Mr. Judge consecrated the colours in the usual manner, and from whose prayer on that occasion the following is extracted:". . . . these standards may never be surrendered or lowered to the traitor or the foe, but in all their warfare may, under Thy Gracious favour, be crowned with triumphant honour and success, and that they to whose keeping these are committed as their centre opinion and their rallying point, may be at all times prepared to stand by them to the last, in defence of our lawful Sovereign, of his just right and dominions, and of the sacred and civil institutions of the Empire-may ever continue to display that surbordination, discipline, valour and unflinching steadiness, for which they have in past times been ever distinguished, and may be enabled in Thy strength to vanquish and overcome all their

enemies. . .

The regiment remained doing garrison duty in Cape Town until July, 1838, when Lieutenant-Colonel Hare was appointed Acting Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope, and having proceeded to assume the government, the regiment was ordered to follow him to the frontier, and embarked at Cape Town in the month of October, 1838, arriving at Graham's Town in the same month.

At the close of 1839, Colonel Hare having been confirmed in the Civil Government, resigned the command of the regiment, which he had held with such distinguished credit to himself and advantage to the service since the year 1825. The command of the regiment then devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson,

who again joined the service companies, the command of the regiment being in the interim held by Major Jolinstone.

The officers present with the regiment in 1841 were LieutenantColonel McPherson, Major Goodman, Captains Sleaton, McLean, Byrne, Smith and Lonsdale; Lieutenants Butler, Neynoe, SmithLewes and Irwin; Ensigns Stapyleton, Molesworth and Turmard; Adjutant Midgeley, Quarter-Master Thompson, Surgeon Mostyn, Assistant-Surgeon Delmege, and Paymaster Raymond.

During this period, that is from 1835 to 1840, the four depôt companies left at home under the command of Major Maclean, did garrison duty both in Ireland and England. On the 25th May, 1835 the depôt marched from Dublin to Newbridge, and from thence on the 24th June following to Nenagh, where it remained until August, 1836, when it was ordered upon the English establishment, and embarked at Cork for Chatham on the 30th August, 1836.

At Chatham the depôt remained until July, 1838, doing garrison duty to the satisfaction of Lord Hill, then commanderin-chief, and the Adjutant-General, as also Lieutenant-General William Ware, the commandant of the garrison. On the 23rd of July Major McPherson arrived in England from the service companies, and assumed command of the depot, as it was about to shift to Dover, where it remained until the 9th September 1839.

During its stay at Dover the depot was much noticed by his Grace the Duke of Wellington, then Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, and other eminent and distinguished officers, and the conduct of the men was so good that at the great festival given by the Cinque Ports to His Grace in the month of August, 1839, the Committee appointed to manage the festival, made special application to Lord Hill, the Commander-in-Chief, that the depot 27th regiment might remain in Dover until after the entertainment was over, it being their desire that the Inniskilling Regiment should furnish the guard of honour on this occasion. The answer of Lord Hill is subjoined.

"Horse Guards, 26th March, 1839,

"Sir, I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 23rd instant, conveying a request from the Acting Committee appointed to conduct an entertainment to be given to His Grace the Duke of Wellington in August next. It affords me great pleasure to be able to meet the wishes of the Committee, by giving directions that the depot of the 27th regiment shall not be removed from Dover until after the time you have specified, and which can be done without any inconvenience to the public

"Edward Thompson, Esq., Mayor of Dover."

The guard of honour was accordingly furnished by the 27th

regiment, and commanded by Captain Smith. The commanding officer and all the officers of the depot being present at the entertainment.

In the month of October, 1839, the depot was marched from Dover to Gravesend, where it embarked for Ireland. On arriving at Cork, orders awaited it to proceed to Wexford where it remained during the winter.

(To be continued.)

REMARKS ON THE PRESENT WAR.

BY AN OLD STAFF OFFICER.

I believe that most of the thinking portion of my countrymen will agree with me that the fall of Napoleon III, is, of all events resulting from the present war, the one most to be regretted by us. For the long period of eighteen years, he managed to curb the restless nature of the French people and army, so as to maintain peace with England; being fully alive to the value of the old Peninsular saying, viz.: war with all the world, but peace with England." A residence of ten years amongst us had served to impress him with just notions of our power, energy and resources; attributes which mainly contributed to the downfall of the first Emperor.

Intoxicated by the greatness of his power, the magnitude of his forces, the craving of the Empire for conquest, together with the hope of securing the throne to his dynasty, it is not improbable that he had almost made up his mind to forfeit our friendship, when he devised, or assented to, the celebrated projet de traité." Of this, indeed, there can be little doubt; but we must make every allowance for all the circumstances of his position, remembering-as he once told the world himself—that as a Frenchman, he must look to the interests of France above all things.

What must now be his feelings towards France and Frenchmen, after the base ingratitude he has experienced from a nation which owed him so much? "Oh, c'est un triste peuple que le peuple français," was the remark made to me by an eminent Frenchman, who could appreciate his countrymen at their worth. But a far greater man, by implication, spoke still more disparagingly of them, in this wise. When intelligence of the melancholy end of Sir Samuel Romilly was received at St. Helena, the account of his death was translated to Napoleon by General, Count The ex-Emperor exclaimed, "Quel mépris de la vie, et quel mépris de la mort! c'est moi me tuant à Marengo parceque j'apprends la mort de Joséphine. What a people are

the English! If I had been sovereign of their nation, I might have lost ten battles of Waterloo without being abandoned by a soldier of my army, or losing a vote in Parliament." I, the writer of these remarks, was then serving at St. Helena, and chanced to meet General ——, immediately after his interview with the great man, when he narrated to me his ipsissime verba, and which I duly noted down directly after.

Let me now venture to make a few remarks upon the present war. What an illustration of the old hackneyed saying, 66 quem Deus vult," &c., does it exhibit! The declaration of war was a tremendous blunder, only exceeded by the folly of the Emperor in nominally directing, or, more correctly, intending to direct operations. Of all the tasks to which the mind can be applied, to carry out strategic operations on a great scale is assuredly the most difficult. Surely the Emperor ought to have learned so much when in Italy. But with an infatuation quite unaccountable, a man who was never a soldier, and considered by persons competent to judge, as deficient in military qualities, undertakes the command of 350,000 men !

I do not suppose, however, that he really intended to exercise personal command; but, knowing that French marshals have often shown themselves refractory in dealing with each other, he probably thought his presence necessary to enforce the measures of the real commander; but he was sadly out of his reckoning in pitting Le Boeuf against Möltke; while he was himself, in fact, playing nearly the part of the Dutch Deputies with Marlborough.

No troops are so difficult to rally after a repulse as the French, and it becomes impossible after a decided defeat. Possibly the Iron Duke was not alive to this defect in them, if Napier's remark was merited, that he was not famous for following up a victory. I presume to think that much may be said for the Duke in reference to the taunt of the historian; but this is no place for entering into a discussion. One thing, however, is certain, that victory is only the means to an end; it is by rapidly following up a victory that its fruits are gathered. Probably, had the allied armies followed up the Russians after the battle of the Alma, with "l'épée dans les reins," we should have had no siege of Sebastopol. The delay caused by the French was attended with serious consequences.

There can be little doubt that General Trochu's strictures on the Armée Française are well founded, and that it contained important defects; but to decide from its complete collapse, within the space of a few weeks, that it was essentially bad, is folly; I have good reason for thinking that at no period of modern date, even during the victories of the first Empire, it was ever a well disciplined army, although its general organization was good. The main deficiency, at all times, seems to have lain in the

commissariat branch, arising in a great measure from the principle, always practised by the French, of making war feed war; and, therefore, trusting to contributions levied upon the territories over which they passed for feeding the troops.

It appears to me that their grand deficiency in the present war was the want of a Commander-in-chief possessing the confidence of all ranks. Let us suppose that such a man as the first Emperor had been in command; would he have remained for many days absent, after his army was assembled near the Rhine? and passed some ten more in a state of supineness after assuming the command? Surely not. He would have crossed into Southern Germany, and assailed his enemy, if possible, with superior force; and at this moment might be occupying Berlin. But confidence and strategy were with the Prussians, engendered during their Bohemian campaign. Even under all disadvantages, we might have seen a different result to what is now before us had the first battle been in favour of the French. Napoleon the First most truly said, "the difference between a battle won and a battle lost is immense."

That popular and graphic little book, the "Mémoires d'un Conscrit," has some excellent remarks upon the French soldier; here is what he says at page 296, "On dit que la confiance donne de la force, et c'est vrai, surtout pour les Français. Tant qu'ils marchent en avant, tant qu'ils espèrent la victoire, ils sont unis comme les doigts de la main, la volonté des chefs est la loi de tous; ils sentent qu'on ne peut réussir que par la discipline. Mais aussitôt qu'ils sont forcés de reculer, chacun n'a plus de confiance qu'en soi-même, et l'on ne connait plus le commandement. Alors ces hommes si fiers, ces hommes qui s'avançaient gaiment à l'ennemi pour combattre s'en vont les uns à droite les autres à gauche, tantôt seuls, tantôt en troupeaux."

In all my reading of warlike operations, I can instance none to equal the miserable mismanagement the present campaign offers. The Emperor being no soldier, it was only to be expected that he would commit serious blunders; but that Bazaine and McMahon should have acted, not only against military rules, but also in opposition to common sense, is wholly unaccountable. Could any man have thought it possible, that the celebrated surrender of Mack at Ulm could be thrown into the shade by one hundred and twenty thousand men passing under the Caudine Forks at Sedan, with the almost certainty of the same being repeated at Metz afterwards! Had the two Marshals, leaving Metz well garrisoned, united at Chalons, and then awaited the enemy, to receive battle if they felt their combined strength equal to a tremendous struggle in the field, or to fall back upon Paris, if thought more desirable, the fortune of the campaign might have been retrieved; and even if defeated, the broken forces would still have been available for the defence of Paris.