artillery reserve of the Navy, in time of war, would be fully maintained, while the expensive training of officers and men would be turned to account by employing them to organize and instruct the reserve forces.

We have now touched on the question of the gunners for the Navy, those who have to handle, manage, and manoeuvre the guns of the ships. With regard to sailors, i.e., men to undertake the ordinary duties of the ship, there is no difficulty. Any number of boys can be obtained for the Navy, and the best seamen in the Service, are those who commenced as boys in the training ship. But with regard to the class termed generally artificers, &c., there is, it is asserted, considerable difficulty, as it is said to be impossible to train a seaman to perform these duties, and consequently a large portion of the ship's company must be useless as regards the performance of duties above deck, that is to say, useless as seamen. But why not try the experiment of training the boys during their service, which averages about thirteen years? supposing they join the training ships at fifteen years of age, and when they are eighteen engage for ten years' continuous service? Why should not they be taught to be carpenters, blacksmiths, ship's stewards, tailors, shoe-makers, &c., &c. There is plenty of time for such training and teaching during these eighteen years, and the many hours which are too often simply idled away, could be well devoted to such useful occupation. Too many of our seamen leave the Service and retire into private life as small shopkeepers, publicans, &c., because when they are getting on in years, the active duties of an able seaman become irksome to them, and if they have not ability to rise to a higher rating, they leave the Service, and seek a more easy billet elsewhere. If they found that by serving the remainder of their time in other capacities, requiring less bodily activity, they could obtain an increase of pension on discharge, we believe their services could be secured, and such men would be available for duty as able seamen, should the emergency of a great maritime war require an extension to the fleet, while their places as artificers, &c., could be supplied by Marines. If ships' companies, on a peace footing, were composed entirely of seamen, with the reserve of Marines and Marine Artillery, efficient and ready, we should have the means at our command of doubling our fleet at any moment.

What, after all, is the nation brought face to face with? With the simple necessity of being able to protect itself from invasion and of being able, if necessity should require it, to transport efficient armies and maintain powerful fleets for the protection of our Colonies. All the argument in the world will not remove the fact that for neither of these emergencies are we, as a nation, at the present time prepared. A whole chorus of voices, clamorous with the instincts of ignorance, or at all events, a blind belief in

old traditions, will be ready to cry out that invasion is simply impossible, that an enemy could only land at certain points of the coast; that we are well prepared at these points; that our Channel Squadron is sufficient in itself to keep any invader at bay; and that we have the means of transporting an army to any of these points of the coast at an hour's notice. These are statements which are reiterated and enforced with all the confidence of truth. But are they true? Does any thoughtful man in the present day believe, with the belief of satisfaction, in their truth? It may be almost too arbitrary to say that they are false; but it is not too much to say that, what is true in them is misunderstood, and that what is not true is not known. To begin with, the old idea that our coast was only vulnerable at certain points is now recognised as a fallacy. It is found that on the contrary, many spots are vulnerable, which half a century ago were not thought of. Unfortunately, not only in such a point as this, but in many others, which it is needless to refer to, we are willing to argue our safety from premises which were admissible fifty years ago, but which are now, through the marvellous agencies brought to light in that time, entirely overthrown. We seem, too, to argue sometimes as though the facilities of communication which have been unfolded during the past half century, by science, were only known to ourselves; forgetting that whoever is our enemy has all these facilities at his command.

In what position, then, do we stand at present, in regard to our Navy? After having shown, as we have in nearly every point, whether in ships, or men, or ordnance, what changes and efforts have been made up to the present time to place our Navy upon an effective footing, and what these efforts have involved, we are now left face to face with the broad question. Are we prepared? A halting answer might fairly be given; but such an answer would only be calculated to mislead. Better to give a downright denial to this question, and answer it with a harsh, hardly to us, uncompromising No. In truth we are not prepared for naval warfare on anything like a large scale. We have a certain number of ships and men; and those ships are not only finer and more numerous than those of any nation in the globe, but our sailors can also be as favourably compared. The efforts of the French navy, however, in this war have shown very clearly that fine iron-clads cannot do much necessarily alone. Nor can men be of much use without ships. The fact is, we have neither enough ships nor enough men, and to place our Navy in any way upon a satisfactory footing, must involve an outlay of a very large sum of money.

First, as regards men, for they are more difficult to procure than ships, in many respects; it is time to open our eyes to the fact that we have by no means a sufficient number for active

service in time of war. The improvements which have been gradually and perseveringly introduced, both into the mode of obtaining men and into the mode of dealing with them when in the Service, are undeniable. Since the establishment of the continuous service system, a higher class of men has been procured, and in every particular has their treatment been improved. In pay, provisions, leave and training, the seaman of to-day is infinitely better off than his colleagues of twenty years ago. But, in spite of these advantages, two drawbacks exist. In the first place, there are not enough men to draw upon in case of emergency. Secondly, there is not a proper intimacy and connexion between the Navy and the Merchant Service. In developing properly the reforms of twenty years ago, these points must be borne in mind. A good principle of securing men for the Navy exists, it has now been considered how best to develop it, and make it less rigid and more elastic than at present. We want, in fact, larger reserves. It ought to be possible for the. country to have the power of securing at a very short notice, a body of more than 100,000 men,

One of the best ways, perhaps, in which this could be done would be to relax the period of continuous service, and offer short service pensions in the shape of a retaining fee. The amount of pay, and the system of payment in the Navy and Merchant Service might be harmonized, and greater inducements, as well as faculties be offered to seamen in the Merchant Service to enter the Navy. By continually drafting out men after five years' service, and securing the services of fresh men, giving all a sound training, and retaining them by a fee, subject to a periodical drill, there ought to be no difficulty beyond the expense of securing a numerous and most valuable reserve.

Then with regard to ships, it will be necessary to pursue a far bolder policy than is now adopted. The fitful practice of building ships by the dozen in one year, and discontinuing shipbuilding for two or three years must be abandoned. Mr. Childers has provided for this, by laying down what he considers the proper rate of ship-building to be carried out every year, to maintain at its minimum force the Navy. This is a step so far in the right direction, and is so satisfactory that it wants no more than extension. Yet, two points have been brought to light by the two facts of the war and the loss of the 'Captain,' namely, that it is not sufficient to confine building to iron-clads, and secondly, that science and service alone can determine how ships are to be built. If we follow out these principles, it will have been so far as we are concerned worth the fatal accidents which have drawn attention to them. In ship-building, and, indeed, in every branch of the Navy there are three elements of power, separate but harmonious, necessary in combination for excellence in any one; but at the same time totally distinct from

one another. These elements are the Practical, the Professional, and the Scientific. Every error of late years can be ascribed to a confusion of these elements of power. The utter neglect of, and, indeed, opposition, to science which has been brought to light by recent transactions, is in the present condition of Naval Warfare almost criminal.

Naval warfare is now more than ever essentially a scientific qnestion; that is the instruments by which it can alone be carried on, can only be obtained satisfactorily by the careful following out of scientific principles. The conditions which determine naval warfare may be political-professional knowledge and esprit de corps may be the life and soul of the combatants; but, without scientifically constructed instruments disaster is inevitable. Unfortunately, a knowledge of fighting and administration has been supposed to carry with it the proper knowledge of the best means of constructing the instruments of wer. Not more thoroughly could this fallacy have been exposed than in the fatal loss of the Captain.' The practical experience of professional knowledge was allowed to outweigh in a scientific matter the inflexible laws of science. Practical experience is useful in handling men and manoeuvring squadrons in action; political sagacity can determine accurately the symptoms of war and its accidents; but scientific skill and the application of the princi. ples of science are, in the present day, inseparable from the construction of the implements of war. It is with an almost savage sarcasm that Mr. Reed suggests, in regard to the too general absence of scientific knowledge in the Navy that, "the centre of gravity is regarded in the light of a coil of rope, or piece of timber, which can be procured from store as part of the fitting of a vessel."

It is to be hoped that years may elapse before our Navy may be called upon to test its powers. In its present fine condition it will, we are sure, give a good account of itself; but, in addition to the advantages it now possesses, it requires considerable development to bear the serious and continued strain of Wooden vessels of small size, and a large reserve are its requirements. Money can produce the first, and will be greatly instrumental in procuring the last by a slight relaxation of the rules of the Service and a determination to harmonize all our sea forces throughout the country.

war.

ORIGIN OF THE SCREW PROPELLER.

Palmam qui meruit ferat.

Many years ago the late Sir James Colleton, a distinguished officer of the Royal Staff Corps, published in this Magazine a paper on the invention of the screw propeller, which he justly

Al.

claimed for Captain Frederick Du Vernet of the same corps. though the merit of the invention had been attributed to another person, I do not remember that Colleton's article produced any discussion, or indeed, excited much attention. Neither have I ever heard Du Vernet's name otherwise coupled with the invention. Recently, when visiting an old brother officer, and talking over old times and doings, we agreed that as we were both present, so to say, when the idea of the screw suggested itself to Du Vernet, we really ought to record our testimony in support of his claim. Having undertaken the task of penning our recol lections, I beg to submit them to the "courteous readers."

Du Vernet had a decided turn for practical mechanics, and was seldom without some hobby connected with their application. In the year 1824; at which period the friend above alluded to, and I were at Hythe, his Pegasus was "perpetual motion," and for a lengthened period, his every spare moment was devoted to that delusion. Often have seen him in his workshop, seated before a huge wheel which was to revolve, by means of iron balls running in grooves along what may be termed its spokes, from circumference to centre, and vice versa. "You see," he would say, "there is just a little hitch, not half an inch in its revolution, to overcome, and the wheel will continue turning." I need scarcely say that the half inch proved an insurmountable difficulty.

His fertile brain next conceived the notion that steam-vessels might be propelled by means of a screw; and it is very probable the motion of his intended perpetual wheel may have proved suggestive thereto, although I never heard him hint that it was ი. At that period-in the infancy of steam navigation, when unscientific and defective paddle-wheels only were in use, men were seeking to improve upon them, and possibly such may have been the object of our friend when his good genius whispered to him the true means of propulsion. I well remember his saying to me that he saw no reason why vessels should not be propelled by the screw, and how much I was myself struck with the idea, which he pondered over for several days, and at length determined to test it by means of a model. Accordingly, he shaped a boat about 18 or 20 inches long; but the formation of a suitable screw embarrassed him. However, this difficulty was overcome by substituting little flat blades of tin fixed to a shaft, which was made to revolve by means of clock-work. As may be imagined, the miniature ship, with its various fittings, cost no little time and thought, especially in determining the angle at which the tin blades should be placed, with reference to the shaft. At last the experimentum crucis took place on that egregious sample of folly, the military canal, and its success surpassed all expectation. Du Vernet's triumph was complete.

Having now found himself right in principle, as he thought, he set to work to make a perfect screw; which, in time,

was ac