Versailles, as suddenly as if it had sprung out of the ground. What " our own correspondent may have said about it, we have not yet learnt, as English papers are slow in reaching us, but when they do come, if our friend tells the truth, he will allow that something very like a panic reigned at head-quarters; and he will also allow that there has been an enormous amount of marching and countermarching ever since the battle of Baccon, the object being to save Von der Tann. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg has moved towards him on one side, and the Crown Prince (now a Russian Field-Marshal, be it remembered) on the other, but they have not been able to out-manoeuvre de Paladine. He, like Trochu, knows how to bide his time, he also knows how to mask his motions, and he will probably be felt by them some day and in some quarter where least expected.

I mentioned to you that Garibaldi had been sent to the Vosges, which certainly was a wise measure, if all that we hear of him is true. His enmity to the priesthood is so ungoverned that he has plundered some churches and communities, and openly accused the priesthood of abetting the enemy. Nothing can be more unwise, or more unjust, and he would pay dearly for his folly did the Bretons get hold of him. He is evidently not fit to rule, but he may be useful in keeping up an enthusiasm among his motley following, which cooler heads may turn to good account. have a report that his son Ricciotti surprised a body of 700 Germans, and killed or captured the whole, on the 18th at Chatillon. If true, this may make some amends for the vagaries of the father, but he had better not come westward.

As to Paris, things are much as they were, that is to say, the place is invested, but the people are neither turbulent nor starving; and the Mobiles are being "seasoned" by sallies on a moderate scale, in which they do much more harm than they receive, though as they, of course, retire, the truth-loving Germans always claim the victory. The grasp of the besiegers is evidently relaxing here and there, and General Trochu knows the weak joint in their armour. He is seconded by a very able staff, whose names appeared lately in the Moniteur Officiel, but as it no doubt has reached you, I need not repeat them. The Prussians are harrassed by an incessant apprehension of a grand sortie, and they find their position an exceedingly disagreeable one. They have, by a vast amount of labour, thrown up a number of works, but the guns to arm them, and the ammunition, are very slow in arriving. In spite of having detached four strong battalions of jagers for the express purpose of watching the railways, and even adopting the monstrous expedient of making unarmed French civilians travel on the engines, they. cannot get up their stores; and as the weather has now become very bad, they are suffering fearfully from typhus. I said some time since, that they gladly received all the stores that your relief societies would send, but they were very unwilling to admit your

doctors. It now comes out, that this was not mere brutal churlishness, as it at first appeared; they had a much larger number of sick than they liked to have known, and the number is daily increasing. This difficulty of getting up stores and guns fit to contend with those in the Paris forts, is the real reason of the noncommencement of the bombardment, which the Germans have the the assurance to ascribe to the "humane disposition of King William !"

Our kind critics in England are pleased to contrast our darkness with the enlightenment of Protestant Prussia, and so far as mere "book-learning" is concerned perhaps they are right. I doubt whether many of our men in arms could write a flourishing accoun of a battle in Sanskrit, as some of the lads from the German Universities are said to have done, though my own impression is, that both "original" and translation were manufactured to order in the Berlin chancery. But be the fact as it may, there is a deep substratum of faith among us, unfashionable as it may be to avow it, which will serve us better in our sore straits than the "free thought" speculations of half-infidel Germany. This has been prominently brought forward in relation to our victory of the 10th of this month. That was St. Martin's day, a saint probably unknown to Prussia, but reverenced here, as the bishop of the city many centuries ago; and as he was once a soldier, it seems to the warm imagination of the French peasant, especially the devout Breton, the most natural thing in the world that he should have led his devotees to a great triumph on his own day. I should not be at all surprised to learn that some Breton saw him, with the eyes of faith, leading them on, as St. Jago is to this day believed to have done with the Spaniards on many a hard-fought field. Of course, the scoffing illuminati of Berlin or Göttingen can have nothing but pity for so benighted a race; but religious fervour, blind fanaticism if you like, has often proved a most effectual instrument in war, and will do so again, should the Germans remain long enough in France for the spirit to be thoroughly aroused.

You know, of course, that the Duke of Aosta has been chosen King of Spain, and that his respected father, Victor Emmanuel, has been again excommunicated by the Pope, a fact not likely to recommend the son to Catholic Spain. Even in the Cortes, the Republic appears to have one-third as many supporters as the newmade King, and it is tolerably evident that he will be kept on the throne only so long as Prim and the Army favour him. When a regiment or two shall choose to "pronounce" against him, he disappears to a certainty.

You may remember that some few months ago I called your attention to an article in a Russian Levant journal, in which Russia affected to fear an attack from Turkey. I remarked at the time, that we probably should hear more of this by and bye, and that

We now

it would prove to have been put forth with a purpose. see that purpose, in Prince Gortschakoff's Circular of October 31, in which he states, in terms more plain and peremptory than diplomatists ordinarily employ, that Russia, on her own authority, has set aside the neutralization of the Black Sea imposed by the Treaty of 1856. Thus the whole work of the Crimean War is undone, unless the reigning Powers say at once, and decidedly, "This shall not be." It seems to me rather difficult for them to do this at present, and to no one is this better known than to the Prince and his Master. Austria and Italy, both on the verge of national bankruptcy, count for nothing; we in France have enough to do in dealing with Prussia, who, as we all know, has a secret treaty with Russia, allowing the latter her full swing in the East, on condition of help, if needed, against us; and the idea that England will go to war single-handed to save the Turks is too wild a fancy. Hence the coming war will at first be localized, and Russ and Moslem will have it all to themselves. Under these circumstances,

it is an important matter to try to ascertain their relative strength, and, strange to say, this does not appear so very different as might be imagined, when we confine ourselves to the forces that can be brought into play at the opening of the war.

The Treaty of 1856 has certainly given this advantage to Turkev, that she has a fairly powerful fleet, which she can send at once into the Black Sea, without any fear of a repetition of the disaster of Sinope. But, on the other hand, rumour affirms that several ironclads have been bought by the Russians from America, and the appearance of these in the Arehipelago would make it very unadvisable for the Turks to enter the Black Sea, as they would thereby risk the bombardment of Constantinople. So the Turkish fleet may be regarded as check-mated, but there is a better prospect for the army.

The

This, according to the latest statements, consists of 350,000 men, 50,000 horses, and 900 guns, all really available for service, and, in the opinion of competent judges, quite able to hold its own against an equal number of Russians even in the open field. Russians have, on paper, 1,014,457 infantry, 212,401 cavalry, 105,639 artillery, 25,160 engineers, and 1,820 guns; but the domestic requirements of their vast empire are such, and there is such a difference between a force on paper and the force that can be sent into the field, that there does not seem any ground to fear the Turks being overwhelmed by mere numbers. The quality of their troops is now excellent, for they have had the wisdom since the last war to send large numbers of young men to foreign military academies, and to establish such at home, which yearly turn out more than a hundred officers, as well fitted for cominand or staff employ as any foreigner, and naturally far more acceptable to the men, who, though quite amenable to discipline under the Giaour, put more heart into the execution of their orders when led

by one of the Faithful. Then, too, the Sultan's name will be quite sufficient to convulse the Caucasian region, and oblige the Russians to strengthen their garrisons all over Asia, which may balance the hostility of the Greeks and Armenians, who have no great deal of fight in them, though they can talk loudly enough. You will remember that Omar Pasha proved himself more than a match for the Russians at Oltenitza, and there seems no reason why he should not do so again. We hear that many of your half pay officers are ready to give their services to the Turks, but from what I have said above, it would appear that not many of them will be required; besides, they may find employment nearer home, if Russia is determined on a war; and in that case you should look to your eastern coast. You may not be as successful in closing the Baltic as you were before.

THE LION AND THE BEAR;

OR,

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS

OF INDIA.

"The French and Germans," said Redschid Pacha to Mr. Senior (Journal in Turkey, p. 117), "think that the strength of England is in India; that if you lose India, you sink into a secondary Power like Holland." What happened in 1857-the sudden flame of mutiny, and its fierce trampling out before leaders of sufficient energy were found to kindle it into flagrant rebellion, demonstrated the hollowness of our power and the rottenness of our hold on the native population, but nevertheless gave further force to the supercilious conviction that India will never be taken from us by the natives of India. There have been, however, circumstances and considerations developed within late years, which emphatically denote that there is now within call of India a Power whose crafty policy, material strength, and military organisation, if supported by Native influences, and consolidating Native interests under an avowed protection, might give to a hostile advance within our territories the character rather of a triumphant march than of a mere invasion.

In the contemptuous view taken of the populations of India by Indian officials, and-in their ignorance-by Englishmen in general, it is presumed that the people, be they landowners, noblemen, princes, or ryots, care but little who rules them, providing they be left in peace to till their fields, gather in their rents, expend their revenues, and draw their titular pensions; non-interference with their religious rites and laws of inheritance being guaranteed to them. This may be so, for these are the

engagements of ordinary good government; but it is not beyond question whether the religious observance of these engagements form a portion of the standing policy of British Government in India, and it has, therefore, not been impossible to far-seeing Natives, conscious of this wrong, and ever patient as is their character, while compelled to endure it, to watch with vigilant interest the advancing steps of another great military nation of equal capacity with England, to ensure guarantees of peaceful Government, and at the same time more studiously wise in observing engagements made with the nobles, Princes and Potentates who have come under the protecting shadow of her power.

It is this, the present condition of India-we are pained to say it-after fourteen years of Imperial Government, that gives such a tremendous additional emphasis to the recent enunciation of Russian intentions in the Despatch of Prince Gortschakoff to the Cabinets of Europe. Too clearly do we recognise in this important document, and the precise time of its promulgation, a clarion of defiance to England more especially; a declaration that Russia is ready and willing, and considers herself able to meet us in hostile conflict, despite the apparently unassailable safety of our position. Too well do we know that, baffled in her ambitious advance against Turkey by our vigorous European policy in 1854, she has been searching the weaker points of our harness in the East, and professedly advancing upon Central Asia, has found the Crimea of England in Affghanistan.

Many of the semi-prophetic phrases of the Great Napoleon have been weighed and considered of late years in a manner which our forefathers would have ridiculed as childish and absurd. He died, a prisoner in our hands, at St. Helena, and it was there he reviewed his past life, and recorded his opinions on political matters. It would be interesting to demonstrate how frequently his predictions have been verified; but at present it is our purpose merely to quote one which has not yet been fulfilled, although the progress of human affairs, in late years, has often threatened its accomplishment. We allude to the famous declaration: "Before eighty years are over, the greater part of the world will either be republican or under the heel of the Cossack." The first part of this prophecy, we need hardly remark, became almost an established fact in 1848-9; let us proceed to examine what chance the other alternative has of realization.

We do not for a moment acknowledge the probability, or even possibility, of the land we live in becoming a Russian Province; but it is not possible for the most sanguine to predicate in the same positive terms the future of our Indian Empire, peopled as it is by motley millions of inhabitants professing divers creeds, languages, habits and peculiarities, and anxious, moreover, as a general body, for any change which might have a tendency to introduce some palpable deviation from the present wearisome and