The original of the treaty of 1819 with Spain being in the Spanish language, not corresponding precisely with the original in English, the language of the former is to be taken as expressing the intent of the grantor as to the lands granted and reserved. The King of Spain was the grantor; the treaty was his deed; the exception was made by him; and its nature and effect depended on his intention, expressed by his words, in reference to the thing granted and the thing reserved and excepted in and by the grant. The Spanish version was in his words and expressed his intention, and, though the American version showed the intention of this Government to be different, we cannot adopt it as the rule by which to decide what was granted, what excepted, and what reserved. The court must be governed by the clearly expressed and manifest intention of the grantor and not the grantee in private, a fortiori in public, grants. U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet., 691. ▾ As to which of the conflicting versions of a treaty is to prevail, see infra, § 165. When a treaty is executed in more than one language, each language being that of a contracting party, each document, so signed and attested, is to be regarded as an original, and the sense of the treaty is to be drawn from them collectively. Ibid., 710. A treaty of cession is a deed or grant by one sovereign to another, which transfers nothing to which he had no right of property, and only such right as he owned and could convey to the grantee. Mitchel v. U. S., 9 Pet., 711. The stipulation in the treaty of cession of Louisiana for the protec tion of the inhabitants in their property, &c., ceased, by its own limitation, to operate when the State was admitted into the Union. City of New Orleans v. Armas, 9 Pet., 224. A treaty of cession is to be construed in accordance with the state of things at the time existing. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet., 410. The term "grant" in a treaty comprehends not only those which are made in form, but also any concession, warrant, order, or permission to survey, possess, or settle, whether evidenced by writing or parol, or presumed from possession; and that in the term "laws" is included custom and usage, when once settled, though it may be "comparatively of recent date, and is not one of those to the contrary of which the memory of man runneth not, which contributed so much to make up the common-law code." Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet., 436. It is a sound principle of national law, and applies to the treatymaking power of this Government, whether exercised with a foreign nation or an Indian tribe, that all questions of disputed boundaries may be settled by the parties to the treaty. Lattimer v. Poteet, 14 Pet., 14. A treaty is to be construed so as to exclude fraud and to make its operation consistent with good faith. The Amistad, 15 Pet., 518. That a reservation in a treaty may operate as a grant of lands, see U. S. v. It has been settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court (1) that compacts between Governments or nations, like those between individuals, should be interpreted according to the natural, fair, and received acceptation of the terms in which they are expressed; (2) that the obligation of such compacts, unless suspended by some condition or stipulation therein contained, commences with their execution by the authorized agents of the contracting parties, and that their subsequent ratification by the principals themselves has relation to the period of signature; (3) that any act or proceeding, therefore, between the signing and ratification of a treaty, by either of the contracting parties, in contravention of the stipulations of the compact, would be a fraud upon the other party, and could have no validity consistently with a recognition of the compact itself; (4) that a nation which has ceded away her sovereignty and dominion over a territory, can, with respect to that territory, rightfully exert no power by which the dominion and sovereignty so ceded would be impaired or diminished. U. S. v. D'Auterive, 10 How., 609. A guarantee in a treaty of cession of vested rights in the ceded territory covers only rights which emanated from a prior rightful sovereign. U. S. v. Pillerin, 13 How., 9. Such a guarantee covers inchoate as well as matured rights. Delassus v. U. S., 9 Pet., 117; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet., 410. That benefits granted as equivalents by a treaty are not to be considered as donations, see Forsyth v. Reynolds, 15 How., 358. Whether a sovereign had the power, in making a treaty, to annul a grant, cannot be examined in the courts of the United States, the Presi dent and Senate having treated with him as having that power. Clark v. Braden, 16 How., 635. Where one of the parties to a treaty at the time of its ratification annexes a written declaration explaining ambiguous language in the instrument, or adding a new and distinct stipulation, and the treaty is S. Mis. 162-VOL. 11- -3 33 afterwards ratified by the other party with the declaration attached to it, and the ratifications duly exchanged, the declaration thus annexed is a part of the treaty, and as binding and obligatory as if it were inserted in the body of the instrument. Ibid. A treaty giving certain rights of succession to realty to subjects of a foreign sovereign, is not retroactive so as to affect the succession of a person who died before the treaty. Prevost v. Greenaux, 19 How., 1. In the fulfillment of treaty stipulations a liberal spirit should be ob served. U. S. v. Auguisola, 1 Wall., 352. A treaty will be so construed as to give full operation to rights. granted by it, and when there are two constructions equally applicable to it, the most liberal will be preferred. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S., 483. The term "validity," as applied to treaties, admits of two descriptions-necessary and voluntary. By the former is meant that which results from the treaties having been made by persons authorized by, and for purposes consistent with, the Constitution. By voluntary validity, is meant that validity which a treaty, voidable by reason of violation by the other party, still continues to retain by the silent acquiescence and will of the nation. It is voluntary, because it is at the will of the nation to let it remain or to extinguish it. The principles which govern and decide the necessary validity of a treaty are of a judicial nature, while those on which its voluntary validity depends are of a political nature. Jones v. Walker, 2 Paine, 688. By a principle of international law, on a transfer of territory by one nation to another, the political relations between the inhabitants of the ceded country and the former Government are changed, and new ones arise between them and the new Government. The manner in which this is to be effected is ordinarily the subject of treaty. The contracting parties have the right to contract to transfer and receive respectively the allegiance of ali the native-born citizens; but the naturalized citizens, who owe allegiance purely statutory, are, when released therefrom, remitted to their original status. Tobin v. Walkinshaw, McAllister, 186. That construction of a treaty most favorable to its execution, as designed by the parties, will be preferred. U. S. v. Payne, 2 McCrary, 289; 8 Fed. Rep., 883. A construction of a treaty acted on by the Executive Department will be accepted by the judiciary, when relating to matters political, unless such construction be plainly inadmissible. Castro v. De Uriarte, 16 Fed. Rep., 93. Tonnage dues do not fall within a provision that goods imported in vessels of one contracting nation shall not be higher than those imported in vessels of the other contracting nation. 1 Op., 155, Breckenridge, 1806. Technical rules of construction ought not to be applied to treaties with the Indians. 2 Op., 465, Taney, 1831. In the construction of treaties, the general doctrine is that any special advantage conceded by a party under any one article is in consideration of all the advantages enjoyed by the same party under that and all other articles of the treaty. 6 Op., 148, Cushing, 1853. Articles of reciprocity, constituting mutual and correlative engagements, do not come within such expressions as "favor," or "freely if the concessions were freely made," or "if the concessions were conditional on allowing the same compensation." Ibid. A treaty to whose operation, in whole or in part, legislation is on its face a prerequisite, does not bind, so far as concerns such provisions, until the requisite legislation takes place; though, from the time it is proclaimed, it may take effect as a national compact. 6 Op., 750, Cushing. See supra, § 132. When a river is the line of arcifinious boundary between two nations, by a treaty, its natural channel so continues, notwithstanding any changes of its course by accretion or decretion of either bank; but if the course be changed abruptly into a new bed by irruption or avulsion, then the river-bed becomes the boundary. [The principle applied to the report of the commissioners for determining the boundary between the Mexican Republic and the United States.] 8 Op., 175, Cushing, 1856. Where, by a convention, it was agreed that all moneys awarded by the commissioners under that convention on account of any claim should be paid by one Government to the other, the moneys found due from the foreign Government to claimants who were citizens of the United States were properly paid to the Secretary of State, whose duty it was to have the same paid to those entitled to receive them. 10 Op., 31, Bates, 1861. The words "confirmed by law" mean confirmation by the act of that power which under our system enacts laws. A confimation by treaty is a confirmation by law, inasmuch as a treaty is to be regarded as an act of the legislature, whenever it operates without the aid of a legis lative provision. 10 Op., 507, Coffey, ad int., 1863. Treaties are subjected to the following general rules which govern all contractual engagements: (1) There must be a concurrence of minds to one and the same thing. (2) The interpretation of obscure terms in a treaty is a matter of fact, as to which extrinsic evidence may be taken for the purpose of explaining objective obscurity. (3) Construction of treaties is a matter of law, to be governed by the samé rules mutatis mutandis, as prevail in the construction of contracts and statutes. (4) As contracts may be modified and rescinded, so may treaties. tracts. (6) "Construction" is to be distinguished from "interpretation." "Construction" gives the general sense of a treaty, and is applied by rules of logic; "interpretation" gives the meaning of particular terms, to be explained by local circumstances and by the idioms the framers of the treaty had in mind. (7) If two meanings are admissible, that is to be preferred which the party proposing the clause knew at the time to be that which was held by the party accepting it. Treaties are distinguishable from contracts as follows: (1) Contracts (unless we regard marriage as a contract) are, in all cases, the subjects of a suit for debt or damages, or for a specific thing. But no such suit lies on breach of treaty. (2) Contracts can only be vacated or rescinded by consent, or by the action of a court. But this is not necessarily the case with a treaty. There is no court which can be appealed to to dissolve it, and when one party violates its terms the practice is for the other party to declare it not to be any longer binding. (3) While a contract may be annulled on the ground of fraudulent influence exercised by strength over weakness, such a reason cannot be set up for regarding a treaty as a nullity, since all nations are supposed to stand on the same footing, with equal opportunities of detecting fraud, and there are many cases of finesse and false coloring or suppression of facts which would avoid contracts, which would not, mutatis mutandis, avoid a treaty. If suppressio veri abrogated treaties to the extent it abrogates contracts, few treaties would stand. (4) A treaty based upon a war accepts the results determined by the war, unless otherwise provided, while a contract does not necessarily assume the existing relations of the parties as a basis. "The uti possidetis is the basis of every treaty of peace, unless it be otherwise agreed. Peace gives a final and perfect title to captures without condemnation, and, as it forbids all force, it destroys all hopes of recovery (of vessels) as much as if the vessel was carried infra praesidia and condemned." 1 Kent's Com., 173, citing The Legal Tender, reported in Wheat. Dig., 302; The Schooner Sophie, 6 Rob. Ad., 138, ཐ |