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§ 141.

Article 1 of treaty of 1870 with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy recognizes the right of an American citizen to change his nationality and become a citizen of Austria; but he must have had a residence in Austria of five years, and have been naturalized there, before the United States is bound to consider the person so naturalized an Austrian citizen.

14 Op., 154, Williams, 1872. See infra, § 171.

"The period for exchanging the ratifications of the commercial treaty of 1829 with Austria was extended, with the advice and consent of the Senate (February 3, 1831). The Emperor's consent was expressed in the certificate of ratification February 10, 1831. The treaty was com municated to the House of Representatives by the President on the 2d of March, 1831.

"On the 13th of February, 1850, the Senate extended the time for exchanging the ratifications of the treaty of 1848 to July 4, 1850, and the ratifications were exchanged on the 23d of that month.

"The naturalization treaty was sent to the Senate on the 12th day of December, 1870, with the correspondence relating to it. The ratifications not being exchanged within the limitations of the treaty, the time was extended three months."

Mr. J. C. B. Davis, Notes, &c.


§ 141a.

"Before the war of Independence, about one-sixth of the wheat and flour exported from the United States, and about one-fourth in value of their dried and pickled fish, and some rice, found their best markets in the Mediterranean.'

"This trade then employed about 12,000 men and 20,000 tons of shipping, and was protected by British passes.

"The war of the Revolution having abrogated this protection, Congress early took into consideration plans for substituting another in its place.

"In a sketch for a treaty which that body, on the 17th of September, 1776, agreed that their commissioners should endeavor to conclude with the French King, an article was inserted to the effect that France should protect, defend, and secure, as far as in its power, the subjects, people, and inhabitants of the United States and their vessels and effects against all attacks, assaults, violences, injuries, depredations, or plunderings, by or from the King or Emperor of Morocco, or Fez, and the states of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, and any of them, and every other prince, state, and power on the coast of Barbary, and the commission ers were instructed that this article ought to be obtained, if possible; but should be waived rather than that the treaty should be interrupted by insisting upon it.' The commissioners did not obtain such protec

tion. Instead of it, the King of France, in the treaty of 1778, agreed to employ his good offices and interposition' with those powers, 'in order to provide as fully and efficaciously as possible for the benefit, conveniency, and safety of the said United States, and each of them, their subjects, people, and inhabitants, and their vessels and effects, against all violence, insults, attacks, or depredations on the part of the said princes and states of Barbary, or their subjects.'

"The recognition of the independence of the United States by Great Britain found no steps taken in this direction, for reasons which appear in the official correspondence. Mr. Adams therefore wrote to the President of Congress on the 10th September, 1783: There are other powers with whom it is more necessary to have treaties than it ought to be; I mean Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. * * If Congress can find funds to treat with the Barbary Powers, the ministers here are the best situated. Ministers here may carry on this negotiation by letters, or may be empowered to send an agent, if necessary.'


"Congress authorized a commission to be issued to Mr. Adams, Dr. Franklin, and Mr. Jefferson, which was done on the 12th of May, 1784, empowering them, or a majority of them, to treat with Morocco, Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, as well as with the several powers of Europe.

"On the 28th of March, 1785, these commissioners addressed a joint note to Count de Vergennes, asking his advice upon the conduct of their negotiations, and requesting that the good offices of the French King should be interposed with the Emperor of Morocco, according to the tenor of the eighth article of the treaty of 1778.

"Franklin left Paris for America on the 12th of July, 1785,and Adams and Jefferson, finding themselves engaged in the negotiation of treaties with European powers, and having received authority to empower substitutes to negotiate with the Barbary States, in October of that year commissioned Thomas Barclay to negotiate with Morocco, and John Lamb to negotiate with Algiers, and they reported their proceedings to Jay, who referred them to Congress, with a recommendation that they hould be approved.

"In the spring of the next year Jefferson was induced to go to London to meet Abdrahaman, the Tripoline embassador, who expressed a desire to negotiate with the commissioners. They found that 30,000 guineas for his employers, and £3,000 for himself, was the lowest terms upon which a perpetual peace could be made,' and that Tunis would treat upon the same terms, but he would not answer for Algiers or Morocco.' These demands were so exorbitant that the negotiations were suspended.


"Barclay was, however, instructed to continue his negotiations with Morocco.

"By the 16th of July, 1786, a treaty with Morocco was nearly agreed upon. After its conclusion Count de Vergennes wrote to the French minister in the United States: You can assure the Congress that the King will seize with eagerness all occasions to facilitate their good intelligence with the Barbary Powers. The treaty which has been recently signed with this last power (Morocco) * will be the best refutation of the suspicions which many public papers are willing to inspire against our system of policy?

"On the death of the Emperor who concluded the treaty, $20,000 was appropriated by Congress to the purpose of effecting a recognition of the treaty with the new Emperor;' and instructions were

sent to secure the recognition for the $20,000, if possible; if not, for $25,000.

"The treaty was renewed, or rather recognized, by the new Emperor, who wrote to President Washington: We have received the present at his [the consul's] hands with satisfaction. Continue writing letters to us; * * we are at peace, tranquillity, and friendship with you, in the same manner as you were with our father, who is in glory.'

"In 1803 a Moorish pirate captured an American vessel, which was released by force by an American frigate; and when hostile demonstrations were threatened for this breach of the treaty, the Emperor issued an order that the American nation are still, as they were, in peace and friendship with our person, exalted of God.'

"The treaty concluded in 1787, to endure for fifty years, was, in its forty-ninth year, renewed for another fifty years, and for such further time as it should remain unaffected by notice.


"In 1865 a convention was concluded for maintaining a light-house at Cape Spartel. The correspondence respecting it will be found in the Senate documents.

"About the commencement of the year 1791 Mr. Jefferson, the Secretary of State, reported to President Washington that there were held captive as slaves in Algiers two American masters, for whose ransom 3,000 sequins each were demanded; two mates, for whom 2,000 sequins each were asked; and ten sailors, held at 750 sequins each; and he reported to Congress that the navigation into the Mediterranean had not been resumed at all since the peace; and that the sole obstacle had been the unprovoked war with Algiers, and the sole remedy must be to bring that war to an end, or to palliate its effects."

"On the 8th of May, 1792, President Washington asked the Senate whether in case a treaty should be concluded with Algiers for the ransom of the thirteen Americans for a sum not exceeding $40,000, the Senate would consent; and whether they would consent to a treaty of peace stipulating for the payment of $25,000 on the signature of the treaty, and a like sum annually? The Senate answered each question in the affirmative, and the President appointed Admiral John Paul Jones a commissioner to negotiate a treaty, with Thomas Barclay as a substitute, in case Jones should not act. Jones died before the appointment could reach him, and Barclay died soon after, without going to Morocco. Col. David Humphreys, then the minister of the United States at Lisbon, was thereupon appointed a plenipotentiary in their place. Eight hundred thousand dollars were placed at his disposal, and he was instructed that the President has under consideration the mode in which the $800,000 may be expended in the purchase of a peace; that is, how much shall be applied to the ransom, and how much to the peace.' More precise instructions followed on the 25th of August, 1794. A Swede named Skjoldebrand, brother of the Swedish consul at Algiers, interested himself in the unfortunate captives, and informed Humphreys (who remained at Lisbon) that a peace could be obtained for the United States for about the following sums (in dollars), viz: For the treasury, in money or timber of construction, fifty thousand; for the great officers and relations of the Dey, one hundred thousand; consular present, thirty thousand; redemption of slaves, from two hundred to two hundred and fifty thousand; in all, between six and seven hundred thousand; together with an annual tribute of from twenty-five to thirty


thousand, and a consular present every two years of about nine or ten thousand dollars. Humphreys sent this communication home, and received instructions that Skjoldebrand's terms are to be acceded to if better cannot be obtained. Only a few days before this instruction was written the Secretary of State had informed Colonel Humphreys of the wishes of the Government and the country on this subject: You are by this time,' he said, 'apprised of the expectation of the President, that you will continue your labors on this head, and of your title to draw for eight hundred thousand dollars, to soothe the Dey into a peace and ransom. The humanity of our countrymen has been long excited in behalf of our suffering fellow-citizens.' In March, 1795, Donaldson, the consul to Tunis and Tripoli, was associated with Humphreys, and the latter was also authorized to employ Skjoldebrand in negotiating the treaty with the Dey. Joel Barlow was added to the negotiators by Monroe and Humphreys in Europe. Donaldson arrived in Algiers on the 3d of September, and concluded the treaty on the 5th, on which day Barlow arrived, and they joined in their report to Humphreys.


Congress was informed by President Washington, in his speech at the opening of the second session of the Fourth Congress, of the probability that the treaty would be concluded, but under great, though inevitable disadvantages in the pecuniary transactions occasioned by that war.' A few days later the House called for information as to the measures taken to carry the treaty into effect, which was communicated confidentially on the 9th January, 1797. The bill making appropriations for these objects was discussed with closed doors, and was passed February 22, 1797, by 63 ayes and 19 nays. The Secretary of the Treasury estimated the whole expense of fulfilling the treaty at $992,463.25. In March, 1802, President Jefferson was able to advise Congress that the sums due to the Government of Algiers are now fully paid up.'


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"In 1808, an inquiry being made by Congress respecting the payments to Algiers, the Secretary of State reported that they were of two kinds: (1) that stipulated by treaty, viz: twelve thousand sequins, equal to twenty one thousand six hundred dollars, made annually in naval stores. (2) Those made in conformity with what is called usage at Algiers, by which it is understood we are bound. These are: (1) the present on the presentation of a consul, $20,000. (2) The biennial presents to the officers of the Government, estimated at $17,000. (3) Incidental and contingent presents, as well on the promotion of the principal officers of the Dey and regency, as for the attainment of any important object. Of these no estimate can be made.'

"The course pursued by Algiers during the last war with Great Britain induced President Madison, in February, 1815, to recommend Congress to declare war against the Dey. The committee to whom the message was referred reported that war existed and was being waged by the Dey against the United States. A naval force was despatched to Algiers, and an Algerian frigate and brig were captured en route to that place. The squadron arrived off Algiers on the 28th of June, and on the 29th opened communications with the Government. The next day the Dey proposed a treaty. The American negotiators replied by forwarding a draft for a treaty, and by declaring that the United States would never stipulate for paying tribute under any form whatever.' The Dey and his officers asked for time, but it was refused. "They even pleaded for three hours. The reply was "not a minute," and the treaty was signed and the prisoners released.'

"The papers relating to the only remaining treaty with Algiers (that of 1816) will be found in 5 F. R. F., 133 ff.

"On the 4th of November, 1796, Barlow concluded a treaty with the Bashaw of Tripoli. The price of the peace was advanced' to the United States by the Dey of Algiers. But the Bashaw did not long rest contented. In April, 1800, he told Cathcart, the American consul, to say to the President that he was pleased with the proffers of friendship,' but 'that had his protestations been accompanied with a frigate or brig of war he would be still more inclined to believe them genuine.' On the 12th of May he said to him, why do not the United States send me a voluntary present? * I am an independent prince as well as the Bashaw of Tunis, and I can hurt the commerce of any nation as much as the Tunisians.' The same month he wrote to the President, 'Our sincere friend, we could wish that these your expressions were followed by deeds, and not by empty words. If only flattering words are meant, without performance, every one will act as he finds convenient. We beg a speedy answer, without neglect of time, as a delay on your part cannot but be prejudicial to your interests."

"The answer made was a naval squadron and a war against Tripoli on land and at sea, which was terminated on the 4th of June, 1805, by a treaty signed on board of an American man-of-war in the harbor of Tripoli. Nothing was paid for the peace. Prisoners were exchanged man for man, and $60,000 were paid by the United States for the release of the number of American prisoners in the hands of the Tripolines over and above the number of Tripolines in the hands of the Americans. They were about two hundred.

"The treaty with Tunis was negotiated under the directions of Barlow in 1797. It cost one hundred and seven thousand dollars, viz: $35,000, regalia; $50,000, peace; $12,000, peace presents; $4,000, consul's presents; and $6,000 secret service. The Senate advised its ratification, on condition that the 14th article should be modified. This modification appears to have been assented to in 1799. See 2 F. R. F., 799, and 3 F. R. F., 394, for correspondence, &c., respecting other questions arising between the two powers.

"In 1824 the modified articles were agreed to in the form in which they now stand.

"In the interesting report of Jefferson to the House of Representatives concerning the Mediterranean trade, which has been already referred to, three modes of dealing with the Barbary pirates are indicated: (1) To insure vessels and cargoes and to agree upon a fixed rate of ransom for prisoners. (2) To purchase peace. (3) To conquer a peace; and he concludes: It rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce.'


"Under the policy adopted by Congress the 'total amount of real expenditures' 'exclusive of sundry expenses incurred but not yet paid' were stated by the Secretary of the Treasury, on the 30th July, 1802, at $2,046,137.22. This was before the war with Tripoli.

"The statutes under which payments were made are the following: 1791, ch. 16, 1 Stat. L., 214; 1792, ch. 24, ibid., 256; 1796, ch. 19, ibid., 460; 1797, ch. 12, ibid., 505; 1797, ch. 12, ibid., 553; 1798, ch. 18, ibid., 544; 1799, ch. 28, ibid., 723; 1800, ch. 47, 2 Stat. L., 66; 1803, ch. 19, ibid., 215; 1804, ch. 21, ibid., 269; 1805, ch. 21, ibid., 321; 1806, ch. 33,

S. Mis. 162-VOL. II— 6


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