FRANK W. BABCOCK. 24 In re Kennedy, 120 Pa. St. 497, 14 Atl. Rep. 397. recently been held in the well considered attorneys. 2. It is not essential to the sumWisconsin case already noticed, that the fact mary jurisdiction that the misconduct or dethat the misconduct occurred before another falcation should have grown out of a cause jurisdiction is no objection to the proceed-pending in the court where the rule is sought. ings to disbar. 20 Ex parte Staats21 was on 3. It is not necessary that the misconduct motion for a rule to pay over money col-complained of should be connected with any lected by voluntary payment on a bond. The action or proceeding in any court. 4. Any attorney questioned the jurisdiction on the court having jurisdiction to license attorneys ground that the money was not paid in con- to practice or to hear proceedings for his disnection with any matter in court, and also barment, bas jurisdiction to issue and enforce made affidavit that he was poor and unable the summary rule for restitution. It is not to pay the money, and offered all his prop- within the purpose of this article to notice erty, and all the restitution it seemed he was the cases in which jurisdiction has been deable to make. In rendering its opinion on nied, or the petition finally failed for such the case, the court tersely says: "The mo- manifest want of merit in the case as distion must be granted. It is plain that this gusted the court. An example of this is bond was left with Mr. E, in his character as found in a Pennsylvania case.*4 an attorney, though no specific directions Chicago, Ill. were given to bring suit. It turned out that there was no need to bring suit. The money was paid in; and the relator is entitled to our aid in obtaining it in the same manner as if collected by suit." In one of the Iowa eases, cited above, the respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that there was a dispute about the relation of attorney and client existing, and also on an attempted showing that he claimed a balance due him as fees, etc., and hence it assumed the form of a civil suit; but the court found no trouble in disposing of these objections, and sustained the jurisdiction, and enforced the summary rule.22 In another case, the Supreme Court of Iowa sustained and heartily indorsed a judgment of suspension with the right to respondent to apply for reinstatement within a given time, upon a payment by him of the money he had appropriated. The court says: "If an attorney withholds the money of his client, the court will afford relief in a summary way without driving the client to an action.''23 These are but a few examples of the many cases which this paper has attempted to epitomize. Conclusion.-From the authorities cited in the foregoing, the following conclusions are deduced: 1. General original jurisdiction in civil actions is not necessary to confer jurisdiction for summary proceedings against 20 In re O, 73 Wis. 602, 42 N. W. Rep. 221. 21 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 76. 22 State v. Morgan, 80 Iowa, 413, 45 N. W. Rep. 1070. 23 Slemmer v. Wright, 54 Iowa, 164, 6 N. W. Rep. 181. CONTRACTS PERFORMANCE DESTRUC TION OF SUBJECT-MATTER. NICAL v. FITCH. Supreme Court of Michigan, November 17, 1897. 1. Where the respective owners of three steamboats agreed to use them as a transportation line, and hired an agent to obtain freight for the line, the owners of each boat agreeing to pay an equal portion of his salary, and the agent performed his part of the agree ment, the owners of one of the boats cannot refuse to pay their stipulated share of his salary because of their boat's destruction. 2. One having agreed to obtain freight for certain parties to transport fully performs his contract when he so obtains the freight, and is not obliged to bring his action for a breach of the contract, instead of upon the common counts, simply because the parties failed to transport the goods. Hooker, J. In the spring of 1894, defendants, being the owners of a vessel named the Ohio, Capt. Galvin, representing the steamer Saginaw Valley, and Capt. Scott, representing the Ford, made arrangements to run these boats on different days, in connection with the Vermont Central Railway, as one line of boats, under the name of Ogdensburg Transportation Line, though they were owned and run by their respective owners. A contract was then made for the mutual benefit of the owners of the vessels, with Capt. Eber B. Ward, to act as agent in securing freight for these boats during the season, for which it was agreed that each should pay him one-third of his salary (which was $1,000), and of certain incidental expenses arranged for. Each owner was to have the proceeds from the freight carried by his boat. It is admitted that Capt. Ward performed the services contemplated during the season, and the owners of the other two boats paid their twothirds of his salary. The defendants paid $107, and refused to pay more, upon the ground that their vessel, the Ohio, was lost during the season, and that the $107 paid was the proportionate share of his contract that Ward had earned at the time the vessel was lost. Plaintiff is the assignee of Ward's executor, and he was allowed to recover upon a declaration containing the common counts, on the theory of a contract fully performed by Ward. Upon the other hand, it is contended that Ward did not perform his contract; that such was made impossible by the destruction of the Ohio; and that, therefore, his right of action, if he had any, was for a breach of the original contract by the defendants. The meritorious question involved is whether the loss of the Ohio terminated the contract. From a refusal to direct a verdict in their favor, the defendants have appealed. It is obvious that the case is not one where the performance of the contract was a physical impossibility, as where one agreed to sell a horse, and the horse died, or to make cider from certain apples, which were immediately destroyed by fire. It is rather the case of one refusing to receive goods bargained for, because it had become impossible, through accident, for him to make a contemplated use of the goods. It is clear that such cases are not within the rule that one is released from a contract when contingencies must be provided for in the contract if one would avoid the consequences. See Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500; Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1; The B. L. Harriman v. Emerick, 9 Wall. 175; Blight v. Page, 3 Bos. & P. 295, note; Jones v. U. S., 96 U. S. 24. This doctrine is well supported by authorities cited in the opinions of the federal cases above referred to. See, also, Ford v. Cotesworth, L. R. 4 Q. B. 132. A distinction is sought to be drawn between the cases of the class mentioned and those where the contract may be said to contemplate the continued existence of a particular person or thing which is the subject of the contract. This rule has been applied to the case of the rental of a music hall destroyed by fire, an apprentice who became ill, and could not render personal service, and a woman whose illness prevented her from performing as a pianist; but it was held not applicable to a case where one contracted to manufacture a certain iron work, and the mill was destroyed by fire. It was said: "There was no physical or natural impossibility inherited in the nature of the thing to be performed, upon which a condition that the mill shall continue can be predicated. *** True, the contract specifies the place, but it necessarily has no importance except as designating a place of delivery." Booth v. Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 490. In Taylor v. Caldwell, 113 Eng. Com. Law, 824, A agreed with B to give him the use of a music hall on specified days, for the purpose of holding concerts. The hall was burned, and both parties were held discharged. Blackburn, J., said: "The principle seems to us to be that, in contracts in which performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance, arising from the perishing of the person or thing, shall excuse the performance." And it is said in Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62: The reason given for the rule is because, from the nature of the contract, it is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the particular thing or person." That there are cases where such an inference is reasonable is obvious, as in cases of contract of marriage, and perhaps the case of the music hall; but it ought not to be said to be apparent, unless the character of the contract is such as to clearly disclose such intention, and there is danger that courts, in their desire to relieve contracting parties in hard cases, may extend it to contracts where the implication is not apparent. The Supreme Court of Missouri held it not applicable where an insurance company claimed that a contract by which an agent was employed for five years was terminated by its insolvency (Lewis v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo. 538); and this court held a school district liable for the wages of a teacher, though it was found necessary to close the school, by reason of the prevalence of smallpox. See Dewey v. School Dist., 43 Mich. 480, 5 N. W. Rep. 646, 38 Am. St. Rep. 208, and note. See, also, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 36. In the case before us the subject-matter of the contract was the procurement of freight to be transported. Ward undertook to give his time to this, and did so. On the part of the defendants a promise to pay was made. Ward performed his promise, and the defendants decline, not because they cannot pay, which is certainly a physical possibility, but because it has become inconvenient for them to transport the goods owing to the loss of their vessel. The parties had agreed that Ward was to secure all the freight for transportation by this line that he could obtain, for which he was to receive $1,000, one-third of which sum was to be paid by the defendants. They were under no obligation to Ward to transport any of it in the Ohio, or at all, for that matter. The share the Ohio would transport would depend upon circumstances not within Ward's control. Had the defendants immediately substituted another boat for the Ohio, Ward would not have been discharged from the obligation of the contract, which would have been susceptible of performance. The case is not dissimilar from one whereby the captain of the Ohio should have agreed with the owner of goods, without qualification, to transport them, both parties expecting them to be transported in the Ohio. The loss of the vessel would not relieve the owner from the contract, as the freight could as well be transported in another vessel. If the contract bound him to transport the goods in the Ohio, the rule would be different. But it did not. In fact, it did not bind him to transport them at all. Ward, as his agent, was to secure the freight, but there is nothing in the record that shows that Ward had a right to insist that it be transported by defendants. His contract was performed when he secured the freight, and defendants had no option but to pay. Ward having fully performed his contract, a declaration upon the common counts was proper. Upon the undisputed testimony, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and the court might properly have directed a verdict. It therefore becomes unnecessary to consider other questions. The judgment is affirmed. The other justices concurred. NOTE. As the principal case shows there is a clear distinction between excuse for the non-performance of a contract, performance of which may be difficult or even impossible on account of the happening of some unforseen event against which the promisor could have protected himself by stipulation, and one where from its nature it is evident that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the person or thing to which it relates. In reference to the first class the common law practically says to parties who are entering into contracts, "Don't promise what you can't perform." A man is not obliged to undertake to do a dangerous or a burdensome or an unreasonable thing, but if he does so he must carry out his agreement. Lawson on Contracts, § 420, citing Vyse v. Wakefield, 6 M. & W. 456; Hall v. Wright, El. B. & E. 765. So if he wishes to protect himself from the thing which he agrees to do turning out to be difficult or dangerous or unreasonable to do, he has full opportunity to so provide in his contract, and if he promises unconditionally he will be bound unconditionally. Dewey v. Alpena School Dist., 43 Mich. 480; Superintendent v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L. 513; McDonald v. Gardner, 56 Wis. 35; Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1; Jones v. Scott, 59 Pa. St. 178. Thus a person who sells goods agreeing to deliver them at a certain time cannot plead that, contrary to his expectations, he could not get the goods when or at the price he intended (Phillips v. Taylor, 49 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 318), nor that on account of disturbances in the country it would be dangerous to try to deliver them. Elsey v. Stamps, 10 Lea, 709. So one who agrees to do certain work cannot set up that on account of matters connected with it which he did not expect it has become difficult or will be impossible to carry it on. Devlin v. New York, 4 Duer, 337. So where a school teacher was engaged for a certain term, and the directors before the end of the term closed the school on account of small pox in the neighborhood, it was held that the fact that it was dangerous to continue the school was no answer to the teacher's suit for the remainder of his salary. Dewey v. School District, 43 Mich. 480. And where the plaintiff entered into an agreement to furnish a certain number of horses to the government, and before the time the horses were deliverable the bureau of cavalry, as it had a right to do, adopted new regulations in regard to the inspection and acceptance of horses, which the plaintiff claimed made it impossible for him to obtain horses and he abandoned his contract, this was held no justification. In re Smoot, 15 Wall. 36. Leaving out of consideration the questions arising in cases where the performance is rendered impossible through the act of God, it may be said by way of summary of the propositions heretofore stated, that if the promisor makes the performance of his promise conditional upon its continued possibility the promisee takes the risk, and in the event of per formance becoming impossible the promisee must bear the loss; but if the promisor makes his promise unconditional, he takes the risk of being held liable even though performance should become impossible by circumstances beyond his control. Lawson on Contracts, sec. 422, citing a long list of cases. Thus in School District v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530, defendant agreed to build and complete a school house for plaintiff. When nearly completed the building was struck by lightning and destroyed. The court held that the destruction of the building did not excuse defendant's non-performance of the contract. So where one had agreed to transport goods from New York to Independence, Mo., within twenty-six days, and failed to accomplish it in that time, it was held that the fact that the public canal on which the goods were intended to be transported a part of the distance was rendered impassable by an unusual freshet, and that this occasioned the detention, was not a legal excuse therefor. Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99. To the general rule, however, there are two excep. tions, first, where the performance is rendered im possible by the act of the law. Wade v. Mason, 12 Gray, 335; Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 416; Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 411; Baker v. Johnson, 42 N. Y. 126; Buffalo, etc. Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 111 N. Y. 132. Second, where from the nature of the contract it is evident that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the person or thing to which it relates. Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62; Lord v. Wheeler, 1 Gray, 282; Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514; Powell v. Railroad Co., 12 Oreg. 488; Ward v. Vance, 93 Pa. St. 499; Walker v. Tucker, 70 Ill. 527; Gould v. Minch, 70 Me. 288; Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134; Livingston v. Graves, 32 Mo. 479; Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826. CORRESPONDENCE. LIABILITY OF WAREHOUSEMEN. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal: A criticism of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, in the case of State v. Stockman, 46 Pac. Rep. 851, by Mr. D. R. N. Blackburn, in your issue of October 15th last, deserves attention. The criticism itself is preceded by a learned discussion of the criminal liability of warehousemen, and with that part of the paper I have no concern, though, to say truth, in parts of it it seems to partake more of the nature of a stump speech to the "neighboring farmers" than of an elucidation of the law of the subject. The opinion in question would not need a defense if Mr. Blackburn had printed, along with his criticism, the vital facts of the case, and the controlling parts of the opinion itself. Mr. Blackburn's contention that the transaction in question was a warehouse transaction, and the defendant was guilty of violating the terms of the warehouse act, is based upon the construction of the receipt for the wheat stored, which is as follows: "Red Crown Mills. No. 1078. Albany, Oreg., Sept. 18th, 1894. Received of E. D. Barrett, by self, 2,19815-60 bushels, No. 1 merchantable wheat, subject to sacks and storage, eight cents per bushel, if with drawn from mill. 2,198-15-60 bushels. (Signed) Red Crown Roller Mills. Lyons." Mr. Blackburn says this contract constituted the defendant a warehouseman and the bailee of the wheat. He says, "Under this receipt, who had the sole right to determine whether or not this wheat should be withdrawn from the mill? Certainly not the company. Then only the storer had this right. In other words, this receipt gave the bailor the right to elect whether or not he would sell the wheat to the company, or pay storage and sackage and withdraw it from the mill. Until he actually exercised this right, the company, under the statute and under its contract, had no interest in the wheat, except that interest which a bailee for hire always has in property in his possession." Of course, if the defendant is to be tried solely upon the facts appearing in the receipt, and if Mr. Blackburn's construction of the writing is a correct one, then he would be right. But neither of these propositions is true. This receipt does not state the terms of the bailment. Sackage and storage were to be charged, "if withdrawn from the mill." But what if not withdrawn from the mill? What was the part of this contract that was omitted from this receipt? The court answers that in this language: "Upon its face the receipt issued to Barrett affords no solution of either of these questions (whether the wheat in question was in fact placed in a warehouse, and whether it was placed there on storage), for it is silent as to whether the building was, in fact, a warehouse, and as to whether the wheat was received on storage or for some other purpose, and, therefore, resort could be had to parol evidence to ascertain the true character of the business in which the mill company was engaged, as well as the terms on which the wheat was received," citing Lyon v. Lenon, 106 Ind. 567, 7 N. E. Rep. 311. The court further said: "Parol evidence was given and offered tending to show, and from which the jury could have found, that the mill company did not receive grain for storage or safe keeping, but that according to its usual course of business, known to its customers, and particularly to Barrett, all wheat received by it was mixed with, and became a part of, the consumable stock of the mill, and was manufactured into flour and other mill prod ucts, and sold and disposed of by the mill company in the usual course of business, and that it satisfied its obligation to its depositors by paying them the market price when demanded, or by returning a like quan. tity and quality of other wheat. In the former case no storage was charged or paid, but in the latter the charge of eight cents a bushel was made for sacks and storage, and this accounts for the provision in the receipt to Barrett concerning the payment of storage, if the wheat should be withdrawn from the mill." The authorities show that such a transaction is a sale and not a bailment. Lyon v. Lenon, 106 Ind. 567; McCabe v. McKinstry, 5 Dill. 509; Fed. Cas. No. 8667; Andrews v. Richmond, 34 Hun, 20; Johnston v. Brown, 37 Iowa, 200; Nelson v. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455. Under the terms of such a contract the mill company had a right to manufacture the wheat into flour and sell it. That was the business it conducted. It did not keep a warehouse for storing wheat, but operated a mill to make flour. Everybody knew this. It had been notorious for years, and in this case it was proven that there had never been a single instance where storage had been received by the mill company for wheat deposited there. wheat and paid for it. And the court, in its opinion, It always bought the says: "The depositee cannot be convicted of a crime for doing that which he is permitted to do by the very terms of his contract." And the court further says: "The evil sought to be remedied by this legislation, and the remedy sought to be applied, alike show it never was within the legislative mind that it should apply to the case where a bailee has the right, under the contract, expressed or implied, to sell or use the Portland, Oregon. SUITS BY POOR PERSONS. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal: In your issue of December 3d, of the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL, No. 23, Vol. 45, at page 441, I observe your excerpt from the ruling of Judge Grosscup, in the United States Circuit Court in Chicago, to the effect that when "poor persons" claim the benefit of being such to avoid giving security for costs, that counsel for such person, filing an affidavit to that effect, must enter into a stipulation that the recovery shall be paid into court, the costs to be first paid therefrom, then the attorney's fee, as determined by the court, and the balance to go to the plaintiff. I fail to see wherein this affords any protection to the defendant in the matter of costs. The rule was made upon an application by a defendant to require the plaintiff to give bond for costs. If the plaintiff recover, costs follow the judgment in actions at law and would be collected, together with the judgment, from the defendant. The only parties benefited might possibly be the officials, but their costs are small, compared to the expenses and disbursements of a defendant in such litigation, and as the learned judge says that four out of five of such cases brought are without merit, it will be seen where great injustice is done to four out of five defendants. In other words, a defendant does not need protection when a recovery is had against him; it is only when the defendant recovers that security for costs will be of any use, and in such cases there would be no fund to pay into court by the plaintiff, hence the defendant is still remediless. In these days of contingent fees, and the consequent multiplicity of litigation by indigent persons against responsible people, it is meet that some restraint should be placed upon such persons, or at least some protection afforded to defendants. I sug. gest, for the consideration of my brethren, that where an indigent person has, or fancies he has, a cause of action, and wishes to bring suit, that he be required (in order to avoid giving security for costs), to apply to the court for leave to sue, making his indigency appear; that if he satisfies the judge that he has a cause of action, that leave to sue be granted, and that in case of his failure to recover, costs be taxed against the county. This would equalize the burden and would afford some measure of protection. If, as Judge Grosscup holds "such a plaintiff is a ward of the court and should be protected if there be merit in the case," then, as costs are not recoverable against the ward, they should be against the municipality which affords the machinery for such ward to cause expense to others. An act embodying these suggestions was introduced into the legislature of Wisconsin in 1893, at my suggestion, but was defeated in the committee room. I think the subject is worthy of agitation, and I know meets the approval of many lawyers, manufacturers and those engaged in industrial pursuits. I see no reason why it should not be favored by the laboring classes as well. Couple with this, the right The city court of New York, in general term, has decided that a party who is induced to sign a promis. sory note by fraud or deception practiced upon him by the payee, and signs it, thinking that it is a different kind of contract, is not liable thereon to an inno cent indorsee for value before maturity, unless the maker was guilty of laches or carelessness in omitting to ascertain the true nature of the instrument. Hutkoff v. Moje, 46 N. Y. Supl. 905 (July 2, 1897). See 36 Am. L. Reg. & Rev. (N. S.) 724. This is not a new rule in New York. Bank v. Veneman, 43 Hun, 241 (1887). But one who has all the means of informa tion at hand, and chooses to rely upon the representa. tions of another as to the nature of the paper which the former is signing, is estopped by his negligence from setting up the fraud in obtaining the note as against a bona fide purchaser for value before maturity. Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137 (1874). There is rather a hopeless conflict of authorities regarding the liability of persons whose names appear on negotiable instruments, through fraud, when the paper is in the hands of bona fide holders. An attempt at reconciliation would be useless. There are many cases where persons have been induced by fraudulent representations to sign negotiable paper, intending and believing that they were signing some other form of contract. There is authority for the proposition, that in the absence of negligence on the part of such persons, they are not liable, even though the paper come into the hands of a bona fide puchaser for value before maturity. Taylor v. Atchison, 54 Ill. 196 (1870); Puffer v. Smith, 57 Ill. 527 (1871); Anderson v. Walter, 34 Mich. 113 (1876); Bank v. Lierman, 5 Neb. 247 (1876); Griffiths v. Kellogg, 39 Wis. 290 (1876); Green v. Wilkie, 66 N. W. Rep. 1046 (Iowa, 1896). And this would seem to be because there was no contract originally, inasmuch as the person so sign. ing had no intention of signing such a paper. Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194 (1871). But it is necessary for the maker to show freedom from negligence. Bank v. Steffes, 54 Iowa, 214 (1880). However, if the fraud be made possible by the negligence or carelessness of the maker, he is liable to a bona fide holder. Garrard v. Haddan, 67 Pa. 82 (1870); Douglass v. Matting, 29 Iowa, 498 (1870). In any case, however, the bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument, fraudulent in its inception, can recover from the maker only so much as the former paid for it. Beckhous v. Bank, 22 W. N. C. (Pa.) 53 (1888); Oppenheimer v. F. & M. Bank, 36 S. W. Rep. (Tenn.) 705 (1896). On the other hand, it has been decided that it is no defense to an action by a bona fide holder against the maker of a note that the latter was induced to sign it by fraud. Broadbent v. Huddleson, 2 W. N. C. (Pa.) 293 (1876); Bank v. McCann, 11 Id. 480 (1882); Highsmith v. Martin, 24 S. E. Rep. (Ga.) 865 (1896). Nor can such a note be invalidated in the hands of a bona fide holder unless actual fraud can be shown on his part. Matthews v. Poythress, 4 Ga. 287 (1848); Worcester Bank v. Dorchester Bank, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 488 (1853); Crosly v. Grant, 36 N. H. 273 (1858); Bank v. Hoge, 7 Bosw. (N. Y. Superior Ct.) 543 (1861); Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 247 (1866); Hamilton v. Vought, 34 N. J. L. 187 (1870); Bank v. Hewitt, 34 Atl. Rep. (N. J.) 988 (1896). But the holder of such a note has the burden of proving his good faith. Hardware Co. v. Bank, 109 Pa. 240 (1885); Hale v. Shamon, 57 Hun (N. Y.), 466 (1890); Jones v. Burden, 56 Mo. App. 199 (1893); Campbell v. Huff, 31 S. W. Rep. (Mo.) 603 (1895); Hodson v. Glass Co., 40 N. E. Rep. (Ill.) 971 (1895); Fawcett v. Powell, 43 Neb. 437 (1895); Thamling v. Duffy, 37 Pac. Rep. (Mont.) 363 (1895).-American Law Register and Review. A LAWYER IN HIS OWN CASE. If the lawyer who represents himself has, according to the proverb, a fool for a client, the converse is equally true, and the client is every whit as unfortu nate in the selection of his counsel. This truth finds illustration in the recent North Dakota case of Root v. Rose, 72 N. W. Rep. 1022. An attorney, who had been punished for contempt and then disbarred for other sufficient cause, conceived the idea of an action for damages. His blood was up, and he was not a person of half-way measures. So he bearded the court and all its satellites, by bringing his action against the judge who convicted, the State's attorney who prosecuted, the clerk who entered up the judgments, and the sheriff who arrested him. But he employed himself as counsel. Fatal mistake! Let the supreme court of the State describe the character of the complaint that he drew. "The complaint in this cause presents, upon a superficial reading of it, a strange medley of conspiracy, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, slander, and other unlawful invasions of the plaint iff's rights. Distinct causes of action succeed each other in rapid succession, each making its separate claim for heavy damages for the wrong it essays to charge against the parties to this alleged conspiracy, the defendants in this case. If the sufficiency of the pleading is to be tested by the number and character of the adjectives employed by the pleader, if a marsh alling of a formidable array of intense epithets can obscure or change the character of the facts which are spread upon the face of the complaints, or alter the legal rules which apply to such facts, then, indeed, has the plaintiff stated a cause of action enti tling him, if sustained by evidence, to the recovery of very heavy damages. A dark and foul conspiracy has been formed and executed by the defendants, having for its object the malicious prosecution of the plaint. iff, his unlawful arrest, his incarceration in a noisome prison, the defamation of his character, and the wresting from him of the privilege of following the profes sion of the law for a livelihood by accomplishing his disbarment. So runs the complaint in its theory. But when we read its admitted facts in the light of legal principles hoary with time, and of universal recognition we can find nowhere within its four corners any charge of an actionable wrong." ." In other words it was pyrotechnics, but it wasn't pleading!— Virginia Law Journal. HUMORS OF THE LAW. The Court (sternly): "Make that man remove his hat!" Miss Flip (indignantly): "I'm no man." The Court (sotto voce): "Then I'm no judge!" |