veyance. It appears from the report that the Act under which the Caledonian Railway was originally formed contained no clause empowering the Company to stop the workings of mines if they chose. North Eastern Railway Company v. Elliott (a) was a case the circumstances in which were peculiar. It is, however, in favour of the defendant, so far as regards the working of the mines within twelve yards of the reservoir; and Wood V. C. did not dispute the soundness of the decision in Dudley Canal Navigation Company v. Grazebrook (b), which he thought, having regard to the different language of the respective Acts involved there and in the case before him, was distinguishable. Wyrley Canal Company v. Bradley (c) is another authority directly in point to shew that the plaintiffs, not having pursued the course pointed out by the statute to prevent the defendant from working the mines, have now no cause of action against him. Manisty, in reply. The Act under consideration in Wyrley Canal Company v. Bradley (c), as the reporter points out in note (a) to p. 371 of the report, did not contain a proviso restraining the mine owner from doing injury to the navigation in working the mines. At the same page Dauncey, arguendo, mentions a case of Birmingham Canal Company v. Hawkesford, tried before Lawrence J., in which that Company, whose Act did contain such a proviso, obtained a verdict. MARTIN B. We are all of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench must be affirmed. Mr. (a) Before Wood V. C., 1 John. & Hem. 145. Affirmed on appeal, by Lord Campbell, L. C., 2 De G. F. & J. 423. (b) 1 B. & Ad. 59. (c) 7 East, 368. 1860. STOURBRIDGE V. Earl of DUDLEY. 1860. STOURBRIDGE V. Earl of DUDLEY. ment. Manisty in the first instance made three points. As to the first, he admitted that Dudley Canal Navigation Company v. Grazebrook (a) was a direct authority against the plaintiffs, and undistinguishable from the present case; and that, unless we now overruled that decision, we must give judgment against them. The second point, that no sufficient notice of intention to work the mines was given to the plaintiffs, he abandoned without arguThe third point, as to the plaintiffs' right of support for so much of their works as are constructed on land allotted to them under the Inclosure Act, failed on the facts; for it was not found that these works had not increased the weight on the strata of land below the surface. We come back then to the first point. And as to this, speaking for myself, I am of opinion that Dudley Canal Navigation Company v. Grazebrook (a) was rightly decided; and, had I now to consider the point for the first time, I should decide it in the same way. It seems to me that when, as in that case and in the present, there is a clause in an Act of Parliament empowering a mine owner to give notice to a Company, which has purchased the surface soil, of his intention to work the mines below; empowering the Company thereupon to have the mines inspected, and, if they choose, to prohibit the working and compensate the owner for the prohibition; and empowering the owner, in the absence of such inspection, prohibition and compensation by the Company, to act upon his notice and work the mines: the Company have no ground of complaint or cause of action against the mine owner, if he, on their failure to comply with the Act, proceeds to work the mines in the ordinary and usual mode, and in so doing occasions an injury to the Company's property. As to the plain(a) 1 B. & Ad. 59. tiffs' contention, founded on the subsequent proviso in the Act before us, that the mine owner, in working the mines, is to do no injury to the navigation; I think that Sir Fitzroy Kelly has given the true answer to it, in saying that the proviso is to be read and construed as subordinate to the main clauses of the Act. The case of North Eastern Railway Company v. Elliott (a) has been cited for the plaintiffs in support of the position that they are at all events entitled to maintain their action for the injury arising to their works from the working of the defendant's mines at a greater distance than twelve yards from the reservoir. The present case, however, does not distinguish between the effect of the workings within and beyond that distance. No damage is shewn to have been occasioned, otherwise than by the working of the mines within the twelve yards' distance. And with regard to damage thus caused, North Eastern Railway Company v. Elliott (a) appears to be in conformity with our view: so that it is unnecessary to consider whether we concur with that decision, so far as it bears upon the question of damage sustained by the plaintiffs from workings beyond the distance of twelve yards. WILLES J. and CHANNELL B. concurred. BYLES J. I am of the same opinion. I found my judgment entirely upon the case of Dudley Canal Navigation Company v. Grazebrook (b), which was decided thirty years ago and has been considered good law ever since. KEATING J. and WILDE B. concurred. Judgment affirmed. (a) Before Wood V. C., 1 John. & Hem. 145. Affirmed on appeal, by Lord Campbell, L. C., 2 De G. F. & J. 423. (b) 1 B. & Ad. 59. 1860. STOURBRIdge Company V. Earl of DUDLEY. 1860. Wednesday, Stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36. s. 1. requires HEWER against Cox. CASE stated under an interpleader order. On 17th September, 1860, the sheriffs of London a description seized, under a writ of fi. fa., at the suit of the defen of the resi dence and occupation of the person making a bill of sale of per sonal chattels to be filed with every such bill of sale; in order to the validity of the bill of sale as against creditors of ness in copart- in the city of filed with the bill stated dant Cox, in an action by him against one William Godson, certain goods and chattels which, on 10th February, 1859, before the delivery of the writ to the sheriffs, had been assigned by the said William Godson and one John Hogben, the owners of the said goods and chattels, by bill of sale to the plaintiff Hewer. On 18th February, 1859, a copy of the bill of sale, and also an affidavit, made under stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36., were filed under the provisions of that Act. At the time of the execution of the bill of sale, and of the filing of the copy thereof, and of the swearing and filing of the affidavit, the said John Hogben resided at 2, Holly Cottages, Wellington Place, Stoke Newington, in the county of Middlesex, and the said William Godson resided at Palsgrave Place, Temple Bar, in the county of Middlesex ; and both carried on business in copartnership as printers, in New Street, Blackfriars, in the city of Lon don, and not elsewhere, but did not sleep there. In the that they were Held that the description was sufficient, and the bill of sale valid: for that no creditor of G. & H. could have been misled as to their identity with the persons described, had the description merely specified New Street, Blackfriars, as their place of residence; and that the erroneous addition, "in the county of Middlesex," instead of "in the city of London," was only falsa demonstratio. Held, further, that New Street, Blackfriars, was the residence of G. & H. within the meaning of the statute. said bill of sale and copy thereof, and also in the affidavit, the said William Godson and John Hogben were described as residing at New Street, Blackfriars, in the county of Middlesex, and as printers and copartners. There is no such place as New Street, Blackfriars, in the county of Middlesex, unless the aforesaid New Street, Blackfriars, in the city of London, can be so considered. On the seizure of the said goods and chattels by the sheriffs, the plaintiff Hewer claimed them as his property, by virtue of the said bill of sale. An interpleader summons was thereupon taken out by the sher fs; upon which Wilde B., the vacation Judge, made an order by consent, that this case should be stated, in which Hewer, as claimant, should be plaintiff, and Cox, as execution creditor, defendant. The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether, under the above circumstances, the said bill of sale was duly registered within the intent and meaning of stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36. Horace Lloyd, for the plaintiff. The question is, whether the description of the residence of the assignors under the bill of sale, filed with the copy of the bill, was sufficient to satisfy stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36. s. 1., which requires "a description of the residence and occupation of the person making or giving the" bill of sale, to be filed together with the bill itself, or a copy of it, and an affidavit of the time at which it was made or given. The description is amply sufficient. In the first place, a man's place of business may be given as that of his residence, although he sleeps elsewhere; Blackwell v. England (a); where it was held that an attorney's (a) 8 E. & B. 541. VOL. III. 2 F E. & E. 1860. IIEWER V. Cox. |